Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎81v] (166/312)

S ultan , therefore, to abandon the English alliance.
Of course this candid opinion may be nothing
more than an independent judgment on public
affairs expressed by an enlightened Sovereign
who stands equally aloof from both Powers j
and weighs them in an impartial balance. But the |
opinion having been expressed, it became necessary j
for the Indian Government to show that half of it [
it least was unfounded. When matters have
reached this state of tension between two neigh
bours, there is no alternative but prompt reconci-
liation or open quarrel. Lord L yxton proffered the
>ne ; S heke A li has chosen the other. We cannot
ioubt what the issue of the quarrel will be, and we
vill still hope that it may be comp osed without
i serious collision. But though there is little room
for alternative as to our immediate course of
action, the question still remains as to the terms
on which we are to live with Afghanistan in the
future.
Clearly, in the first place, we must demand an
ample apology from S heke A li for the affront
offered to our Envoy. So far there is no difference
of opinion. Whether it will be prudent for this
purpose to do more than mass troops on the frontier,
and, if possible, at once to occupy portions of the
A meer's territory, is a military question which
will soon be decided. Meanwhile, if a winter's reflec
tions do n^t bring him to his senses, we shall be
able to act decisively in the spring. If reparation
is offered or exacted, we can hardly refrain, as Lord
L awrence urges that we should, from demand
ing the admission of an accredited Envoy at
the A meer's Court. Lord L ytton , it is true,
refrained from such a demand in 1876 for reasons
which doubtless were then sufficient. But a good
deal has happened in the meanwhile. We have seen
how difficult it is to maintain friendly relations
with a Sovereign who isolates himself and
cherishes his animosity in silence without giving
us a chance of allaying it. The demand to be al
lowed to ssnd an Envoy cannot be called an unrea
sonable one on the part of a Power which has such
interepts at stake as England has in Afghanistan.
For want of an Envoy those interests have
been grievously imperilled, even if they have not
for the moment been wrecked. The native Vakeels
have either done nothing or have wrought mischief,
and, as we cannot afford to be indifferent to what
goes on in Afghanistan, we have a right to be re
presented by an agent whom we can trust. If,
therefore, the Government decides that it is neces
sary for us to be represented for the future by a
mission at Cabul, the best reparation that S here
A li could make for his recent insolence
would be to welcome such a mission with such
marks of respect as would indicate to his own
subjects and to all India regret, or, at all
events, reparation, for his previous insult. By
that means it would be possible for us to show
him that our purposes are really what we
have always professed them to be. We wish for
his friendship, but we have no desire to extin
guish his independence. We know what a
country Afghanistan is, and we know what a
dangerous possession it would be likely to prove to
any Power that was forced to undertake its con
quest. We print elsewhere an account of the
forbidding characteristics of some of its border
tribes, and there is no reason to suppose that the
tribes of the interior would prove to be more easy
to deal with either as neighbours or as subjects.
An Indian proverb says there is no recovery either
from the bite of a cobra or the hatred of an
Afghan, and an old border man many years ago
summed up the characteristics of his countrypeople
to E lphinstone by saying, " We are content with
" discord, we are content with alarms, we are con-
" tent with blood, but we will never be content
" with a master." We must hope that S heke
A li's animosity has not yet reached the point of
incurable hatred, for we certainly have no desire
to teach intractable Afghans the lesson of submis
sion to new rulers.
AFGHANISTAN.
