Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎122v] (252/312)

THE TIMES, PHIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1878,
f—— '-well off indeed in point of property and finance.
RUSSIAN POLICY.
(from our correspondent.)
BERLIN, O ct. 8.
Two uncommonly important articles on Eastern
affairs have appeared on the same day in the St.
Petersburg Golos. I begin vrith the Afghanistan
effusion :—
" According to the latest telegrams, a first exchange of
opinion has already passed between Loudon and St. Peters
burg upon Afghan affairs. The English Charge d'Affaires
has asked the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in what
way the mission of General Stoletoff can be reconciled with
the obligation undertaken by Kussia to refrain from seek
ing political influence in Afghanistan. The answer is
stated to have been that General Stoletoff's mission was
determined upon in circumstances which no longer exist,
and that the exclusive object of the Embassy, more
over, was to pay a compliment to the Ameer. In our
opinion, if the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
really given some such reply to the British Government, the
answer did not refer to the refusal of the Ameer to receive
Sir Neville Chamberlain. Logic and the rules of diplomatic
intercourse forbid us to entertain any such idea. The
English Charg6 d'Affaires cannot have been commissioned
to put such a question at a moment when the English Am
bassador was on his way to this capital. Lord Loftus left
London almost immediately after the arrival of the Ali
Musjid news. On his way he saw the Russian Chancellor,
and, of course, discussed with him Afghan affairs. At
'that particular moment the Charge d'Affaires cannot have
been ordered to put questions at St. Petersburg. Such
being the case, and taking into account that no date is
signified in the telegram touching the inquiry of the
CBritish Government, it follows that the question must
have been asked at the time when the reception given to
the Russian Embassy at Cabul; first became known in
Europe. It is important to fix the date of the event in this
Vay. After what has happened, it is altogether impossible
to admit that the Russian Government can have returned
euch an answer to such a query now. Iso Rus
sian Government could have adopted an apologetic j
tone when the step concerning which an explanation was j
demanded had been previously stigmatized as hostile by
the English Government and Press. Russia has been openly
•charged in England with instigating the Ameer of Afghan
istan to make war agaiast Great Britain. How, then,
could the Russian Government have brought themselves to
•vouchsafe a declaration bordering upon excuse ? An an
swer in this strain has not been given, nor ever will be.
Should the English Government desire us to account for
the affront they have sustained at the hands of the Ameer,
& reference to the attitude of the English Government be
fore and during the war of 1877 will be all the reply
granted. But surely no such reprimand will be torn from
iw. Only a few days ago The Times stated that England
was at peace with Russia, and that it was to the interest of
!both countries to maintain neutral relations. In all pro
bability this will be the motto adhered to by British
diplomacy. British diplomats cannot.but foresee that should
they ever presume to question us upon matters connected
Vith Afghanistan, we should be obliged to retort in a style
which it would not be very pleasant for them to have to
jpublish in a Blue-book."
The above is an avis au lecteur which speaks for
itself There can be little doubt that the Russian
'Government, having directly or indirectly encou-
l r aeed the Ameer of Afghanistan to take a step cal
culated to involve him in war with England, now
Btand upon their dignity and refuse official allusion
to the subject. Private conversations between
Excellencies may be held, and even provoked, but
these do not count. ,
The other article, turning upon the relations
[between Russia and Turkey, is perhaps eVen more ;
interesting ,
i « Besides the Afghan difficulty, the symptom of a defi
nite crisis in Central Asiatic affairs, the great question
lof the day is the rapprochement between Russia and
Turkey. It may be remembered that even in the midst of
ithe war, when excitement was at its highest pitch, we
attributed to the Ottoman race certain commendable
equalities required for the prolonged maintenance of their
Irule over subject races. We did so at the risk of being
•denounced as Tarcophils by those who dreamt of achieving
victory by despising the enemy. At present when a change
has supervened and our late enemy is about to sign a treaty
Which makes him if not actually our ally at least our
• friend in perpetuity/ the question arises what ws are to
think of the Turks and of their former and present bearing
towards us. Recalling to mind the savage enthusiasm
with which war to the knife was preached against us, we
Wre tempted to think that we had better expel the Osmanli
■race from Europe ; while if present friendly assurances |
We sincere we cannot but wonder at the sudden evapora- |
tion of the bitter and revengeful spirit displayed during
the war. In endeavouring to reconcile this apparent con.
