Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎84r] (171/312)

the south of the Aral Sea to the Chinese fron
tier in Khokand. This coincides with the second
step of advance. Further annexation being con
sidered necessary, another line was begun, this
time from the south of the Caspian Sea, which,
running east along the frontier of Afghanistan,
is to end at the Chinese frontier, where it
adjoins Cashmere. This will coincide with the
third step of advance indicated above. Roughly
therefore, but not inaccurately, the three succes
sive rectifications of the Russian frontier in Asia
1 may be said to start in the west from the north,
1 centre, and south of the Caspian Sea respectively,
and to end all of them in the east at corresponding
points on the frontier of the Chinese Empire.
In brief recapitulation it may be pointed out
that two methods of looking at the advance of
Russia may be employed—the first as a succes
sion of waves from north to south; the second
as a series of military lines frota west to east.
Either of these methods taken alone must of
necessity be inadequate to represent the advance,
but taken conjointly they indicate both the
direction and method with sufficient accuracy.
Each of these extensions of boundary re
present, of course, the subjugation of many in
dependent chief ships. As picturesque episodes
in one of the most remarkable campaigns ever
undertaken, these conquests possess individually
a striking interest for both the military student
and the general reader. But, collectively, they
form a chapter of Asiatic history fraught with
momentous consequences to England, and there
fore with facts of the utmost importance to
every Englishman. Prominent in the story
stands out the facility with which pretexts for
advance and annexation have been found, and,
though it is quite true that in the history of the !
British in India the same facility is equally
apparent the two courses of aggressive advance
cannot be considered analogous. In India we 1
always enlarged our boundaries in self-defence, ■
and not with any ulterior object outside of India
set in the future before us. But in Central Asia
Russia has never possessed anything to defend,
and every advance has been a pure aggres
sion, apparency though not really, uncon
nected with any distinct, far-seeing policy
and irrespective of previous annexations. One
" natural boundary" after another has been ac
cepted as definitive, but each has iu turn been
transgressed as larger prospects of conquest
opened out. And from this haphazard, impul
sive appearance it has been argued that Russia
has no Asiatic policy ; that she takes whatever
comes next, and moves only as opportunity
happens to suggest. Northwards she can
not move ; eastward lies China, too strong
for attack; westward all is Russia already ;
so southward, if anywhere, she must expand.
This argument, given the necessity of expan
sion, is certainly complete, but then no such ne
cessity has ever existed. It is not with Russia
in the Khanates as it was with England in
India. She has no magnificent trade to defend,
no established administration to support. Nor,
in the Khanates, can she ever have. Her occu
pation of the provinces which she has overrun is
purely a military occupation, and from
such a poor country she can never hope
even to pay her expenses, much less realise
revenue. Such is the latest word of Russian
authorities themselves. Taking Turkestan alone, [
the most promising of all her Asiatic possessions, |
the income for the five years ending with 1872
amounted to ten and a half millions of roubles,
the expenditure to nearly thirty millions, and
the average annual deficit, therefore, to nineteen
millions. Miserable as is this financial condi-
1 tion, it becomes even worse when it is considered
I how large a proportion of such "income"as there i
| is is paid by the Russians in Turkestan themselves,;
and how little by the country ; and when we add i
to the current expenditure all the preliminaiy |
expenses of military outfits and so forth, made in
and paid by Russia. We need not go into fur-
I ther details. It suffices to prove the unproduc
tiveness of her Asiatic conquests that, be
sides the large initial expenditure upon her
armies, she has to make up annually a large de
ficit. It cannot, therefore, be for their wealth
that Russia has absorbed one after the other the
inoffensive chiefships that intervened between
Siberia and India. Why, then, does she con
tinue to advance ? We have seen that it is not
from necessity within nor from pecuniary ad
vantages to be gained without, and those who
say that she does so for no settled reason, having
no "policy," must confess that for so impove
rished a Monarch as the Cza^ of all the Russias,
the taste for conquest is a very extravagant one.
