Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎99v] (202/312)

Onr special telegrams from India this morning
are full of interest, though the attention of our |
readers will naturally be divided between them
and the Cabinet Council which met on Saturday in
Downing-street. Our latest intelligence shows that
the rumour that S heee A li was concentrating
troops at Ali Musjid for a forward movement
against our outposts has quickened the movements
of our troops along tho whole line. The garrison of
Peshawur, which maybe computed attwelve thousand
men, has marched on Jumrood, and it was intended
to-day to attack Ali Musjid before the main portion
of the Afghan army could come up, or the Momunds,
who are reported to be advancing from Lalpura,
could arrh*. The troops contentrated at Dera
Ghazi Khan have also been instructed to advance
without delay. The former of these movements
shduld decide the action of the border tribes, and
the latter will effectually relieve the Quettah
garrison from all risk of surprise. In regard to the
the meeting of the Cabinet, the supposition
in which some of our contemporaries have
indulged, that it would meet to condemn, or
materially tb modify, what is inaccurately
spoken of as the policy of Lord L ytton was,
it is almost unnecessary to say, as wide of the mark
as the assumption that our present relations with the
Ameer of A fghanistan had been expected and
have been provided for. It will be obvious that if
nothing has occurred but what was anticipated,
and if nothing is now needed but what has been
abundantly prepared, there was no particular neces
sity for a Cabinet Council at all : but the fact
that it sat for three hours ought to warn I
people not to confound the affectation of superior
knowledge with its reality. The Cabinet must
on Saturday necessarily have discussed a situation ;
■ which is entirely novel, and debated concerning
the measures with which it is to be encountered.
In so far as th©- Indian V iceroy has acted on
his own responsibility he has now the approval
of the Cabinet at home, but it may safely be
believed that its approbation is extended to
him only because he has in reality acted upon
well-understood instructions. But the delibera
tions of Saturday necessarily concerned the
future rather than the past, and questions had to
be decided which had not yet been made the
subject of discussion by the Cabinet in its collective
capacity. It seems likely that a course will be
pursued towards Afghanistan which will represent
a sort of compromise between extreme counsels,
While Lord L awrence has advised a resumption
of the policy of "masterly inactivity," and less
responsible and, perhaps we shall add, more factious
persons have recommended that Lord L ytton should
be recalled and an apologetic explanation be offered
to the A meer, others have insisted that an immediate
advance on Cabul is indispensable, and an occupation
of the A meer's capital must occur before the advent
of winter. None of these courses seems likely
to be adopted. It is quite possible, as our tele
grams from India indicate, that, even as we
write these lines, hostilities may have commenced ;
for the A meer is represented as eager to anticipate
our martial wishes, and to confront us at points
contiguous to our own territory. Even then,
I however, it would seem to be considered, both in
j India and at home, that we shall in all proba-
i bility have to content ourselves with occu
pying and holding the leading passes before
Christmas, and possibly advancing to Kandahar.
, If military operations are commenced at once,
and are pushed on vigorously, no reasonable person
will pretend to lay down in advance the amount j
1 of success that is to be achieved in a given time.
It would be absurd to suppose that the Government
would object to an attack upon Cabul during the |
present year, if the season admitted of that
operation, and the A meer still maintained a de
fiant attitude. It is just possible that an
advance may be attended with fewer difficulties
and less resistance than are at present contem
plated ; and it would, of course, be an act of great
negligence not to prepare for the possibility of
a march on the capital before the autumn
expires. At the same time, it is never well to
underrate the difficulties of an undertaking, and the
Government may be wise in moderating the expec
tations of the community. We must again
express our surprise, seeing the choice of a
moment for forcing a Mission upon the A meer |
lay in our own hands, that wo did not choose |
a moment when four or five clear months for |
military operations would be before us in case the !