traduction, we ought to bear in mind that there are no
laudden leaps in the history and character of nations, ihere
lis ample evidence that the atrocities which made some
denounce the Ottomans as so many unreclaimable savages,
?were a frequent yet transient phenomenon, brought on by
circumstances. Though displaying the defective political
organization of Turkey, these atrocities by no means prove
the entire race cannibals. The Osmanlis, after all, have
»hown themselves competent to vindicate the rights of the
jconqueror, and a people possessed of other qualities hke-
■wise. When our armies were liberating the subject races
they had sufficient opportunity to become convinced that
though the rayah had no political rights, they were very
The tens
!cf thousands of Turkish prisoners,too,who have been sojourn- |
ing in Russia for so many months have convinced our people j
that, far from being savages, the Osmanlis are willing and |
industrious, though not very expert at work. The Osmanlis j
.in their turn, thanks to the prolonged presence of our:
'troops under the walls of Constantinople, and the accounts
[given by Ottoman soldiers returning from captivity, have
'learned something about the Russian people. Direct
■ contact, notwithstanding, the acrimony raised by vain- ;
Iglorious and narrow-minded talkers, has not only dimi-
ftoished the painful impression created by rayah sufferings,
but has also produced in both nations a favourable disposi
tion towards each other. When we began to respect the
Turkish army as a worthy adversary.we made the first step
towards modifying our views of the Turkish people ; and
at present it is impossible not to admit that our returning
Soldiers speak much more of the wealth they have seen in
Turkey than of the barbarism of the Turks. It is
very likely that wo shall learn to think yet better i
of the Turks, now that our Slavonic co-religionists in ,
the Ottoman Empire are admitted to an equality of |
frights with the Mussulmans. This spontaneous awakening j
: 0 f| a friendly disposition between Turk and Russ is one of |
fithe most important results of the war, and if turned to j
account by diplomacy may secure the pacific solution of ;
[the Oriental question, to the mutual advantage of both
[parties. Those political robbers of Europe who count upon
jdividing the inheritance of the Porte are entirely mis-
;taken as to the enduring importance of recent changes,
'deferring as they do the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement to a
mere diplomatic combination, which, created by the exi
gencies of the moment, must be evanescent, they yet can
[cot help feeling some considerable uneasiness about the
good relations springing up between the Russian and
Turkibh Governments. It is just possible that our late
enemy may shortly become our only ally, and a near future j
will demonstrate whether we are wise enough to effect thU '
^result.
i " As to the Afghan question we have the fact that while
lour own Embassy to Cabul has been perfectly successful,
•the English mission has been treated with open hostility by
•the Ameer. Russia, it is well known, forced "by the
'pressure of her political destiny and the necessities of her
geographical situation, since she first rose intq, existence >
has been compelled to extend her Asiatic frontiers. An
nexation after annexation has occurreii, for Imperial
purposes. The real significance of this policy will be seen j
■in the future, while the present requites only continual
[sacrifices. Whatever the future may bring, present sacri- i
fices, though of no great magnitude in themselves, are op- i
pressive because our means are limited, and because we
have economical problems nearer home requiring our im-
' mediate attention. That the early solution of these
problems is indispensable, not only to develope
our wealth, but to supply our daily wants, renders
the expenditure involved in our Asiatic policy the
more onerous. Another drawback to our Asiatic doings is
that while our great aims can only be realized in the future,
one immediate result is to diminish the population of
Russia Proper, already so thin, by emigration to the far
East.
" However, if the direct interests of the Russian people,
whose taxes have to support these diplomatic doings, have
nothing in common with Afghanistan, there isthe fact that
England, hostile to Russia, may by an Afghan war have
her action diverted from Asia Minor and the Balkan to
Cabul. What we can lose in these troubles in Central Asia
is insignificant, while to England any Indian complication
is simply a question of life and death. Russia being thus
advantageously placed, she will no doubt profit by her
Asiatic opportunities to paralyze England's policy in
Europe. This does not, of course, mean that the principal
burden of the strife will have to be borne by Central Asia.
To transfer the feud to Asia would be unprofitable and in
convenient to us. It would imjiose upon us immense sacri
fices and yet settle nothing."