On the other hand, there is a large party who
maintain that Russia does possess an Asiatic
policy, and that in all her madness there is a
great deal of method. In support of their view
they adduce historical facts, among them the
following. When England was engaged in war
with Napoleon I,, the Czar Paul suggested to the
Emperor an invasion of India viA the Caspian
; Sea and Persia. But Napoleon was then think
ing of invading England viA Boulogne and the
Channel, and showed no enthusiasm in the Rus
sian project, so the Czar Paul, being an enter
prising and irrepressible Monarch, determined to
invade India by himself. An army of Don
Cossacks began to assemble at Orenberg; General
Orlof was appointed to the command ; and the
Czar, in his address to his soldiers, informed them
that " all the wealth of India will be your reward
in this expedition." But six weeks before the
day fixed on for the start of the army the Czar
Paul died, and the expedition, though discussed
on a larger scale at Tilsit, was abandoned by
his successor. Forty years passed, and England
was at war with Russia, and again the
Czar Nicholas took the subject of the inva
sion of India via Persia into consideration.
General Duhamel, so Mr. Schuyler, in his
work on Turkestan, informs us, actually drew
up a plan of operations; but affairs in the
, Crimea proved too pressing for the development
| of the project. Once more, in the year that
j has just passed, it seemed at one time as if the
| strained relations between England and Russia
| would result in an open rupture, and simulta
neously the news came from India that the offi
cials who have charge of our Eastern Empire
were cognisant of rumours of restlessness be
yond the frontiers. In the native bazaars the
gossip went round that trouble was impending
in Cabul, and in well-informed circles it was
known that movements of troops, now amicably
designated as "military reconnaissances," to
wards the districts nearest the Afghan, and there
fore the Indian, frontier were in progress,
and that the potentates on our borders
were being taken into the confidences of Russian
Generals. Such are three facts of history. We
might quote many more to show that, turn the
compass as they might, the needle of Russian
hopes has always pointed to India. We might
recapitulate once more the broken pledges of
successive Ministers of the Czar that they
would never think of Cabul with more posses
sive aspirations than does the dog of the moon
it bays. We might heap up from the experi
ences of the reigns of the two last Ameers of
Cabul instances of Russian intrigue on the
Indian frontier, some of them so notorious that
Dost Mahomed, the late ruler, and Shere Ali,
the present, pleaded them in justification of ap
peals for British protection. But we are not
indicting Russia. Our purpose is only to note
the successive stages of her advance, and to
glance at the two theories which are entertained
with regard to them. The one denies Russia
any Asiatic policy, any object or aspiration in
her costly and dangerous enterprises The
other believes such madness in expenditure and
risk to be impossible, and affirms that, coupled
with a similarly costly domination in Trans
caucasia, which entails an annual deficit, the con
quest of the Khanates is only a means towards an
end, and that end India. How far common
sense supports the one theory, or history the
other, we leave-our readers to ju^ge. But, in!
judging, facts only should be considered, and
not the speeches of Czars; for Livadian pro
mises will go down to posterity bracketed with
Punic faith,
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v Sa|OCI 'qiTiap -a qSuojqi 'a;TVS JOj Xjo^tsodoa oitoq^tJO
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sjapjoq no ssauisnq ^xmoo paqsuiq'Bjsa-pio uy "IVSOcT
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pnB pooSMoaoqx—•snuaj no p«q aq puf) •apuj} qs«3 Xu;
Pub Btutqaj aiUTrj •|Eunuou ■jtiajj "asBfci 3noi •sasjmajd
aAlsuajxa qsoK 'XNTTJ SSfENISnff S.TISTA
•qiaqure^ 'ptjoj-aSpf-ia JaisajmisaAV
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Xanoui-XpBaa ip 'mnuntj .iad OOS'SJF snjina^j 'pua-isa^
'nonisod possradjnsun SSHNISna STOHS P™ XOO
the south of the Aral Sea to the Chinese fron-1
tier in Khokand. This coincides with the second
step of advance. Further annexation being con
sidered necessary, another line was begun, this
time from the south of the Caspian Sea, which,
running east along the frontier of Afghanistan,
is to end at the Chinese frontier, where it
adjoins Cashmere. This will coincide with the
third step of advance indicated above. Roughly
therefore, but not inaccurately, the three succes
sive rectifications of the Russian frontier in Asia
may be said to start in the west from the north,
; centre, and south of the Caspian Sea respectively,
and to end all of them in the east at corresponding
points on the frontier of the Chinese Empire.
