Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎111r] (227/312)

I live a comparatively quiet and peaceable life. The
t Afghans of the plain, on the other hand, have lost
! louoh of their native character, and have become
subordinate to their chiefs in a far greater degree
than the wild dwellers in the hill region. Among
the pure Yusufzae, each little tribe forms a
separate community, governed by its own pa
triarch, and distributed into " races," each of
which has its own special name, ending in the syl
lable zae; and again into 44 clans," or minor
divisions, marked by the termination khel or
khail. Before the British occupation, all these
separate tribes and families were perpetually at
war with one another, and the men ploughed their
little fields with rifles slung across their
shoulders to repel the attacks of the next petty
village, or stood guard over their rice fields at
harvest time with drawn swcrds in their hands.
And even now, though the stern arm of British
power has quelled for a time the feuds and
bickerings of the hostile clans, their animosjUes
are not entirely forgotten ; while the tales of the
elders incite the growing youths to emulate the
great deeds of their fathers in the days when
every Afghan was free to stab or shoot his
neighbour as he willed, without the absurd in- i
terveution of a beardless youth who represents !
to their eyes the distaat majesty of the
English Crown. Yet the Yusufzae are
a religious race after their own pat
tern ; very reverential not only towards
the Prophet himself, but also toward all the minor
saints and holy shrines with which local piety has
enriched the faith of Islam. But their religion
does not prevent them from regarding the duty of
revenge as one among their most sacred obliga
tions ; and the Afghan who should omit to oxaci
signal vengeance for an affront, even if it ex
tended to the necessary length of taking his |
victim's life, would be exposed to universal con- j
tempt amongst his fellows, as one regardless of!
the common decencies of life.
The city of Peshawur itself, whose associations
stretch far back into the remote past, and oven to
the period of the ancient Buddhist monarchy of
1 Upper ludia, stands iu the midst of the valley,
i near the left bank of the Bara stream, and some
1 ten and a half miles from the now famous fort
! 0 f Jumrood. Its total population amounts to
60,000 souls, crowded within a low mud wall, and
distributed among the tortuous alleys or culs-de-
sac, which pass by courtesy as streets in most ori
ental towns. In spite of its advantageous position |
for trade with Central Asia, only a small amount of
i caravan traffic with Cabfil and Bokhara has ever
enlivened its somewhat sleepy bazaars ; while the
efforts of the Indian Government to establish a
great fair upon the spot were so unsuccessful that
the attempt was abandoued after a few years' ,
trial as absolutely hopeless. The Bala Hissar
Fort, built by the Sikhs to overawe the city and !
aid them in collecting their hated revenue from
i the sullen and half-subdued Afghan inhabitants,
commands every part of the town. Its walls rise
to an eminence of ninety feet above the ground,
and it contains large magazines, besides an
abundant internal supply of fresh water.
After the common fashion of Indian stations,
the cantonment and European quarter stand a
little apart from the stuffy streets of the native
city, occupying a slight elevation to the west, and
commanding a full view of the Khyber hill*. The
importance of this great military post, as guarding
the main gateway of the Punjab, has always
bee« fully recognised | and the ordinary garrison
comprises no less than four regiments of native
infantry, one regiment of native cavalry, another
of British infantry, and a strong detachment of
artillery. The cantonment with its belougings
contains a population of some 22,000 souls.
1 Though picturesquely "situated and considered a
| pleasant station for society, Peshawur bears a bad
I reputation as a hotbed of fever, which renders it
an undesirable place for British troops, especially
if not yet fully acclimatised.
Numerous other cantonments occupy the princi
pal strategic points in the circumference of the
valley. Among these the chief are at Nowshehra
and Hoti-Murdan, together with the oool hill
sanitarium of Cherat, perched upon one of the
peaks in the Ehuttack range. We shall probably
hear more of all these minor garrisons hereafter,
if, as seems probable, the first point of attack in |
the Ameer's dominions should turn out to be the
Ehyber Pass.