To add anything to these comprehensive avowals
i i&fta unnecessary aa JA.ia imooaaible, They ftre
neither more nor less than a condensed retrospect
of the past, and a stereoscopic shadowing forth of
the future. The rayahs ; said to be the daily sport of
Turkish assassins and thieves, were found to be so j
very well off as to astonish the poor Moujiks sent
to deliver them. The atrocities once declared a proof j
of the inveterate savagery of the unspeakable Turk |
are now represented as a desperate means to repress |
rebellion adopted by a warlike, hard-bested race, {
lighting for life. After these admissions as regards
the past, we have the cool statements-hat the 'lurk,
being recognized as a respectable fellow by the
suddenly-illnmined Russ, every effort is made to
convert him into the ally of his late would-
be exterminator. The means used, as we know
from other sources, is to represent to the successor
of the Calipti that, haying^ satisfied Russia in j
Europe, there is no occasion for him to be at the
puffoj'ozgi
raojj papuiuiaj 'sSmpooooad orp Smuado ut 'miu!
-ji'BqD •uoi^tsm'baj « auBusand Sm^aera oq^'patt^
-uoo oqM 'uoiq.-BiocIjcoo aq^ jo umuatuqo oqij 'ouaAUoc
"d 'U ^3A 0 papisajd etm Sniqaara aqx „-pJACj«
-de Jiaq; ipafqus 'smiof pres aq^ jo suodnoo pire spnot
oqij jo uoisjaauoo oqij joj !>u8uiu.raa0*) oittojpjj oqq. q^ia
o^ui pQja^ua uaoq stsq qoiqA quaraaSuejuU irB jopisnoo o!j ,
'aoa.i ^s -e^gjroopi 'sjrappq'puog; u S istoj jo uoi^jbdaoq aq
jo esnoq -tiouuoo 8q» ^ ppq putt jo SMvo r
saaaf) oqi^ jo saappq oqq. jo Sat^aaui jujaaaS v. i^pia^sa^
•paijdopB •/Cfsnonnamm eaoiv snoiijnpgaj
guiAioaaa 'os op X/tira aqtw jo noi^dTdi^uB m di
and oq. a.nsap X / bui oqAV s-iappqa j ^qs aeoq^' onq 'jo; paqw
aq -[ttAi squarafB^sui aanpaj oqi saqnp i^qM. in ^Cjijofjxa if-es oL
siqi: gnasajd ip? qou mv. j •joqmaAOjsr jo qqg aq?. uo ajq^d
aq [p3qs 'mmcaajd -pg si pm? '-sox ft? jo
THE TIMES,
RUSSIAN POLICY.
(fkom our correspondent.)
BERLIN, O ct. 8.
Two uncommonly important articles on Eastern
affairs have appeared on the same day in the St.
Petersburg Golos, I begin with the Afghanistan
effusion :— I
" According to the latest telegrams, a first exchange of
opinion has already passed between Loudon and St. Peters
burg upon Afghan affairs. The English Charge d'Affaires
has asked the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in what
way the mission of General Stoletoff can be reconciled with
the obligation undertaken by Bussia to refrain from seek
ing political influence in Afghanistan. The answer is
Btated to have been that General Stoletoff's mission was
determined upon in circumstances which no longer exist,
and that the exclusive object of the Embassy, more
over, was to pay a compliment to the Ameer. In our
opinion, if the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
really given some such reply to the British Government, the
answer did not refer to the refusal of the Ameer to receive
Sir Neville Chamberlain. Logic and the rules of diplomatic
intercourse forbid us to entertain any such idea. The
English ChargS d'Affaires cannot have been commissioned
to put such a question at a moment when the English Am
bassador was on his way to this capital. Lord Loftus left
London almost immediately after the arrival of the Ali
Musjid news. On his way he saw the Russian Chancellor,
and, of course, discussed with him Afghan affairs. At
that particular moment the ChargS d'Affaires cannot have
been ordered to put questions at St. Petersburg. Such
being the case, and taking into account that no date is
signified in the telegram touching the inquiry of the
CBritish Government, it follows that the question must
have been asked at the time when the reception given to
the Russian Embassy at Cabul first became known in
Europe. It is important to fix the date of the event in this
'■way. After what has happened, it is altogether impossible
: to admit that the Russian Government can have returned
euch an answer to such a query now. No Rus
sian Government could have adopted an apologetic
tone when the step concerning which an explanation was
demanded had been previously stigmatized as hostile by
the English Government and Press. Russia has been openly
■charged in England with instigating the Ameer of Afghan
istan to make war against Great Britain. How, then,
could the Russian Government have brought themselves to ,
vouchsafe a declaration bordering upon excuse? An an-i
Bwer in this strain has not been given, nor ever will be.
