Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎69v] (142/312)

of India. If again yve are forced into a
war on behalf of India, it is probable that
Parliament will feel, now as then, that India's
interest is England's too, and that we have
no right to shrink from a necessary war be
cause India is too poor to bear the expense.
It is well to keep out of war if we can, and if we
fight, to fight only i n a just and honourable cause ;
but if we once let it go forth to the world that we
shrink from a necessary war because India is too
poor and England too niggardly or too indifferent
to pay for it, we shall soon find that such ill-timed
economy is ruinous as well as disgraceful.
TURKEY AND AFGHANISTAN
VIENNA, O ct. 1.
According to a telegram from Constantinople inS
the Politische Correspondenz, Mussafir Khara, sup- ^
posed to be a secret agent of . the Ameer of B
Afghanistan, has been there since the middle of
this month. His mission is said to be primarily to
prevail upon the Sultan to use his infinence in '
order to dissuade England from using any coercive®
means against Afghanistan ; but at the same time
his efforts are directed towards persuading thej |i
Sultan himself that a Russia alliance at thisl, ^
moment is the best thing for all Mahomedan ;
nations, and that the Ameer is resolved to make
common cause with the Muscovite. The telegram
adds it is a well-known fact that some months ago ||
the Ameer sent a letter in this sense to Sul- ||
tan Abdul Hamid. His Majesty, on his side, it is g
stated, a few weeks ago despatched a secret agent «
to Central Asia with orders to visit Cabul and the m
capitals of the other Central Asiatic States, in order
to awaken there a feeling of solidarity among all ||
Mahomedans and to bring about a Pan-Islam itic £
league. The mission from Constantinople referred
to is probably that of Hulussi Effendi, a Ulema,
who was sent some two years ago, and to whom, at W
any rate in Constantinople, it is alleged to be due
that the conflict between England and Afghanistan, ;
already then ripe, did not at once break out. And
this opinion may not be altogether without some
foundation ; for, however much the political autho-
rity of the Sultan in Europe may have been ||
lowered, bis prestige all over the Mahomedan
world has been but little impaired. In proof of this, 'X
consider the large sums of money sent him by the
Mussulmans of India during the war, accompanied ;||
by letters showing clearly how agitation had been •
produced in India by events passing on the 3-'
Danube and at Constantinople, an agitation which ||
would have assumed far larger proportions had -
not efforts been made in Stamboul, out of J
consideration for England, to calm instead of
nourishing it. AH this, therefore, as well as the C
mission from Afghanistan now in Constantinople, ■
is, at any rate, calculated to draw attention to the
fact that, in spite of distance, affairs on the
borders of India and on the shores of the
Bosphorus have more connexion than might at first
Bight seem, and that the policy followed in the one
quarter will undoubtedly react on the other.
CENTRAL ASIA.
BERLIN, O ct. 1.
It appears that the Chinese Government have
«nce more, and this time more urgently, demanded
the restoration by Russia of the Kuldja territory.
This extensive region was occupied by the
Russians during the Mahomedan Tatar rebellion,
which led to the expulsion of the Chinese
authorities fr om
" CjUU-"
THE AFGHAN DIFFICULTY.
The Central News Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. says it is informed th&t the
obi icfc of Sir Neville Chamberlain's recall to Simla is
that he may be at hand to ad vis? with Lord Lytton on |
certain pressing questions in connection with the Afghan ]
crisis.
General Crawford Chamberlain has expressed his j
-willins-ness to accept; the chief command of the Afghan j
Expedition.
WEDNESDAY EVENING,
OCTOBER 2.
LORD LAWRENCE'S LETTER.
It is very much to be regretted that Lord L aw
rence should have written the letter which appears
in the Times this morning. He was a fairly suc
cessful, although not a popular, Governor-General;
and as administrator of the Punjaub he conferred
inestimable benefits on India. His opinion on
subjects connected with India, therefore, carries
considerable weight, and it is possible that
some impression may be produced by the very
decided manner in which he expresses bis con
victions. There is nothing mysterious, however, in
the questions of which he treats. The main facts lie
on the surface, and in order to judge them it
is not necessary to have a special training, or t ) be
initiated into curious secrets. And we venture
to say that of those Englishmen who read the letter
and estimate it according to the principles of
ordinary good sense, the vast majority will be .
amazed either at its heedlessness or at its want of
candour. For Lord L awrence , in dealing with a
large problem, instead of carefully weighing every
circumstance bearing upon it, omits from considera
tion the only governing factor in the question.
His contention is that in our whole recent policy
towards Afghanistan we have been wrong. ...We
ought-thiakar to M-ve despatched 'a- Missioa.
to Cabul; and now that we have sent it, and it has
been ignominiously turned back, we ought not to
resent the insult by war. The ground of these |
judgments is that Afghanistan has a perfect right, j
if she chooses, to shut herself up from intercourse '
with foreign nations. Lord L awrence appears to !
be of opinion that a civilised State would |
not have the same right, but a barbarous |
people may, he decides, tell its neighbours |
that they shall not intrude upon it, and,
may deride and humiliate them if they attempt to
make friendly advances. The practical conclusion
is that we should in some way or other patch up our ;
quarrel with the' A meer . How we are to do it
Lord L awrence does not tell us; but the principles j
on which we are to rely are solely those of " kind- 1
ness and conciliation."
It is not too much to say that this reasoning has
simply no bearing on the matter in hand. So far as
Afghanistan alone is concerned, England has no
sort of wish to interfere with her. In any case,
we should, of course, like to find new
mai-kets for our trade; but if Afghanistan
were merely a barbarous State, with no other State
behind her of which we had reason to be jealous,
there is not a single English politician who would
dream of forcing her to enter into relations with us.
The one important fact in the case is that Afghanis
tan is not a country in this position. Be
hind her is, the only Government in the
world whose designs at the present moment can
be of the slightest danger to us. Russia loudly pro
tests her innocence j never, if we believe her news
papers, was there a na-tion more unfairly judged.
And Lord L awrence is still so much in love with
the policy of " masterly inactivity " that he appears
to receive her assurances with touching confi
dence. The rest of the world are less credulous.
Not only in England but all over the Continent ii>
is universally believed that Russia is altogether re
sponsible for these Afghan troubles. In defiance of
the most solemn pledges she has lung been intriguing
at Cabul, and the result proves that she has acquired
absolute predominance over the mind of the A meer.
How was it possible, under these circumstances,
that the Government of India should sit still, and
with sublime calmness watch the progress of the
plot against it? It was bound to let the A meer
know precisely how matters stood, and .to take the
precautions suggested by common prudence. The !
policy of " kindness and conciliation " was all very
well so long as he was really isolated ; we were not
anxious for his friendship while he was not abso
lutely hostile and did not play into the hands of our
i rival. But the instant he took a side against
us, and consented to become, if possible, an agent
for the destruction of our rule in the East
the whole aspect of the question changed. The
very principles which induced us to adopt the policy
of masterly inactivity " forced us to enter upon a
course of energetic action. Any one who does not
see this, and who clings obstinately to a mere for-