Mission was refused a welcome. But we need i
scarcely say that it would be childish to press upon |
the Cabinet the execution of military projects
within a period too brief for their execution for
no better reason than that the Government, had
they been more provident, would have had an ample
period at their disposal. Moreover, the prevailing
opinion at the Cabinet Council on Saturday may
not improbably have been that once the A meer finds
we have possession of the passes that lead from
our territories into his, and discovers, moreover,
that, though Russia may have incited him against
us, tlie Russians have no intention of supporting
him actively in his insolent attitude, he will
return to a more pacific turn of mind, and
implore for the friendship he lately rejected. So
long as the entertainment of this hope causes no
delay in the commencement of military operations,
and no slackness in the conduct of them, it can do
no harm. We, too, hope, though we cannot say we
expect, that S here A li will be overawed by an
exhibition of our military strength ; but it is the
duty of the military authorities in India to act as
though he will show no signs of repentance till he
feels his throne slipping from under him. After
what has occurred a mere apology, no matter how
abject, or a consent to receive an English Resident
Envoy at Cabul, would be utterly inadequate
reparation. Guarantees of a much more solid
character will be required; and since it has
pleased Russia that the Central Asian Question
should be opened, England cannot agree to its being
closed until we have secured ourselves not only
against Afghan hostility on our own frontiers,
but likewise against Russian hostility on the Afgnan
frontier. It is not now merely a question of the
Afghan passes. The position and future of Merv
and Herat will likewise have to be taken into
consideration. Any attempt to " patch up the
question—in other words to relegate its settlement
to another generation—cannot be tolerated. The
English people are at this moment witnessing the
first result of the unfortunate attempt to treat the
Eastern Question in that fashion. The same
Government will hardly commit the same mistake
twice over in the space of the same twelvemonth.
Another question that naturally came under the
consideration of the Cabinet on Saturday was the one
. w hich has been so much debated by the public during
1 the last ten days, whether the expense of an Afghan
campaign should be borne by the Indian or by
the Imperial Treasury. We have already expressed
the opinion that the bulk of the burden, if
not the whole, should be borne by ourselves.
We believe that the Cabinet is of opinion that
India should bear some portion of the expense, other
wise we should be setting up a dangerous precedent.
On the other hand, the Government of India Act of
1858 lays down that " except for preventing or
repelling actual invasion of her M ajesty's Indian
possessions, or under other sudden and urgent
necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without
the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be
applicable to defray the expenses of any military ;
operation carried on beyond the external frontiers
of such possessions by her Majesty's forces charged
upon such revenues/' If we invade Afghanistan,
our operations will obviously be carried on beyond
the external frontiers of India. But it is equally
clear that the Act contemplated operations being
carried on beyond them under circumstances which
would cause them to be regarded as undertaken for
the prevention of an invasion of our Indian
territories. Are such the circumstances now 1
Some acute minds have attempted to argue that
they are ; but the victory has undoubtedly rested
with the side that has urged the opposite conten
tion, The true inference to be drawn is that the
point cannot be settled by mere reference to an Act
of Parliament, No doubt, the very words we have j
i ^ ^- n
pjoraqo^uo nopncrjr jo sanreduroo jo ss^iramoQ oq ?
jo XaMonoH Wop etp jo ^pip
TOT P a m> '-tosdraoo sqq. jo aqq. jo Jdoo nol puag
o; sjaiunx J 0 Amjduioo pjdiqsjo ^ aip jo s^m^sissy jo
ijanoo ptre 'gaapjc^ 'ja^soj^; Xq papaiip tub I—'nig
'aavciKVis ani, 50 'amiaa ani 01
'ROLivonna ivdixhdkj ;
•■mrepnuQ tit mT^qo ireo sav uoi^isod ^UTOituop
oqa pTre ui OAsq iCptmre 9Ai'uoi?Tsod Stioj^s
^loudiso ^soul^n s ^ t o ^ jfoidiuo put? 'ajqissod
sb ^TT^soq ao uot^jodo-oo jo ^'uapuod
-apui sb uSreduiBO jo tn3 [d juo ej^ui gai ji
oq ntAv 0sbd A tib ux -pre oanoas saipTsqnsI
jo uio^SiCs p?J9U9S b iq pure 'raoq^ oottbtttb
o^ui j9au9 o; 2j99s ubo 0m jo £ ppq a'psto Pinoo
9av qoiqAi jo qoB9 tetianqjf oqo aopoojxunp
puoAaq QOTiBApB UB toojj TiTB^sqB aomie ubo
a AA -raoq^ q^m JmqBop .xoj 'su o^ uedo
oa^ OABq •ejopgj ifyte^n o^ ^oj eq p T noA\
Onr special telegrams from India this morning
are full of interest, though the attention of onr j
readers will naturally be divided between them
and the Cabinet Council which met on Saturday in
Downing-street. Our latest intelligence shows that
the rumour that Sheee Ali was concentrating