Should the English Government desire us to account for
the affront they have sustained at the hands of the Ameer,
a reference to the attitude of the English Government be
fore and during the war of 1877 will be all the reply
granted. But surely no such reprimand will be torn from
us. Only a few days ago The Times stated that England
was at peace with Russia, and that it was to the interest of
Iboth countries to maintain neutral relations. In all pro-
ibability this will be the motto adhered to by British
diplomacy. British diplomats cannot.but foresee that should
they ever presume to question us upon matters connected
Vith Afghanistan, we should be obliged to retort in a style
■which it would not be very pleasant for them to have to
ipublish in a Blue-book."
The above is an atns cm ledeur which speaks tor
itself There can be little doubt that the Russian
'Government, having directly or indirectly encou-
'raged the Ameer of Afghanistan to take a step cal
culated to involve him m war with England, now
Btand upon their dignity and refuse official allusion
to the subject. Private conversations between
Excellencies may be held, and even provoked, but
these do not count. . . „
The other article, turning upon the relations
[between Russia and Turkey, is perhaps eVen more
interesting :— , , -
! « Besides the Afghan difficulty, the symptom of a defi-
Lifce crisis in Central Asiatic affairs, the great question
U>f the day is the rapprochement between Russia a 53
STnrkey. It may be remembered that even in the midst of
the war, when excitement was at its highest pitch, we
attributed to the Ottoman race certain commendable
'qualities required for the prolonged maintenance of their
irule over subject races. We did so at the risk of being
■denounced as Turcophils by those who dreamt of achieving
victory by despising the enemy. At present when a change
bai supervened and our late enemy is about to sign a treaty
'which makes him if not actually our ally at least our
'• friend in perpetuity,' the question arises what we are to
thinlr 0 f the Turks and of their former and present bearing
Wards us. Recalling to mind the savage enthusiasm
with which war to the knife was preached against us, we
We tempted to think that we had better expel the Osmanli
Wacs from Europe ; while if present friendly assurances
are sincere we cannot but wonder at the sudden evapora-
ifcion of the bitter and revengeful spirit displayed during
the war. In endeavouring to reconcile this apparent con.
.(traduction, we ought to bear in mind that there axe no
isudden leaps in the history and character of nations. The e
lis ample evidence that the atrocities which made some
denounce the Ottomans as so many unreclaimable stages,
were a frequent yet transient phenomenon, brought on by
circumstances. Though displaying the defective political
organization of Turkey, these atrocities by no means prove
the entire race cannibals. The Osmanhs, after all,
«hown themselves competent to vindicate the rights of the
conqueror, and a people possessed of other qualities like-
wise. When our armies were liberating the subject races
they had sufficient opportunity to become convinced that
though the rayah had no political rights, they were very
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1878,
. iwell off indeed in point of property and finance. The tens
«f thousands of Turkish prisoners,too,who have been sojourn
ing in Russia for so many months have convinced our people
that, far from being savages, the Osmanlis are willing and
industrious, though not very expert at work. The Osmanlis
Jin their turn, thanks to the prolonged presence of our
[troops under the walls of Constantinople, and the accounts
'given by Ottoman soldiers returning from captivity, have
(learned something about the Russian people. Direct
'contact, notwithstanding, the acrimony raised by vain-
Iglorious and narrow-minded talkers, has not only dimi-
ftoished the painful impression created by rayah sufferings,
ibut has also produced in both nations a favourable disposi
tion towards each other. When we began to respect the
Turkish army as a worthy adversary.we made the first step
towards modifying our views of the Turkish people; and
at present it is impossible not to admit that our returning
soldiers speak much more of the wealth they have seen in
Turkey than of the barbarism of the Turks. It is
'Very likely that we shall leaxn to think yet better
[®f the Turks, now that our Slavonic co-religionists in
[the Ottoman Empire are admitted to an equality of |
Irights with the Mussulmans. This spontaneous awakening j
i ofl a friendly disposition between Turk and Russ is one of l
[the most important results of the war, and if turned to |
"account by diplomacy may secure the pacific solution of
[the Oriental question, to the mutual advantage of both
parties. Those political robbers of Europe who count upon
dividing the inheritance of the Porte are entirely mis
taken as to the enduring importance of recent changes.
