Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎101r] (205/312)

In an article headed "England's Duty in Af
ghanistan," the Bombay Gazette of September 13
expresses the opinion that there is no probability
of the Government of India annexing Afghan
istan. "The interests of England," it adds,
'• would bo sufficiently secured if she took the
Ehyber Pass, advanced her troops to Jullvmdnr, !
where the principal passes into India converge,
and took firm precautions for the establishment of
British representatives in Cabnl, Kandahar, and
Herat. We do not believe that Sir Neville Cham
berlain's instructions will so bevond these out
lines, and perhaps that some such policy as we have
indicated is contemplated by the Government of
India may be surmised from the fact that Dr.
Bellew has been attached to the mission. Dr.
Bellew is a thoroughgoing opponent of the policy
of inaction, and after a considerable amount of
personal experience in Afghan affairs he came
years ago to the conclusion that Jullundur, and
not Peshawur, was the only safe outpost for the
Government of India to occupy, and that a
powerful British Embassy should be established
permanently in Cabul. So strongly was he im
pressed with the danger of the Government of
India remaining idle regarding Afghanistan while
Russia was pushing forward towai'ds the Hindoo
Koosb with unceasing energy that he published
a vigorous pamphlet in 1868 upon the frontier
question. His views on tjie subject are at the
present moment peculiarly interesting, and we
make no apology for republishing his description
of the considerations which induced him and
other eminent thinkers on frontier politics to con
clude that the presence of Russia in Afghanistan '
would be a serious danger to the stability of the |
i Indian Empire."
In this swift progress of Eussia towards the East they
; see cause for the greatest alarm. Her establishment iu
Central Asia they view as a direct menace to India, as |
the accomplishment of a deep scheme for the compassing
; of her designs on Turkey. In Russia settled in the cradle 1
whence have proceeded the conquering nations of Asia,
j they discern the elements of untold troubles and dangers
to our rule. The excitement and distrust which the move
ments of Russia in Central Asia hare already produced
amongst the Mughals and Pathans of India, they notice as
a sign of sinister import, and one demanding our special
regard and attention. The native armies maintained by
our tributary and protected chiefs in Central India and
the Deccau, they look upon as so many foci for sedition
and revolr, a8 instruments of danger not to be tolerated
within the limits of the Empire, as fields for Russian
I intrigue, and as connecting links between native aspirations
| and Russian ambition. With Russia on our border,
j these writers foresee an era of discontent, intrigue, and
sedition amongst a large and widely-scattered portion of '■
our subjects. Her near presence, instead of acting as a •'
stimulus to industry and trade, will have exactly the
|» contrary effect. It will distract the country by restless
rumours and threats of impending danger, unsettle the
minds of the people by a general feeling of insecurity,
disturb trade and check internal improvements by the
operation of the same cause, shake the belief of the na
tives in our superior power and prestige, and, by afford
ing them the opportunity of comparison between the
merits of the two Governments, perhaps create a I;
desire for change. Bearing in mind the repeated
invasions of India from the north, and the readi
ness with which the border tribes on the route I
| have joined the invading armies, they urge the
I pressing necessity of our I securing without _ delay the
. approaches to our Indian Empire from that quarter. They :
point out the insecurity of our present border on the
north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , dilate on the inefficiency in numbers, a|
arms, and discipline of our native army, and warn us
against a blind reliance on the advantages of railway com
munication alone. They insist on the necessity of at once ^
stopping the further advance of Russia, and see no safety •,
for India except by an immediate advance into Afghan
istan. The military occupation of this country, they say,
is the only course left by which the designs of Russia can
be thwarted. British garrisons in Cabul, Kandahar, and
Herat are, they affirm, the only guarantee for the stability ^
of our rule in India. These, in brief, are the arguments m
of those who, in the present aspect of affairs in Central
Asia, urge on us the adoption of a policy of prompt
and vigorous action. Thus may be summarised the main V ■
arguments used by the two opposite classes of writers on
this subject, viz., by the party advocating a policy of dig-
! nified inaction, and the party advocating a policy of
vigorous action—vigorous, because any action at this
| stage of the game, and on Afghan ground, to be at all hi
successful, must be energetic and decided. It will be well
here to remind the reader that, of the two policies above {
| described, the former or that of inaction—the policy of
masterly inactivity as it is generally designated—is the j
j one that has hitherto prevailed in the judgment of our !
rulers. Its advantages, at the best, appear to be but few,
whilst its dangers are many and grave. So far it has
served to save its adopters from the reproach of fear or
precipitancy, and here ends all that can be said in its j
favour. The loss of prestige it has produced, the cheap
estimation and contempt to which it has brought our
name amongst the border tribes and our own subjects,
and the state of unpreparedness and inefficiency to
which it has reduced us at a time when we should be most
| prepared for instant action, are not the least of its ill
j consequences.
i '' Holding such pronounced views as these on |
| the folly of the policy of inaction, Dr. Bellew's j
presence in Sir Neville Chambeilain's mission sug
gests (says the Bombay Gazette in conclusion) that
at last the Government of India has determined to
interfere effectively in Afghan affairs, and to put
faith rather in its own deeds than in the promises
either of Shere Ali or Russian diplomatists. It
will be the duty ol the Home Government to give
the Government of India every assistance to inau
gurate a policy which should aim at nothing less
than the British occupation of .1 ullundur, the estab
lishment of an embassy in Cabul, and the appoint
ment of political officers in Herat and Kandahar.
