Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎127v] (262/312)

of Ottoman territory; or eve» if he outwardly sub,
mitted, that it would be with a secret determina
tion to read'.'r the occupation as difficult as possible
for Austria. There was thus very cogent reason why
the St. Petersburg Calinet should ursre on the Yiennese
Government to appropriate these outlying provinces
of its neighbour, and Count Andbassy unfortunately
sufEered himself to be beguiled into a proceeding
whxh made Austria & particejps criminis in the par
tition of European Tu key. Not le^s clever is the
way in -which Muscovite diplomacy has brought
about the embarrassment of Croat Britain. A com-
patisoi^ of dates will show that General Abeam OFF
was not sent to Cabul, as has been alleged by the S:.
Petersburg Government, at the moment when
England and Russia were on the eve of
war. That danger had passed some time
before the Mission set out from Turkestan,
although it is likely enough that a secret
arrangement had been come to with Sherb
A li some months before. Buc, arrangement or no
arrangement, it is a fact that frkndly relations were
supposed to exist between the Russian and English
Governments when the Savoy started on his errand
of mischief. What just ification, then, can "be
pleaded for the flagrant breach of the understand
ing, constantly reiterated by our great Asiatic ri^al,
•• that Afghanistan lay beyond the sphere of Rus
sian politics " ? To pretend that the Mission had
no political object is an insult to common sense,
| for if its purpose had been merely an ordinary ex*
I change of courtesies, the Czab would nob have ap-
! pointed as Envoy the most consummate diplomatist;
in Asiatic affairs in his service. Without question.
General Abramoit went to Cubul for the express-
purpose of br.nginsr the Ameer under Russian in-
fluence. Success crowned the attempt, and England
now has to face'the prospect of a troublesome war
I on her Indian frontier, which cannot possibly bring
her any profit, and may result in inconvenient com-i
plications.
Even assuming that our arms meet with no check
during the advance into Afghanistan, and that we
take possession of the northern exits from the passes
without much trouble, this success will not be ob-.
j tained for nothing. We may safely count on a cer
tain loss of life, for the Afghans know how to fight
in their own country. It also seems inevitable that
the cost of the invasion will amount to a large*
sum than was first expected, as the number
of troops to be employed is now set down
at double the figure originally estimated as
sufficient. Some losses in blood and treasure
are certiin, but Russia has wrought us even
worse mischief by compelling the Indian Govern
ment to enter into a war which, be its results what
it may, will inevitably embitter the whole Afghan
I nation against England. These people are ardent
i patriots, and when it comes to the invasion of
1 their land, they do not enter into the rights and
wrongs of the matter, but unite as one man m
deadly hostility to the intruder. Unless Shere Ali
should give in at the last moment, which is ex
tremely improbable, this will be the legacy left to
England by the astute General Abramoff , and,
at some future time we shall have Russia ad*
vancing into Afghanistan as the champion of her
people'against the hated English. Thus, whatever
i comes of it, as matters stand at present, Russia
| wins, England loses. We do not wonder,
therefore, at the feeling which is slowly
growincr up in this country, that it, will
b3 very pusillanimous policy to oontiue our
punishment to that half demented despot, bHERE
A LI. while allowing the Power who really worKed us
alftta mis«-b:»f -to aiWi W ends witliaut let DC
hindranca. -
OUK CONTEMPORARIES.
AFFAIES IN THE EAST.
The Times says :—" If there are still elements of dis
quiet and disorder in Eastern Europe, we may be satis
fied to believe that the difficulties are not insurmount
able. TTothiag', it may be said, has happened, or
appears likely to happen, of which the germs could not
be discovere 1 in the conclusions of the Berlin Congress.