iKeferring as they do the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement to a
mere diplomatic combination, which, created by the exi-
igencies of the moment, must be evanescent, they yet can
[cot help feeling some considerable uneasiness about the
f good relations springing up between the Russian and
fTurkhh Governments. It is just possible that our late
f enemy may shortly become our only ally, and a near future
| will demonstrate whether we are wise enough to effect thia
iresult.
j " As to the Afghan question we have the fact that while
1 our own Embassy to Cabul has been perfectly succfessful,
the English mission has been treated with open hostility by
[the Ameer. Russia, it is well known, forced "by the
pressure of her political destiny and the necessit^s of her
geographical situation, since she first rose intc* existence,
has been compelled to extend her Asiatic frontiers. An
nexation after annexation has occurreci, for Imperial
purposes. The real significance of this pq^icy will be seen |
in the future, while the present requires only continual ;
iBacrifices. Whatever the future may bring, present sacri- j
fices, though of no great magnitude in themselves, are op- i
pressive because our means are limited, and because we
have economical problems nearer home requiring our im- j
mediate attention. That the early solution of these
problems is indispensable, not only to develope
our wealth, but to supply our daily wants, renders
the expenditure involved in our Asiatic policy the
more onerous. Another drawback to our Asiatic doings is
that while our great aims can only be realized in the future,
one immediate result is to diminish the population of
Russia Proper, already so thin, by emigration to the far
East.
" However, if the direct interests of the Russian people,
whose taxes have to support these diplomatic doings, have
nothing in common with Afghanistan, there is the fact that
England, hostile to Russia, may by an Afghan war have
her action diverted from Asia Minor and "the Balkan to
Cabul. What we can lose in these troubles in Central Asia
is insignificant, while to England any Indian complication
is simply a question of life and death. Russia being thus
advantageously placed, she will no doubt profit by her
Asiatic opportunities to paralyze England's policy in
Europe. This does not, of course, mean that the principal
burden of the strife will have to te home by Central Asia.
To transfer the feud to Asia would be unprofitable and in
convenient to us. It would impose upon us immense sacri-
fices and yet settle nothing."
To add anything to these comprehensive avowals
i U as unnecetBary aa .i^ is iaiDoafiibl©. They wo
neither more nor less than a condensed retrospect
of the past, and a stereoscopic shadowing forth of
the future. The rayahs, said to be the daily sport of
Turkish assassins and thieves, were found to be so j
very well off as to astonish the poor Moujiks sent i
to deliver them. The atrocities once declared a proof
of the inveterate savagery of the unspeakable Turk
are now represented as a desperate means to repress
rebellion adopted by a warlike, hard-bested race,
lighting for life. After these admissions as regards
the cast, we have the cool statement'that the iurk,
being recognized as a respectable xellow by the
suddenly-illumined Russ, every effort is made to
convert him into the ally of his late would-
be exterminator. The means used, as we know
from other sources, is to represent to the successor
of the Calipn that, haying satisfied Russia in
Europe, there is no occasion for him to be at the
expense and trouble of obliging England in Asia.
This much being done to deprive England ot her
European ally, we are further treated to the avowal
that to cripple British action in Europe entirely
an Afghan complication is purposely got up by
sagacious diplomatists on the Neva. And, as if all
this were not enough to unveil the momen
tous objects pursued, this suite of confessions is
closed by the remark that Russia has a destiny to
work out in Asia which, unfulfilled after centuries
of annexation, will only show its true bearing when
in the future fresh events happen. For the pre
sent, it is significantly added, Russia is not in a
position to wish to fight England chiefly in Asia.
Indeed, if her business can be done by the Ameer
in Asia and the Sultan in Europe, why need she
fight at all ? j
The Golos is one of the most discreet and best-
edited papers of the Russian Empire. Unlike some
other organs it is not given to indulge in specula
tive boastings while events are maturing and the
issue doubtful.
The Turkish alliance is suddenly advocated along
the whole line of the Russian Press. It is almost
superfluous to observe that the move is accompanied
with attacks upon Austria. If the Sultan can be
led to see things from the Russian point of view,
the national Slavonic armoury may once more be
made available for weapons against Austrian com
petition.