In brief recapitulation it may be pointed out
that two methods of looking at the advance of
Russia may be employed—the first as a succes
sion of waves from north to south; the second
as a series of military lines frota west to east.
Either of these methods taken alone must of
necessity be inadequate to represent the advance,
but taken conjointly they indicate both the
direction and method with sufficient accuracy.
Each of these extensions of boundary re
present, of course, the subjugation of many in
dependent chiefsbips. As picturesque episodes
in one of the most remarkable campaigns ever
undertaken, these conquests possess individually
a striking interest for both the military student
and the general reader. But, collectively, they
form a chapter of Asiatic history fraught with
momentous consequences to England, and there
fore with facts of the utmost importance to
every Englishman. Prominent in the story
stands out the facility with which pretexts for
advance and annexation have been found, and,
though it is quite true that in the history of the
British in India the same facility is equally
apparent the two courses of aggressive advance |
cannot be considered analogous. In India we
always enlarged our boundaries in self-defence,
and not with any ulterior object outside of India
set in the future before us. But in Central Asia
Russia has never possessed anything to defend,
and every advance has been a pure aggres
sion, apparency though not really, uncon
nected with any distinct, far-seeing policy
and irrespective of previous annexations. One
" natural boundary" after another has been ac
cepted as definitive, but each has in turn been
transgressed as larger prospects of conquest
opened out. And from this haphazard, impul
sive appearance it has been argued that Russia
has no Asiatic policy ; that she takes whatever
comes next, and moves only as opportunity
happens to suggest. Northwards she can
not move ; eastward lies China, too strong
for attack; westward all is Russia already ;
so southward, if anywhere, she must expand.
This argument, given the necessity of expan
sion, is certainly complete, but then no such ne
cessity has ever existed. It is not with Russia
in the Khanates as it was with England in
India. She has no magnificent trade to defend,
no established administration to support. Nor,
i in the Khanates, can she ever have. Her occu-
| pation of the provinces which she has overrun is
purely a military occupation, and from
such a poor country she can never hope
even to pay her expenses, much less realise ;
revenue. Such is the latest word of Russian
authorities themselves. Taking Turkestan alone,
the most promising of all her Asiatic possessions,
the income for the five years ending with 1872
amounted to ten and a half millions of roubles,
the expenditure to nearly thirty millions, and
the average annual deficit, therefore, to nineteen
millions. Miserable as is this financial condi
tion, it becomes even worse when it is considered
how large a proportion of such "income"as there
is is paid by the Russians in Turkestan themselves,
and how little by the country ; and when we add
to the current expenditure all the preliminary
expenses of military outfits and so forth, made in j
and paid by Russia. We need not go into fur
ther details. It suffices to prove the unproduc
tiveness of her Asiatic conquests that, be
sides the large initial expenditure upon her
armies, she has to make up annually a large de
ficit. It cannot, therefore, be for their wealth
that Russia has absorbed one after the other the
inoffensive chiefships that intervened between {
Siberia and India. Why, then, does she con-1
tinue to advance ? We have seen that it is not
from necessity within nor from pecuniary ad
vantages to be gained without, and those who
say that she does so for no settled reason, having
no "policy," must confess that for so impove
rished a Monarch as the Czar of all the Russias,
the taste for conquest is a very extravagant one.
On the other hand, there is a large party who
maintain that Russia does possess an Asiatic
policy, and that in all her madness there is a
great deal of method. In support of their view
they adduce historical facts, among them the
following. When England was engaged in war
with Napoleon I., the Czar Paul suggested to the
Emperor an invasion of India vid the Caspian
; Sea and Persia. But Napoleon was then think
ing of invading England vid Boulogne and the
Channel, and showed no enthusiasm in the Rus
sian project, so the Czar Paul, being an enter
prising and irrepressible Monarch, determined to
invade India by himself. An army of Don
Cossacks began to assemble at Orenberg; General
Orlof was appointed to the command ; and the
Czar, in his address to his soldiers, informed them
that " all the wealth of India will be your reward
in this expedition." But six weeks before the
day fixed on for the start of the army the Czar
Paul died, and the expedition, though discussed
on a larger scale at Tilsit, was abandoned by
his successor. Forty years passed, and England
was at war with Russia., and again the
j Czar Nicholas took the subject of the inva
sion of India vid Persia into consideration.
