Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎68v] (140/312)

The tone adopted by the Russian press on the subject of the con
tinued occupation of the Chinese province of Kuldja is curiously illus
trative of Russian policy in Asia. It will be remembered that in 1871,
after Yakoob Khan's successful campaign against the Dungans, the
Russians, fearing lest the ruler of Kashgar should continue his advance
to Kuldja, occupied that city and the surrounding district, at the same
time giving the Chinese Government a solemn pledge that they would
surrender it as soon as a sufficient Chinese force had been brought
to restore order. The Chinese part of this engagement has now been
fulfilled. The army of Tso Tsung-tang, fresh from its victories over the
forces of Yakoob Khan, is now waiting at the frontier for the order to march
in and take possession. But the Russians show a decided disinclination to
move, and the Russian press loudly opposes the promised restoration. " If
Kuldja were to be surrendered to China," says the St. Petersburg Journal,
" Russian rule in the Eastern part of Central Asia would be undermined.
.... The surrender of Kuldja to China would be another triumph to
England, and the Manchus would hold their heads still higher. In fine,
Russian influence in Central Asia would be shaken." And therefore the
deliberate promise given seven years ago should be broken and another pro
vince snatched by fraud from an ally. Fortunately, the Chinese Government
appears to appreciate the position, and has despatched a large additional
force in advance of the envoy, Chung How, who is to negotiate with the
intruders. It is further reported that Chung How will be instructed to
remonstrate vigorously against the continued encroachments of Russia in
Manchuria. For some years he has held the post of Governor of
Moukden, the capital; and it was probably on account of his personal
knowledge of this part of the impending question between the two countries
that he was appointed envoy. By this time the Chinese Government must
have learned to recognize the truth of the saying of Yakoob Khan, that
" the Russians ar e a restless an d crooked-minded people."
aw^mstant
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—The news from Peshawur which appeared
in 'J he Times of the 23d inst., telling us that the
Ameer of Cabul had refused to receive the pro
posed Mission on its way to his capital, and had
forced Major Cavagnari to turn back from Ali
Musjid, is no doubt a serious rebuff to the Govern
ment of India, more particularly as the Mission had
actually started. It seems to me to have been a
serious mistake organizing a Mission to Cabul
before wa had ascertained whether Ameer Shere
Ali was prepared to receive our overtures or not,
and a still greater mistake despatching the Mission
until we had received his consent to our doing so-
Had these precautions been observed, the affront
which we have met with would not have appeared
to be so flagrant as it now does. But, however
vexatious is the Ameer's conduct in this matter, it
ought not to lead us to force our Mission on him,
still less should it induce us to declare war against
him. It appears to me to be contrary to sound
policy that we should resent our disappointment by
force of arms ; for by doing so we play the enemy's
game, and force the Afghans into a union with the
Russians.
We ought not, indeed, to be surprised that the
Ameer has acted as he has done. From the time
of the Treaty of 1857 the late Ameer Dost Mahomed
Kban refused to allow us to have a Mission at
Cabul, or even to send one there as a temporary
arrangement, solemnly assuring us that such a step
would lead to mischief, and not to peaceful relations
with the Afghans. We accepted his excuses. In
1869 the present Ameer affirmed the same policy.
Whatever may be his own faults and shortcomings,
he has never concealed from us his views on this
subject. What occurred at the meeting in
Peshawur towards the end of 1876 between the
Ameer's agent and Sir Lewis Pelly has not actually
transpired, but I believe that our wishes on the
subject of a Mission to Cabul were at that time
reiterated, though in vain.
The old policy was to bear with the Afghans as
far as we could reasonably do so, and to endeavour
by kindness and conciliation to bring about friendly
relations, gradually leading them to see that their
interests and ours did not conflict. Of late, how
ever, we have seemed to think that we understood
the interests of the Afghans better than they did
themselves. We appear to think that we can, in
short, force our policy on them without their taking
offence at such conduct.
What are we to gain by going to war with the
Ameer ? Can we dethrone him without turning
the mass of his countrymen against us ? Can we
follow the policy of 1838-39 without, in all pro
bability, incurring similar results ? If we succeed
in driving Shere Ali out of Cabul, who can we put
in his place ? And how are we to insure the main
tenance of our own creature on the throne, except
by occupying the country ? And when is such an
occupation to terminate ?
I have no doubt that we can clear the defiles and
valleys of Afghanistan from end to end of their de
fenders, and that no force of Afghans could stand
against our troops when properly brought to bear
against them. The country, however, consists of
mountain ranges, for the most part broken up into
rugged and difficult plateaux, where brave men
standing on the defensive have considerable ad
vantages ; and when we force such positions we
cannot continue to hold them.
The cost of invading such a country will prove
very great, and the means for so doing must be
drawn from elsewhere. The country held by the
Ameer can afford neither the money nor the trans
port, nor even the subsistence in adequate quantity
for the support of the invading army. It is impos
sible to foresee the end of such a war, and in the
meantime its prosecution would utterly ruin the
finances of India.
Such are the political and military considerations
i which lead me to raise my voice against the present
i policy towards Ameer Shere Ali. Are not moral
considerations also \ ery strong against such a war ?
Have not the Afghans a right to resist our forcing
a Mission on them, bearing in mind to what such
Missions often lead, and what Burns's Mission
in 1836 did actually bring upon them ?
I have heard it contended that no nation has a
right to isolate itself in this way and refuse to
have intercourse with its neighbours. This may be
a reasonable objection among civilized nations, but
ought not to apply, I submit, between civilized
Governments on the one hand and barbarous
peoples on the other.
No doubt. Ameer Shere Ali has aggravated his
offence by the mode in which he has resisted our
overtures, more particularly in the threat of. his
Mir Akhor at Ali Musjid to shoot Major Cavaghari
if he did not turn back. But we should not bear
too hardly on the Ameer on this account. I have
no doubt that if we promise to give up forcing a
Mission on him he would make any apology that
we could reasonably call for. I urge that we were
wrong in the outset in our policy towards the Ameer
in many instances which could be pointed out, and
therefore ought not to be over hard on him in ac
cepting his excuses. I insist that there will be no
real dishonour to us in coming to terms with him ;
whereas, by pressing on him our own policy, we
may incur most serious difficulties, and even
disasters.
The last telegrams from India are that three con
siderable bodies of troops are to be concentrated,
one atQuetta, one atThall, on the River Koorum,
and the third in reserve at Mooltan, as what are
called " precautionary measures." I should call
them very offensive measures. The same impulses
which have brought us into the present complica
tions and troubles will almost certainly lead us to
still more decisive movements unless very speedily
checked by the people of England.
Yours faithfully,
LAWRENCE.
Stone-house, St. Peter 's, Isle of Thanefc, Sept. 27.
LONDON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1878.
We print this morning a letter from Lord
L awrence on the subject of our relations with
Afghanistan. No reasonable man would wish
to make up his mind on a question of such
moment without hearing all that can be said
on it by men who have a right to speak.
Lord L awrence's vast Indian experience and his
acknowledged weight of character unquestionably
give him such a right. The fact that his judgment
is given against the policy of Lord L ytton in rela
tion to Afghanistan is a very important one, and it
is entitled to full weight even when it is dis
sociated from the reasons on which it is ostensibly