Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎86r] (175/312)

In explanation of the meeting of the Cabinet to-morrow, and in excuse
of no Council having been held earlier, it is now said that only a few
days ago it was still hoped that the crisis might be averted, and that
"our relations with Afghanistan were about to be put on a better
footing by the Ameer's consent to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain at
Cabul." It is added that those hopes have now been disappointed. No
attention need be paid to such official exploitations as this. The reasons
why no Council was called till now are clear enough. Some we explained
yesterday: as for the rest, there has been the usual difficulty in
the Government about coming to conclusions, and the unfortunate com
plexity of political with military considerations has aggravated the
vacillations and disagreements of a Ministry which has never
ceased to vacillate and disagree. If one day it seems desirable to
treat the whole matter as a mere frontier row, next day the diffi
culties of so treating it come uppermost. At one time the seductions
of securing themselves against possible electioneering consequences at
home, by refusing to regard an Afghan war as an Imperial matter
and so putting off the cost of the war upon India, operate on the
minds of certain Ministers, if not on all; but it soon appears
that the public will not allow them to saddle India with these expenses,
and that disorders their views a little. Now the dread is paramount that an
instant attack on the Ameer at this season of the year, and with present
preparations, might possibly lead to check, or even to some small but humi
liating " disaster 3" and then everything is to be decided by the Viceroy's
military advisers. And so it is resolved (for there can be no doubt that
for a time at least the resolution was taken) to await the possibility of
a favourable outcome of events, meanwhile adopting an attitude of
aimed expectation. But no sooner is this done than the probable
political consequences of such a course are presented to view, and the
Government have to consider how foolish they will look if they admit
that they allowed the matter to drag on till the Ameer could defy
us with any amount of accompanying outrage—leaving the Viceroy ol
India for six months (as one of their critics put it) in the absurd position
of holding forth one hand for an apology, while the other is applied
to the bruises inflicted on his honour. And so the days have dragged
on; no man being able to guess with any degree of surety at what
the Government proposed to do, and the Government itself being
scarcely better informed. But of course this state of things could not
last for ever—especially with a Viceroy out in India by no means
content with it, and very much wanting to know whether the Home
Government had any mind on the subject, and what that mind hap
pened to be. At last a Ministerial Council is called; and it is to be
hoped that by the time to-morrow's meeting is over something like
order and precision of judgment will have settled over the Cabinet. But
the chances are that more meetings than one will be held before that
happens.
The Times, referring to the meeting of the Cabinet Council to-morrow,
says that if it is not mistaken, the Indian Government has already
decided on the measures to be immediately pursued, and is now
engaged in carrying them out. But a question of greater moment
awaits the decision of the Cabinet at home. Whatever the issue of
the present misunderstanding, whether Shere Ali makes amends at once
for his insolence, or whether he awaits the chastisement that will certainly
overtake him, it is clear that our future relations with Afghanistan must
placed on a new footing. If Shere Ali will be friends with us, it is well,
and we wish for nothing better. But we can permit no more doubt on the
subject. We cannot submit to constant anxiety because he is unfriendly to
us whenever he has the chance, while he receives the emissaries of a rival
Power. It now rests with the Cabinet to decide whether our former for
bearance should cease, and whether inactivity, masterly or mischievous,
should give place to a more decided policy. Before we blame Lord Lytton,
or the Cabinet under whose instructions he has acted, for an alleged change
in our policy towards Afghanistan, we must be quite sure that the course of
events had left an alternative open to them. What we know is that the
Indian Government was so ill served by its native agents Non-British agents affiliated with the British Government. at Cabul that it was
forced to endeavour to establish more satisfactory relations. It was clearly
not Lord Lytton's fault that the Peshawur conference proved abortive.
He offered all that Shere Ali had asked for in 1869 and i8 73» an d he asked
for little in return; but the Afghan envoy professed to have no powers to
conclude a treaty, and would not even assent to the reasonable demand
that British officers should be stationed on points of the Afghan frontier
exposed to Russia. In point of fact it is clear that Shere Ali has long
hesitated between England and Russia. If we blame any one for this
besides ourselves, for pursuing a policy always hesitating and at times ill-
considered and short-sighted, it is Russia we must blame rather than Shere
Ali himself.