Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎89v] (182/312)

deal with them before we attempt to advance. As
these tribes are connected with the A meer by very
loose ties of allegiance, and in some cases do not
even admit his theoretical suzerainty, it by no
means follows that war with S here A li means
also war with all the border tribes. By a mixture
of silver and lead we could not only secure the
neutrality of these tribes but induce them to side
heartily with us. But even if incorruptible hosti
lity is to be feared, surely we are prepared to
subdue it by force of arms* In our incur
sions into the hills hitherto our object
has been to destroy the villages and crops,
and, bringing the mountaineers to bay, kill as
many of them as possible. Such would not be
our object in the event of an invasion of Afghan
istan. We should only seek to force and guard a.
passage through the hills. We should not under
take the arduous task of hunting down the hill
men, but only that of keeping them at bay when
they sought to interfere with our communications.
The zone of operations would be of necessity
narrow, and consequently few men and simple
arrangements would suffice. Jt^rom the British
entrance of the Khyber Pass "to Jellalabad th<
distance is only seventy-five miles, and 5,000 meu;'
skilfully disposed in echelons would be ample to
protect our communications; 5,000 more wouldmore
than suffice to protect the remaining 105 milet
from Jellalabad up to Cabul. Indeed, we believe
that we have exaggerated considerably the num.-,
ber of etappen troops needed, and that with a,
moderate expenditure and very little diplomatio
skill, 5,000 men would adequately protect the entire
length of our communications from the mouth oi
the Khyber to Cabul. As to the active force,
10,000 men could easily defeat any attempt to bar
j their progress by the Khyber to the capital. Of
! course a large quantity of supplies and transport
| would be indispensable; but it is under-?
■ stood that our stores on the frontier have
been for some time past filled in view of thf
present emergency. The fertile and populouc,
valley of Peshawur ought to be able to furnish
much both of stores and transport, and as a
secondary base there is Jhelam, the present
northern terminus of the railway. There all th^
resources of men and food of India can hi
rapidly concentrated and sent on to the frontier,
which is but 170 miles distant. This is the drj
season, and transport through the Punjaub if
attended with no difficulty. The railway certainly
during the rains suffered some damage ; but nont
that a few weeks will not suffice to remedy. Foi-
some distance beyond Jhelam the country is quite
flat ; and the process of continuing the
railway, which has been going on for %
considerable time, is now being pushed forward
with vigour. Within a very short time, therefore!
it will be possible to remove the terminus somf:
twenty miles at least on the road to Eawul Pindeei
The streams that have to be crossed between^
Jhelam and Peshawur are quite insignificant
during the dry season—that is, at present, an<^
even the passage of the Indus during this time of
the year presents no difficulty.
As to the troops needed they could, had camels
and elephants been available in sufficient numbers^
have been collected at Peshawur within throe;
weeks from the date of the issue of aij
j order to that effect. They could marclt
from Jhelam to Peshawur without exertioib
in a fortnight, and at Jhelam there could have;
been disembarked from the train at least 2,00(5'
men a day. But Jhelam and the country north oil
it could unaided supply, without difficulty, 10,00f
men. We are told, however, that the columns
assembled at Peshawur is only to make ^
demonstration, and that the real advance is to b<p
made via Kandahar. If that is the case, the,
question of the occupation of Cabul before winter
is disposed of at once, for only through the KhybeJL
can that operation be performed. But what is th<t
Khyber force to demonstrate against, and what
effect would the demonstration have ? The
A meer is a shrewd soldier, and knowi;
that the force holding the Khyber would
have plenty of time to reach, say, Ghuzni
in time to anticipate the Bolan force, if it moved, a^
soon as a start was made ftora Quettah. We
should simply threaten nothing by massing a force;
at the mouth of the Khyber, and the A meei,
Bin t •pepiOA'B tljuil UA*bLi r "u *- >; ' '
13 mSnoui t avon pitioqit^s mo no ^mocl v v
sq; i uoqav •noS. m araq* inq q
1 ubo sdrauo ,/ooanoq aq^ ao „ si io °
s-eq jopioq; oift sv ^mpjooo'b spa-mdn sx roai} „
i eoudqqj, noi ji jfrbp- ofy q qt tio^ j]
I t is not generally known, we believe, that
India in times of peace has the services of well-
nigh as many fighting soldiers of the British
Army as we possess at home for the defence of
this country. A force of between sixty-two and
sixty-three thousand men is necessary, it seems,
to maintain our sway in the Ea^t at the best of
times, consequently considerable reinforcements
of British troops will be called for in the event of
our being involved in war with the Afghans.