Recent news from India confirms previous
announcements that Lord Lytton's Government are
at present contenting themselves with massing
troops on the immediate frontier, and that no active
operations will be undertaken, at any rate in the
nfiighbourhood of Cabul and Ghuzni, until the
spring, unless, indeed, the conduct of the Ameer
should make it imperatively necessary to push
through the passes before winter sets in. To many
delay appears dangerous ; an example, it is argued,
should be made, and that quickly ; but it
should be borne in mind that extended operations
in the East have never been, and can never be, un
dertaken in a hurried, dashing manner. Havelock's
slow, though sure, advance on Lucknow drew down
upon him the indignant remonstrances of many
even in his own command. Lord Clyde's subse
quent operations were irreverently styled the
" Hackery Campaign but both these Generals
accomplished their work the more thoroughly
because they provided for every contingency, and
prevented the possibility of a mistake. So, in
the same way Sir Paul JHaines is preparing; for
every eventuality, feeling that the least difficult
task the expeditionary aimy has before it is the
defeat of the Ameer's forces. Many of Shere Ali's
subjects hold high rank in the Army, Police, and
Civil Service of Bengal, so that there is no lack of
sources of information as to these troops. The ob
servations we have published from the records of
the Russian Military Department on the military
strength, geography, and the population of Afghan
istan show that the Russian Government have not
been slow in collecting statistics, but there is little
doubt that more detailed reports still are in the
possession of the Indian authorities.
A slight sketch of our dealings with the various
tribes who inhabit the mountain ranges between
the Punjab and Afghanistan may be of some in
terest, as it demonstrates what an important
element they constitute in the preparation of any
scheme for the invasion of Cabul. All, or nearly
all, of them nominally own allegiance to the Ameer,
and his emissaries and officials have free inter
course with them. None have ever recognized our
authority in any way, and, with the exception of
the Belooch tribes on the southern portion of the
border, not one of them has ever willingly ad
mitted an Englishman into their territory. Our
knowledge of their country has been obtained by
survey parties attached to the numerous expeditions
wo have waged against them, or from the notes of
officers who, without Government sanction, have
from time to time succeeded in penetrating through
the first fringe of mountains on our frontier. The
jealqus reserve they maintain with regard to us is
the less explicable when it is remembered that they
are permitted to pass freely to and fro between our
territory and theirs ; allowed to trade freely in our
bazaars, to enlist into our regiments ; and that
many of them hold responsible positions with and
draw, large emoluments from the Indian Govern
ment. It may safely be asserted that there is not
a Punjab regiment in the service that has not on
its rolls at least one native officer from the trans
frontier tribes. They are to be found in Madras,
Hyderabad, and Bombay ; and yet with all these
inducements to remain on friendly terms, and to
cultivate the closest relationship with us, we are on
no better footing with these men than we were in
the first days of the annexation of the Punjab.
It is true that their raids are less frequent, and
that, consequently, British ( expeditions into
their territory are more rare than they were
m the early days of the occupation of the
trans-Indus provinces ; but that is simply
because ; they know that raids in force are
promptly avenged, and feel they are not strong
enough to resist a British expeditionary army.
The great difficulty in dealing with the
Pathan tribes on the Punjab frontier is that they
own allegiance to no man. Each tribe is split up
into many sections ; these again are subdivided into
so many clans. Between these there are blood feuds
of long standing, so that often not only is village
divided against village, but house against house.
There'was one man, indeed, who possessed a great
deiil of influence in the northern portion of the
transrfrontier mountains—the Akhoond of Swat—
whose peculiar career we traced on the 22d of
January last ; but he has passed away, and his
power has not descended to any other person. With
the Belooch tribes, who dwell opposite the southern
portion of the Derajat and Scmde, a different
system prevails. Tbey own implicit obedience to
their chiefs, and, consequently, it is far easier to
deal with them. For this reason, the administration
of Scinde has been less hampered by troublous
warfare than that of the Punjab.
Between the Mahabun Mountain, north of
Peshawur, and the Bozdar Hills, south-west of
iDera Ismail Khan, the ranges immediately con
tiguous to our frontier aie inhabited by 15 different
Pathan tribes, of whom no less than 13 have felt
the force of our arms, and against these 13 up
wards of thirty separate expeditions have been un
dertaken. West of these tribes are others of whom
we know comparatively little, and against whom
we have but small cause of complaint. South of
the Bo/.dars the Belooch element may be said to