troops at Ali Musjid for a forward movement
against our outposts has quickened the movements
of our troops along the whole line. The garrison of
Peshawur, which may be computed at twelve thousand
men, has marched on Jumrood, and it was intended
to-day to attack Ali Musjid before the main portion
of the Afghan army could come up, or the Momunds,
who are reported to be advancing from Lalpura,
could arrh*. The troops contentrated at Dera
1 Ghazi Khan have also been instructed to advance
without delay. The former of these movements
1 shduld decide the action of the border tribes, and
| the latter will effectually relieve the Quettah
garrison from all risk of surprise. In regard to the
the meeting of the Cabinet, the supposition
in which some of our contemporaries have
indulged, that it would meet to condemn, or
materially to modify, what is inaccurately
spoken of as the policy of Lord Lyxton was,
it is almost unnecessary to say, as wide of the mark
as the assumption that our present relations with the
Ameer of Afghanistan had been expected and
have been provided for. It will be obvious that if
nothing has occurred but what was anticipated,
and if nothing is now needed but what has been
abundantly prepared, there was no particular neces
sity for a Cabinet Council at all : but the fact
that it sat for three hours ought to warn |
people not to confound the affectation of superior
knowledge with its reality. The Cabinet must
on Saturday necessarily have discussed a situation
which is entirely novel, and debated concerning
the measures with which it is to be encountered.
Insofar as th§ Indian Vicekoy has acted on
his own responsibility he has now the approval
of the Cabinet at home, but it may safely be
believed that its approbation is extended to
him only because he has in reality acted upon
well-understood instructions. But the delibera
tions of Saturday necessarily concerned the
future rather than the past, and questions had to
be decided which had not yet been made the
subject of discussion by the Cabinet in its collective
capacity. It seems likely that a course will be
pursued towards Afghanistan which will represent
a sort of compromise between extreme counsels,
While Lord Lawrence has advised a resumption
of the policy of " masterly inactivity," and less
responsible and, perhaps we shall add, more factious
persons have recommended that Lord Lytton should
be recalled and an apologetic explanation be offered
to the Ameer , others have insisted that an immediate
advance on Cabul is indispensable, and an occupation
of the Ameer's capital must occur before the advent
of winter. None of these courses seems likely
to be adopted. It is quite possible, as our tele
grams from India indicate, that, even as we
write these lines, hostilities may have commenced;
for the Ameer is represented as eager to anticipate
our martial wishes, and to confront us at points
contiguous to our own territory. Even then,
I however, it would seem to be considered, both in
j India and at home, that we shall in all proba
bility have to content ourselves with occu
pying and holding the leading passes before
Christmas, and possibly advancing to Kandahar.
If military operations are commenced at once,
and are pushed on vigorously, no reasonable person
will pretend to lay down in advance the amount |
of success that is to be achieved in a given time. i
It would be absurd to suppose that the Government
would object to an attack upon Cabul during the |
present year, if the season admitted of that 1
operation, and the Ameer still maintained a de
fiant attitude. It is just possible that an
advance may be attended with fewer difficulties
and less resistance than are at present contem
plated ; and it would, of course, be an act of great
negligence not to prepare for the possibility of
a march on the capital before the autumn
expires. At the same time, it is never well to
underrate the difficulties of an tmdertaking. and the
Government may be wise in moderating the expec
tations of the community. We must again
express our surprise, seeing the choice of a
moment for forcing a Mission upon the Ameer
, lay in our own hands, that wo did not choose
a moment when four or five clear months for
military operations would be before us in case the i
Mission was refused a welcome. But we need j
scarcely say that it would be childish to press upon j
the Cabinet the execution of military projects
within a period too brief for their execution, for
no better reason than that the Government, had
they been more provident, would have had an ample
period at their disposal. Moreover, the prevailing
opinion at the Cabinet Council on Saturday may
not improbably have been that once the Ameer finds
we have possession of the passes that lead from
our territories into his, and discovers, moreover, I
that, though Russia may have incited him against
us, tile Russians have no intention of supporting
him actively in his insolent attitude, he will
return to a more pacific turn of mind, and
implore for the friendship he lately rejected. So