Either, therefore, we must withdraw soldiers
from the British establishment, or increase our
standing army by fresh enlistments, or by once
more calling out the Reserves. Nominally we
have nearly 100,000 men in the ranks at home, but
then the whole body of racruits for feeding
the Indian and Colonial armies, as well as
the home force, make up a large proportion of this
total. There are, besides, non-efficients and time-
expired men, who again reduce the number of
actual fighting men in the country; so that in
reality there is not much difference between the
strength of th® British and Indian armies. We
usually maintain an artillery force twelve thou
sand strong in India, for among our native
troops a few batteries only are to be found,
armed with mountain guns. In fact, we only
make use of native artillery at stations where,
for sanitary reasons, we cannot well employ
Europeans, since it ha§ been found the wisest
course to keep so formidable an arm almost
exclusively in the hands of British soldiers.
Fifteen batteries of horse artillery and forty-
three of field artillery are to be found in India
at this moment, together with more than a score
of batteries and garrison artillery. This
large artillery force is supplemented by
fifty battalions of the line, mustering
something like 46,000 bayonets, which share with
native infantry regiments the duty of garrison
ing the many Indian stations, and act as a
leaven upon our vast native army. Of Eoyal En
gineers there are but a few hundreds scattered
over our Indian dominions, for in road-
making and field-work the native sapper is
all that is required. Of British cavalry we
always maintain a strong foice in India. At this
moment there are nearly 4,500 sabres, or nine regi
ments, stationed in the East, notwithstanding the
fact that our native troops are very strong
in this particular arm. In a word, India calls for
the assistance of twice as many British troops as
are to be found in all our colonies put together.
GIiOBE, OCTOHUli 5.
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN-
ADVANCE OF BK1TISH TROOPS.
(EETJTEE 's TEIiEOBAM.)
Simla, October 4.
It is generally reported that a British force is
advancing from Peshawur in the dirtcfi n of Jam^
rood, with the view of making an attack on Ali
Musjid.
The Ameer of Afghanistan is massing troops at
Ali Musjid and C ndahar, and threatens Quetta.
Strong h stility exists between the Khyberie
tribes and the Ameer.
War material is being collected at Kohat.
THE INDIAN FRONTIER.
A committee, und r the presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. of Colonel Palliser,
<D B., has been drawing up in India an elaborate report
on the subject of the defences of the hill s ation, of
■Kussowlie, which place it is proposed to render, if
possible, impregnab •, as part of a scheme now before
the Government ctf India for providing a number of
fortified posis along the fiontier line.
deal with them before we attempt to advance. As
these tribes are connected with the A meer by very
loose ties of allegiance, and in some cases do not
even admit his theoretical suzerainty, it by no
means follows that war with S here A t.t means
also war with all the border tribes. By a mixture
of silver and lead we could not only secure the
neutrality of these tribes but induce them to side
heartily with us. But even if incorruptible hosti
lity is to be feared, surely we are prepared to
subdue it by force of arms. In our incur-
sione into the hills hitherto our object
has been to destroy the villages aud crops,
and, bringing the mountaineers to bay, kill as
many of them as possible. Such would not be
our object in the event of an invasion of Afghan
istan. We should only seek to force and guard a.
passage through the hills. We should not under
take the arduous task of hunting down the hill
men, but only that of keeping them at bay when
they Bought to interfere with our communications. I
The zone of operations would be of necessity I
narrow, and consequently few men and simple !
arrangements would suffice, l^rom the Britislfi,
entrance of the Khyber Pass "to Jellalabad thf
distance is only seventy-five miles, and 5,000 mes;'
skilfully disposed in echelons would be ample to
protect our communications; 5,000 more wouldmore
than suffice to protect the remaining 105 milet,
from Jellalabad up to Cabul. Indeed, we believe
that we have exaggerated considerably the num
ber of etappen troops needed, and that with a,
moderate expenditure and very little diplomatio
skill, 5,000 men would adequately protect the entire
length of our communications from the mouth of
the Khyber to Cabul. As to the active force,
10,000 men could easily defeat any attempt to bar
their progress by the Khyber to the capital. Of
course a large quantity of supplies and transport
would be indispensable; but it is under-*
■ stood that our stores on the frontier have
been for some time past filled in view of the
present emergency. The fertile and populouf,
valley of Peshawur ought to be able to furnish
much both of stores and transport, and as a
secondary base there is Jhelam, the present-
northern terminus of the railway. There all th^
resources of men and food of India can bt,
rapidly concentrated and sent on to the frontier,
which is but 170 miles distant. This is the drj
season, and transport through the Punjaub if
attended with no difficulty. The railway certainly
during the rains suffered some damage; but nont
that a few weeks will not suffice to remedy. Foi-
some distance beyond Jhelam the country is quite
flat ; and the process of continuing the
railway, which has been going on for %
considerable time, is now being pushed forward
with vigour. Within a very short time, therefore!
it will be possible to remove the terminus somf
twenty miles at least on the road to Eawul Pindeei
The streams that have to be crossed between,
Jhelam and Peshawur are quite insignificant
during the dry season—that is, at present, andj
even the passage of the Indus during this time of
the year presents no difficulty.