The Berlin Treaty could not pretend to be an instant
settlement of the Eastern Question. There were two
ways open on which an agreement might have been
arrived at. It was possible for the assembled statesmen
to hare drawn up a far yore elaborate document than
the: Berlin Treaty. Every point might have been
arranged beforehand, every difficulty might have been
foreseen and expressly provided against. Contin
gencies, likely and uniikely> might all have been duly
written d ,wn. and the entire problem and the answer
might have been stated together and seitled out of
hand. It is, we know, in this sort of way that lawyers
love to proceed when they are spinning out deeds of
partnership or assisting at the birth of a joint-stock
company. It is well enough suited to a case where
the parties are in agreement beforehand, and
have come together by their own choice. It
was scarcely as well suited to the kind of
work that had to be done at Berlin. The
problem there was, not to arrange agreements, but
to put an end to existing quarrels. The parties to be
brought to terms had been forced int® relations, not of
their own choosing-, but created for them by the uncon
trollable force of circumstances. There were few definite
ends proposed as to which all were alike agreed. That
the European peace should not be broken was the one
thing for which each State was obliged to work. But
the terms on which it was to be maintained were the
subject of controversy, and as to these it was hard
enough to come to a conclusion that could be accepted
as even tolerable. The thing, nevertheless, was done,
and in the only way in which it could have been done at
all. The settlement was made in outline, and the filling
in was left to follow. The task with which Europe is
now busy is the completion of the imperfect work. We
must be patient if this appears sometimes to be proceed
ing less rapidly than we could wish—patient, yet watch
ful and determined. That it will be done in the end we
see no reason to doubt. Done it must be, and there
fore done it will be, were the difficulties in the way ten
times greater than any that have yet shown them-
selves."
THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION.
The Saturday Review considers "the lndian Govern
ment will be well advised in dealing as vigorously as
circumstances may allow with the Ameer of Cabul, j
while he is still ostensibly isolated. The fable of the i
dwarf and the giant is a primitive anticipation of the
doctrine of responsibility. The humbler offender is
justly punished for acts which he may have committed
at the instigation of a powerful patron in the back
ground, There is reason to hope that the English Go
vernment has not been found unprepared. Its principal
members must have long since considered all the
questions which are now subjects or controversy. The
distribution between England and India of the cost
of tho probable war ought to be arranged on due
consideration both of the principle involved and of
the respective abilities of the two Governments.
An Indian quarrel is not rendered Imperial by the
accident of its having been fomented by Russia.
A neighbouring potentate has offered an affront and a
threat to the Viceroy, who is compelled to accept the
challenge without reference to iis real or supposed
motives or authors. It would not be at preeent politic
to recognise any interest of Rusiiia in a quarrel with
which no European Power except England has legiti
mate concern. The former Afghan war, which origi
nated in England much more fiistinctly than the pre
sent complication, was conducted at' the expense of
India. It is satisfactory to fina\ that, with few excep
tions, even Liberal politicians recognise the necessity of
action/'
The Spectator " cannot see why, if tbe general ad
vance is postponed, as it ought to be, and ap arentlv
will be—unless the Indian GoveAiment, a3 is possible, j
is concealing its intentions—till spring, we should not
postpone i altogether; why we should go forward
with this isolated movement on Candahar, which, so
far as appears, is to continue. It may be all mere
talk, but we notice in all the accounts a
reserve upon the expedition to Candaliar. Let
us reinforce Quetta, by all means. Let us
conciliate Khelat, by all nr.ans. Let us by
all means accumulate force at Sukkur, as we are
said to b 1 doing. But why should we press on to
Candahar, in order that an isolated and small corps
d'armce should remain there waiting through the long
winter ? Sljere Ali would not feel the loss of Caadahar,
and his people will feel the intolerable provocation
offered to their pride. We can take Candahar when we
want it just as well as now, and can convince India that
we are in earnest without running tbe risk involved in
so half-hearted an invasion, and encamping- a weak
army in a valley so completely cut off from India durino-
|. winter as if it were another planet."
The Standard will " not be persuaded but that it is
i the intention of the Indian Government, however
| reticent they may choose to appear of their designs,
to make an attempt to force the Khyber Pass without
i waiting for the assemblage of the main army under Sir
1 Frederick Haines. As for tho reserve which is practised
at head-quarters, it may be justifiable on the ground
that there are others besides the Afghans who may
benefit by the news of the contsmnlated operations -
but it is after all a vain precaution in th?se days!