General Duhamel, so Mr. Schuyler, in his
| work on Turkestan, informs us, actually drew
up a plan of operations; but affairs in the
Crimea proved too pressing for the development
of the project. Once more, in the year that
has just passed, it seemed at one time as if the
strained relations between England and Russia
would result in an open rupture, and simulta
neously the news came from India that the offi
cials who have charge of our Eastern Empire
were cognisant of rumours of restlessness be
yond the frontiers. In the native bazaars the
gossip went round that trouble was impending
in Cabul, and in well-informed circles it was
known that movements of troops, now amicably
designated as "military reconnaissances," to
wards the districts nearest the Afghan, and there
fore the Indian, frontier were in progress,
: and that the potentates on our borders
were being taken into the confidences of Russian
Generals. Such are three facts of history. We
might quote many more to show that, turn the
compass as they might, the needle of Russian
hopes has always pointed to India. We might
recapitulate once more the broken pledges of
successive Ministers of the Czar that they
would never think of Cabul with more posses
sive aspirations than does the dog of the moon
it bays. We might heap up from the experi
ences of the reigns of the two last Ameers of
Cabul instances of Russian intrigue on the
i Indian frontier, some of them so notorious that
1 Dost Mahomed, the late ruler, and Shere Ali,
j the present, pleaded them in justification of ap-
: peals for British protection. But we are not
| indicting Russia. Our purpose is only to note
the successive stages of her advance, and to
glance at the two theories which are entertained j
with regard to them. The one denies Russia
any Asiatic policy, any object or aspiration in
her costly and dangerous enterprises The
other believes such madness in expenditure and
risk to be impossible, and affirms that, coupled
with a similarly costly domination in Trans
caucasia, which entails an annual deficit, the con
quest of the Khanatesisonly a means towards an
end, and that end India. How far common
sense supports the one theory, or history the
other, we leave-our readers to judge. But, in
judging, facts only should be considered, and
not the speeches of Czars; for Livadian pro
mises will go down to posterity bracketed with
Punic faith.
India has often been conquered from without,
and—except that once when the Queen of the
Seas used her own highways—always from Af
ghanistan. It will never be conquered from
without again. But within itself British India
must for many generations to come contain all
the material for and elements of terrific strife.
They may be modified in time, but as yet—
and the best friends of India a^e those 1 who
first confess it—we have great need of peace
within our boundaries, and the leisure for an
undivided attention to our own liberal schemes
for the enrichment and civilisation of the
peoples we are going to make a great nation.
And to ensure this peace we must have no
taunting savages at our gates, no incendiary
ambassadors throwing firebrands over the walls
of our domains. An ill-intentioned neighbour,
whether he is so of his own motion or at the in
stigation of others, cannot be permitted to im
pede us in our task, and any one who incites him
to misdemeanours proves himself an enemy. Our
diplomatic correspondence with Persia and Cabul
' abounds in expressions of our anxiety at the in
terference of Russia with either, and with admis
sions from both that such anxiety is well founded.
Nor have we, in our naive way, been backward
in apprising Russia directly of "the apprehen
sion we entertain from her approach to our In
dian frontiers, and she in reply has always assured
us of her determination never to awaken appre
hension. But her face .has been set south
throughout her career of conquest, and to-day
she is actually engaged in warfare with the
very last tribe that intervenes between her
and Merv. At Merv her armies would
be encamped within two marches of both
the Persian and Afghan frontiers, and within
ten of Herat, and the prospect is one for
very serious consideration, for the same absence
of policy that has brought her across fifteen
degrees of latitude towards India may some day
bring her a hundred miles further in the same
direction, and England will then have to settle
with Russia^ once and for all time, the Asiatic
1 question of the peace of India.