As to the troops needed they could, had camels
and elephants been available in sufficient numbers^
have been collected at Peshawur within thre^
weeks from the date of the issue of aii
; order to that effect. They could marclc"
from Jhelam to Peshawur without exertiofii
in a fortnight, and at Jhelam there could have,
been disembarked from the train at least 2,006'
men a day. But Jhelam and the country north of
it could unaided supply, without difficulty, lO.OOCj
men. We are told, however, that the columit
assembled at Peshawur is only to make
demonstration, and that the real advance is to bcC
made via Kandahar. If that is the case, tht,
question of the occupation of Cabul before winte^
is disposed of at once, for only through the Khybe^
can that operation be performed. But what is the
Khyber force to demonstrate against, and what
effect would the demonstration have ? The
A meer is a shrewd soldier, and knowi;
that the force holding the Khyber woulcf
! have plenty of time to reach, say, Ghuznl
in time to anticipate the Bolan force, if it moved, a(,
soon as a start was made from Quettah. We
should simply threaten nothing by massing a force
at the mouth of the Khyber, and the A meei,
would soon discover from the state of our transport
whether there was any real intention of advancing
or cot. As to the hill tribes, the presence of l
field army near Peshawur would only have th»
effect of irritating them, and perhaps producing ^
general conflagation along the borders. If we
intend thoroughly to subdue them before com
mencing the invasion of Afghanistan, the struggle
with the A meer will be Referred for an indefinite
period.
I t is not generally known, we believe, that
India in times of peace has the services of well-
nigh as many fighting soldiers of the British
Army as we possess at home for the defence of
this country. A force of between sixty-two and
sixty-three thousand men is necessary, it seems,
to maintain our sway in the EaSt at the best of
times, consequently considerable reinforcements
of British troops will be called for in the event of
our being involved in war with the Afghans.
Either, therefore, we must withdraw soldiers
from the British establishment, or increase our
standing army by fresh enlistments, or by once
more calling out the Eeserves. Nominally we
have nearly 100,000 men in the ranks at home, but
then the whole body of recruits for feeding
the Indian and Colonial armies, as well as
the home force, make up a large proportion of this
total. There are, besides, non-efficients and time-
expired men, who again reduce the number of
actual fighting men in the country; so that in
reality there is not much difference between the
strength of th« British and Indian armies. We
usually maintain an artillery force twelve thou
sand strong in India, for among our native
troops a few batteries only are to be found,
armed with mountain guns. In fact, we only
make use of native artillery at stations where,
for sanitary reasons, wc cannot well employ
Europeans, since it ha^ been found the wisest
course to keep so formidable an arm almost
exclusively in the hands of British soldiers.
Fifteen batteries of horse artillery and forty-
three of field artillery are to be found in India
at this moment, together with more than a score
of batteries and garrison artillery. This
large artillery force is supplemented by
fifty battalions of the line, mustering
something like 46,000 bayonets, which share with
native infantry regiments the duty of garrison-
! ing the many Indian stations, and act as a
| leaven upon our vast native army. Of Eoyal En
gineers there are but a few hundreds scattered
I over our Indian dominions, for in road-
] making and field-work the native sapper is
'all that is required. Of British cavalry we
always maintain a strong foice in India. At this
moment thyre are nearly 4,500 sabres, or nine regi
ments, stationed in the East, notwithstauding the
fact that our native troops are very strong
in this particular arm. In a word, India calls for
the assistance of twice as many British troops as
are to be found in all our colonies put together.
GLOBE, OCTOBEK 5;
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN-
ADVANCE OF BRITISH TROOPS.
(EEUTER'S TELEGRAjil.)
S imla , October 4.
It is generally reported that a British force is
advancing from Peshawur in the dirtcti n of Jam>»
rood, with the view of making an attack on Ali
Musjid.
The Ameer of Afghanistan is massing troops at
Ali Musjid and C ndahar, and thi'eacens Quetta.
Strong h stility exists between the Khyberie
tribes and the Ameer.
War material is being collected at Kohat.
THE INDIAN EBONTIER.
A committe e, und r the presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. of Colonel Palliser,
(0 B., has been drawing up in India an elaborate report
on the subject of the defences of the hill s ation, of
Kussowlie, which place it is proposed to r.-'niefj if
possible, impregnab •, as part of a scheme now before
the Government of India for providing a number of
fortified posts along the fiontier line.