Every movement of the troops must necessarily be
known all over India, and therefore to all tbe woritL
■ 4 ^ -- 1 L - —
9U5 .I9P.T0 uooS aru in nmi k-kav aaiiU W .aun.uwf'h
of Ottoman territory; or even if He outwardly sub.
mitted, that it would be with a secret determina
tion to rend'-r the occupation as difficult as nossible
for Austria. There was thus very cogent reason why
the St. Petersburg Calinefc should urge on the Yiennese
Government to appropriate these outlying provinces
of its neighbour, and Count AkdeaSSY unfortunately
suifered himself to be beguiled into a proceeding
whxh made Austria a. particejps criniinis in the par-
tition of European Tu key. Not le^s ciever is the
way in which Muscovite diplomacy has brought
about the embarrassment of Oxreat Britain. A com
parison of dates will show that General Aub - amofb "
was not sent to Gabul, as has been alleged by the S;.
Petersburg Government, at the moment when
England and Russia were on the eve o£
war. That danger had passed some time
before the Mission set out from Turkestan,
although it is likely enough that a secret
arrangement had been come to with Shebb
Ali some months before. But, arrangement or no
arrangiment. it is a fact that frkndly relations were
supposed to exist between the Russian and English
Governments when the Envoy started on his eirand
of mischief. What ification, then, can be
pleaded for the flagrant breach of the understand
ing, constantly reiterated by our great Asiatic rival,
" that Afghanistan lay beyond the sphere of Rus
sian politics " ? To pretend that the .Mission had
no political object is an insult to common sense,
for if its purpose had been merely an ordinary es-
I change of courtesies, the Czab would not have ap.
j pointed as Envoy the most consummate diplomatist
in Asiatic affairs in his service. Without question.
General Abramoit went to C:tbul for the express-
purpose of bivnginar the Ameee under Russian in-
fluence. Success crowned the attempt, ana England
i now has to face'the prospect of a troublesome war
I on her Indian frontier, which cannot possibly bring
her any profit, and may result in inconvenient com-,
plications.
Even assuming that our arms meet with no check
during the advance into Afghanistan, and that we
take possession of the northern exits from the passes
without much trouble, this success will not be ob*
; tained for nothing. We may safely count on a cer
tain loss of life, for the Afghans know how to fight
in their own country. It also seems inevitable that
the cost of the invasion will amount to a large*
sum than was first expected, as the number
of troops to be employed is now set down
at double the figure originally estimated as
sufficient. Some losses in blood and treasure
are cert an, but Russia has wrought us even
worse mischief by compelling the Indian Govern
ment to enter into a war which, be its results what
it may, will inevitably embitter the whole Afghan
I nation' against England. These people are ardent
| patriots, and when it comes to the invasion of
1 their land, they do not enter into the rights and
, wrongs of the matter, but unite as one man m
' deadly hostility to the intruder. Unless Shebe Ali
should give in at the last moment, which is ex
tremely improbable, this will be the legacy left to
England by the astute General Abbamofp , and-
at pome future time we shall have Russia ad*
vancing into Afghanistan as the champion of her
I people against the hated English. Thus, whatever
1 ernes of it, as matters stand at present, Russia
! wins, England loses. We do not wonder,
therefore, at the feeling which is slowly
growing up in this country, that it will
i hi very pusillanimous policy to can tine our
punishment to that half demented despot, .- here
Ali . while allowing the Power who really wovked us
all' tb<J misehlirfhftr ends- without i€t Of
iiadrance- . - :
OUK CONTEMPORARIES.
AFFAIRS IN THE BAST (Per.) A Persian custom allowing an individual to seek asylum at a designated location. .
The Times says :—" If there are still elements of dis
quiet and disorder in Eastern Europe, we may be satis
fied to believe that the difficulties are not insurmount
able. Nothing-, it may be said, has happened, or
appears likely to happen, of which the germs could not |
be discovere 1 in the conclusions of the Berlin Congress.