The advantages of holding Jellalabad would be
that it would enable British troops to control all the
passes from the Takht-i-Suleiman to the Hindoo
Koosh on the confines of Cashmere—that is, every
pass from Cabul to India; they would be near
enough to Cabul to control it and protect our em
bassy; and they would occupy a position central
enough to exert a most potent influence over all ]
| Afghanistan. If all this were done England, with the \
j Bolan Pass already in her power, would have very
little to fear from Russian designs in Central Asia."
The Calcutta Englishman, in an article headed
" The Cabul Mission," says that in despatching
that mission, the Government had two main
| objects in view—to secure itself against any
danger that might arise from the latest develop
ment of Russian policy in Central Asia, and t©
insist on such arrangements being made regarding
■ the succession to the throne of Cabul as might
afford a satisfactory guarantee against the country
relapsiBg into a state of anarcfiy. The Calcutta
j Englishman adds:
The construction by Russia of a railway to Herat
j would scarcely constitute a casus belli against that Power.
On certain conditions it might even be desirable that
such a railway should be made. Its construction
would, however, entail upon us the necessity of
effectually securing our own communications with
Herat, and;this we could do only by occupying the
intervening country. Apart, however, from the construc
tion of such a railway, it is very questionable whether
the present position of Russia in Central Asia, read in the
light of the late diplomatic advances, does not make it in
dispensable for us to secure our communications with
Herat, while it is beyond all question that it compels us to
assume such a position towards Cabul as to preclude the
possibility of Russia acquiring any influence in that
country. We need not be sui-prised, then, if one of the
demands which Sir Neville Chamberlain makes of Shere
Ali is for permission to locate in E;andahar and Herat
military establishments of sufficient strength to command
effectually the route from Quettah to those parts; or, if
the British Ministry has determined on the occapation,
not of Cabul, but of Kandahar, and perhaps also of
' Plerat, in case of this permission being refused _
j In the first instance, we may be sure, every
effort will be made and every reasonable temptation ex
tended to induce, the Ameer to enter into amicable ar
rangements for this purpose. A liberal quid pro quo in
the shape of money for the ground, in addition to the old
subsidy, will no doubt form part of the offer. The
character of the conditions on which it may be thought
; fit to insist with a view to settling the question of succes-
; sion will depend greatly on circumstances regarding which
the Government is at present imperfectly informed, fore
most among them the mental condition of Yakub Khan.
If that unfortunate Prince should prove to be compos
mentis, then che British Government will, it may
ba assumed, insist upon his recognition and release,
and possibly on his being made Governor of
Kandahar and Herat, under the protection of
, British bayonets, which will be at once an
adequate guarantee for his own safety and against his i
; coquetting with Russia. Should Yakub Khan, however,
be, as is stated, imbecile, or for any other personal reason
ineligible for the throne, the question of the succession
will be one full of difficulties. Independently of these
matters, the Government will certainly insist on the right
of maintaining a representative at Cabul. Should all the
above points be satisfactorily settled, we may be quite 1
surp thert) is no intention of annexing either Cabul or (in
the full sense of the term) any portion of the Ameer's
territories. Should they not be settled, it is of course
impossible to say whore annexation might cease, the
more especially as it is morally certain that the death of
Shere Ali would be the signal for a reign of anarchy which
foreign interference alone could terminate, and which
would afford Russia just the opportunity she wants.
The Lahore paper says that if there were no
other reason for following up and protecting the
mission to Cabul by the preparations it has sug
gested for the occupation of the Koontm Valley, a
good one might be found in the " notorious
character of the Ameer Shere Ali for treachery,"
" This vice, a conspicuous one in all Afghans, is
especially so (it adds) in the Ameer, His bad faith
is to him political wisdom, and in violating the
safe conduct given to the English envoy, even if
he should give one under his hand and seal, he
would only db exactly what he did before to his
I own son. Now, against this sort of treachery we
need hardly point out that an escort of three
hundred horsemen, even if they were all equal to
Sh Neville Chamberlain himself iu prowess, is a
' weak defence. It may be said that in showing
distrust we invito it, and that by undue threats
we mis-ht only friahteu uud alicuuto whore wa