——-■ .-.nmyn— - " ,r 1
Without attaching too much importance to the
utterances of the Russian Press upon our Afghan
quarrel—utterances which are not less remarkable
for the malevolent candour with which they speak
of Russia's policy than for the extraordinary
ignorance which they display of the character and
motives of the English Government (in India—it
would be idle to overlook these indications of the
non-official Russian mind at a time when the long-
, threatened collision between the two Powers in
Central Asia seems about to be realised. The
speculations in the Russian newspapers would be
interesting if it were only for the light they throw
on the nature of that understanding on which
we have so long relied as our best security
against a disturbance of the peace of Central
Asia. It cannot be wholly profitless if on this
occasion we remind the public of the unceasing
, warnings which have for years been uttered by
those most competent to offer an opinion on the
subject of the gradual and steady approach of
Russia to our Indian frontier. Ever since 1837,
when her agents for the- first time appeared
in the Afghan territory, it has been evident to those
who have watched the course of events that India,
or at least Afghanistan, was the objective point of
the C zak's policy. Those who have had the courage
during all this period to express this opinion
have had to bear the reproach of being
" Russophobists," " alarmists," and " fire-eaters."
Yet they have lived to see the doctrines
they preached, though only a few months ago
derided by leading English statesmen as a " night
mare and a delusion," justified by the event, and
the dangers they have pointed out acknowledged
by almost the unanimous voice of England. He
would be a bold man now who, with the assistance
of the largest maps, would deny that there was any
reason for England to take measures against the
intrusion of Russia into India. The danger rather
seems to be lest the zeal of some of our recent
converts to what used to be called " Russophobia "
should lead the country into an excess of alarm at
the presence of a Russian agent in the Afghan
capital, even though that presence has been coincident
with the repulse of the British Mission. No greater
mistake could be made at the present moment than
for us to exaggerate the influence of Russia in
Afghanistan ; and there ought to be no risk of our
falling into the kind of panic, because a Russian
Agent has appeared at Cabul, that we yielded to
forty years ago, with such evil consequences to
our good name and our prestige. The Indian
Government, at any rate, may be expected to
know precisely the kind and the amount of
| danger which has to be feared from Russia in
Afghanistan; nor is Lord L ytton , surrounded
as he is by able and experienced officers, to
whom that country is no longer a terra incognita,
likely to repeat the blunders of Lord A uckland
and the coterie of young Bengal civilians who made
war upon D ost M ahomed in 1838.
But whilst it would be unwise to attach too much
importance to the apparent connection between the
visit of General S tolieteff to Cabul and the
refusal of the A meer to receive a British Envoy,
| the explanations and comments of the Russian
Press upon the situation are of much "significance,
i and, if they can be taken to express the general
feeling of the Russian Government 1 as to their
future policy in Afghanistan, they deserve our
most serious attention. So far as the present
quarrel is concerned, we may accept the explana
tion that the Mission to Cabul was a part of
the precautionary measures adopted by Russia in
view of a possible rupture with England, and that
its policy belongs to the period previous to the
Treaty of Berlin. As a matter of fact, General
S tolietefp did not arrive at Cabul until fully a
month after the Peace had been signed ; but we may
give Russia the benefit of the difficulty of tele
graphic communication in Central Asia. It is
known also by previous experience that the Russian
political department is not always able to secure the
ready obedience of its Asiatic Generals. Allowing
that General S tolieteff's Embassy has become
malapropos through the change of the situation in
Europe, we may also admit the inconvenience of
suddenly withdrawing it at the demand of England.
The position is full of embarrassment, and we can
readily believe that Russia would like to get out
of it if she could. Indeed, we cannot help seeing
that, in her eagerness to retaliate upon England in
Asia for the rebuffs suffered by Russian policy in
Europe, Russia has been guilty of a blunder
of a kind not very creditable to her diplo-