The Berlin Treaty could not pretend to be an instant
settlement of the Eastern Question. There were two
ways open on which an agreement misrht have been
arrived at. It was possible for the assembled statesmen
to have drawn up a far 9-ore elaborate docament than
the: Berlin Treaty. Every point might have been
arranged beforehand, every difficulty might have been
foreseen and expressly provided against. Contin
gencies, likely and unlikely, might all have been duly
written down, ani the entire problem and the answer
might have been stated together and settled out of
hand. It is, we know, in this sort of way that lawyers
love to proceed when they are spinning out deeds of
partnership or assisting at the birth of a joint-stock
company. It is well enough suited to a case where
the parties are in agreement beforehand, and
have come together by their own choice. It |
was scarcely as well suited to the kind of
work that had to be done at Berlin. The
problem there was, not to arrange agreements, but
to put an end to existing qnan els. The parties to be
brought to terms had been forced into relations, not of
their own choosing, but created for them by the uncon
trollable force of circumstances. There were few definite
ends proposed as to which all were alike agreed. That
the European peace should not be broken was the one
thing for which each State was obliged to work. But ■
the terms on which it was to be maintained were the
subject of controversy, and as to these it was hard
enough to come to a conclusion that could be accepted
as even tolerable. The thing, nevertheless, was done,
and in the only way in which it could have been done at
all. The settlement was made in outline, and the filling
in was left to follow. The task with which Europe is
now busy is the completion of the imperfect work. We
must be patient if this appears sometimes to be proceed
ing less rapidly than we could wish—patient, yet watch
ful and determined. That it will be done in the end we
see no reason to doubt. Done it must be, and there
fore done it will be, were the difficulties in the way ten
times greater than any that have yet shown them
selves,"
THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION.
The Saturday Bevietv considers the lndian Govern
ment will be well advised in dealing as vigorously as
circumstances may allow with the Ameer of Cabul,
while he is still ostensibly isolated. The fable of the 1
dwarf and the giant is a primitive anticipation of the
doctrine of responsibility. The humbler offender is
justly punished for acts which he may have committed
at the instigation of a powerful patron in the back
ground. There is reason to hope that the English Go
vernment has not been found unprepared. Its principal
members must have long since considered all the
questions which are now subjects of controversy. The
distribution between England and India of the cost
of tho probable war ought to be arranged on due
consideration both of the principle involved and of
the respective abilities of the two Governments.
An Indian quarrel is not rendered Imperial by the
accident of its having been fomented by Eussia.
A neighbouring potentate has offered an affront and a
threat to the Viceroy, who is compelled to accept the
challenge without reference to its real or supposed
motives or authors. It would not be at present poiitic .
to recognise any interest of Rusi/ia in a quarrel with
which no European Power except England has legiti-
mate concern. The former Afghan war, which origi
nated in England much more (distinctly than the pre
sent complication, was conduced at the expense of
India. It is satisfactory to finc^ that, with few excep
tions, even Liberal politicians recognise the necessity of
action." 1
The Spectator " cannot see why, if tbe general ad- i
vance is postponed, as it ought ti be, and ap arently i
will be—unless the Indian Goveitament, ai is possible,
is concealing its intentions—till spring, we should not
postpone i altogether j why we should go forward
with this isolated movement on Candahar, which, so
far a=! appears, is to continue. Jt may be all mere
talk, but we notice in all the accounts a
reserve upon the expedition to Candahar. Let
us reinforce Quetta, by all means. Jjet us
conciuate Khelat, by all m r ans. Let us by
all means accumulate force at Sukkur, as we are
said to b 1 doing. But why should we press on to
Candahar, in order that an isolated and small corps !
d'armce should remain there waiting through the long
winter ? Sljere Ali would not feel the loss of Candahar,
and his people will feel the intolerable provocation
I offered to their pride. We can take Candabar when we
1 want it just as well as now, and can convince India that I
we are in earnest without running tbe risk involved in 1
so half-hearted an invasion, and encamping a weak !
army in a valley so completely cut off from India durino- j
■ winter as if it were another planet."
The Standard will 0 not be persuaded but that it is
i the intention of the Indian Government, however
J reticent they may choose to app?ar of their designs,
' to make an attempt to force the Khyber Pass without
| waiting for the assemblage of the main army under Sir
1 Frederick Haines. As for the reserve which is practised
at head-quarters, it may ba justifiable cn the ground
that there are others besides the Afghans who may
benefit by the news of the contemplated operations-
but it is after all a vain precaution in th?se days!
Every movement of the troops must necessarily be
known all over India, and therefore to all the world,
within a few hours of its being ordered, and the utmost
candour in this respect cannot be half so mischievous as
delay."