long as the entertainment of this hope causes no
delay in the commencement of military operations,
and no slackness in the conduct of them, it can do
no harm. We, too, hope, though we cannot say we
expect, that Shere Ali will be overawed by an
exhibition of our military strength ; but it is the
duty of the military authorities in India to act as
though he will show no signs of repentance till he
feels his throne slipping from under him. After
what has occurred a mere apology, no matter how
abject, or a consent to receive an English Resident
Envoy at Cabul, would be utterly inadequate
reparation. Guarantees of a much more solid
character will be required; and since it has
pleased Russia that the Central Asian Question
should be opened, England cannot agree to its being
closed until we have secured ourselves not only
against Afghan hostility on our own frontiers,
but likewise against Russian hostility on the Afgnan
frontier. It is not now merely a question of the
Afghan passes. The position and future of Merv
and Herat will likewise have to be taken into
consideration. Any attempt to " patch up " the
question—in other words to relegate its settlement
to another generation—cannot be tolerated. The
English people are at this moment witnessing the
first result of the unfortunate attempt to treat the
Eastern Question in that fashion. The same
Government will hardly commit the same mistake
twice over in the space of the same twelvemonth.
Another question that naturally came under the
consideration of the Cabinet on Saturday was the one
w hich has been so much debated by the public during
1 the last ten days, whether the expense of an Afghan
campaign should be borne by the Indian or by
j the Imperial Treasury. We have already expressed
the opinion that the bulk of the burden, if
not the whole, should be borne by ourselves.
We believe that the Cabinet is of opinion that
India should bear some portion of the expense, other
wise we should be setting up a dangerous precedent.
On the other hand, the Government of India Act of
1858 lays down that " except for preventing or
; repelling actual invasion of her Majesty's Indian
possessions, or under other sudden and Urgent
necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without
the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be
applicable to defray the expenses of any military
operation carried on beyond the external frontiers i
of such possessions by her Majesty's forces charged
upon such revenues/' If we invade Afghanistan,
our operations will obviously be carried on beyond
the external frontiers of India. But it is equally
j clear that the Act contemplated operations being
carried on beyond them under circumstances which
would cause them to be regarded as undertaken for
the prevention of an invasion of our Indian
territories. Are such the circumstances now ?
Some acute minds have attempted to argue that
they are ; but the victory has undoubtedly rested
with the side that has urged the opposite conten
tion. The true inference to be drawn is that the
point cannot be settled by mere reference to an Act
of Parliament. ISTo doubt, the very words we have
cited leave it open incontestably to the Government
to ask the two Houses of Parliament to allow it to
saddle the revenues of India with the whole expense
of an Afghan campaign. But a Cabinet would be mad
that made such an application tinder existing con
ditions ; and the Legislature that granted
it would give evidence of insular intelligence
and almost corrupt motives. The question is one
to be treated, not by lawyers, but by statesmen.
We are aware there are persons who are anxious
to prove that the necessity of an Afghan campaign
would demonstrate conclusively the utter failure of
, the Treaty of Berlin and the Anglo-Turkish .Con-
j vention, and that if the Government proposed that
I England should bear the whole expense of the cam
paign they would thereby be avowing their own
failure and their full responsibility for it. It is useless
to occupy ourselves with the ingenious arguments of
faction. Before the Treaty of Berlin, as since the
Treaty of Berlin, every intelligent politician re
garded the Eastern question and the Central Asian
question as one. That is a conclusive reason why
England should not shirk its share and
interest in an Afghan campaign. The question
is an v Imperial one, or Imperialism has
no meaning ; and the burden must be of a similar
character. But if it is contended that India ought
to bear some small and subordinate portion of the
expense, in order that it may be recognised that,
while it is to our interest not to lose India, it is
India's interest not to lose us, we are not, as we
have said, disposed to dogmatise on the subject, or
to take our stand on a hard and fast line. Were
we to quit, or to be driven from, India, the country
would be given up to every conceivable misfortune.
In a word, our interests and those of India are one.
But we are rich, and India is poor; and justice arid
magnanimity alike dictate a generous course.