Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎138r] (284/312)

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AFQSAmBTAN ,
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir, —It is, no doubt, desirable that in so important a
matter as the Afghanistan fiasco there should be ample and
unrestricted discussion, and the letters of such men as Earl
Grey and Lord Lawrence should receive careful considera
tion.
So much, however, has already been said and written as
regards the past that it would be presumptuous in me to
offer any observations on what has ceased to be practically
important, and it would, I venture to think, be the part of
true wisdom to say, with Mrs. Malaprop, " No more
anticipations of the past; let all our retrospections be to
j the future."
Whether, therefore, the " masterly inactivity " of bygone
days was wise or unwise might, I apprehend, be left to the
region of history, and not be suffered to interfere with the
vital question now before the country ; and on this point I
would wish to say a few words.
Having had some opportunity of watching the movements
of the Oriental world, and having, with many others j
observed with pain the terrible evils which have been
brought upon us by ignorance of the native character, I
would desire to point out that prevalent and unfailing
characteristic which invariably actuates them in their
dealings with others—the natives of India can neve
understand conciliation or compromise. "Whether in a
petty case before a Court of Justice, a social dispute, er a
matter of peace or war, conciliation is regarded as fear>
compromise as a confession of weakness.
For England, after the public and offensive insult offered
by Shere Ali, to exhibit the slightest hesitation or to enter
into any conciliatory negotiations would at once be
regarded, not only by the Ameer himself, but by the people
and Princes of India, as a mark of weakness, a fear of
Russia, a distrust of her own power, and a confession of
inferiority. This is our real danger, infinitely more serious
than any difficulty or disaster which we may encounter in
the struggle with Afghanistan ; and if this js passed over,
forgotten, or set aside under a sentimental and misplaced
theory of maudlin conciliation, our prestige is gone and our
ultimate defeat only a question of time.
I sincerely trust that the excellent spirit in which you
have discussed this vital question will counteract the well-
meaning, but unwise and inappropriate, suggestions made
in other quarters. I am, yours obediently,
WILLIAM TAYLOR, late Commissioner of Patna.
AFGHANISTAN.
We published yesterday the details as far as they
are yet gazetted of the Expeditionary Force
destined for service in Afghanistan. They call for
some comment, inasmuch as the traditional organi
zationofan Indian field force has been entirely
abandoned, and a new and as yet quite untried
system supersedes that which for generations has
won for us an unchecked career of victory through
out the length and breadth of Hindostan.
The Northern or Khyber column is evidently not
alluded to in the details which have as yet
reached us, and that one we may assume will be the
most powerful of all the Divisions. Taking the
other details we find that the Quettah and Kuram
columns, together with General Donald Stewart's
reserve, comprise 14 batteries with a siege train, five
squadrons of British Cavalry, 18 squadrons of
K ative Cavalry, four battalions of British with 17
of Native Infantry, or, in round numbers, 84 field
guns, 3,300 Cavalry, with 11,000 Infantry. Here
we find that the usual proportion of Artillery to
other branches, which in Europe varies from three
to four guns per thousand, has been increased to
six per thousand,—a change we are disposed to ac
quiesce in, for although the actual effect of ar
tillery fire is absurdly small, and although its
moral effect on European troops, when once sea
soned to the fray, is absolutely nil, yet Orientals,
more especially hill men, hold it in such dread that
a few well pitched shells, even if no casualties
occur, will clear a ridge as if by magic. The im
proved accuracy and increased range of guns
has modified the principles of hill warfare. In
former days it was necessary to crown the heights
dominating a pass withskirm)shers,and so by the aid
; of infantry clear a way for the guns toiling in the
ravines below. That, however, was in the days
when from 1,000 to 1,200 yards.;was the maximum
range of field artillery. Now, however, when our
rifled cannon throw with accuracy to a distance of
from 3,000 to 4,000 yards, these conditions have
been completely changed ; a position can generally
be found in the pass below whence the command
ing heights can be thoroughly searched out by shell'
fire long before the infantry flanking parties arrive
within rifle range. Their work then is much
accelerated and the casualties consequently
lessened. Our gunners will not find themselves
(unless the rumours of unofficial warfare take a
much more decided shape than we imagine) op
posed to guns worthy of their steel, and we imagine
that the principal role they will have to play will
be clearing heights at long ranges and high eleva
tions. Much as we are inclined to approve the
preponderance of artillery iu the expeditionary
force, we cannot but regret the total dispro
portion of British to Native Infantry. Hitherto
it has been accepted as an axiom in In
dian warfare that an Infantry Brigade should
consist of one British to two Native battalions, and
this plan has received the sanction of usage and
the stamp of success. Now, however, in defiance
of past experience, and in obedience to no new
principle that wo can hear of, we learn that no less
than 17 Native Infantry Corps are included in the
forces detailed for service, and that there are but
four British regiments to form the backbone of the
army. This truly is carrying ti e principle that a
little leaven leaveneth the whole to an extreme,
and is so opposed to the hereditary custom of the
Indian Government that we cannot but hope that
the details of the army have not yet been gazetted
in extenso. It is folly to ignore the fact that we hold
India simply and solely by the aid of those 60,000
British soldiers cantoned there, that without them
the 120,000 native troops would be as useless as a
steam vessel without her engines. In case of any
difficulty, any reverse, it is the thin red
line which promptly puts matters on their
proper basis. Even when matters are going on in
a straightforward manner, however excellent our
native troops may be, there is no gainsaying
the fact that without British officers to lead
them, British bayonets to support them, they
would be valueless. Can it be denied that the
heroic gallantry of our Line Corps at Chillian-
wallah saved the day ? A perusal of the casualty
rolls of that engagement shows on whom the brunt
of the engagement fell, how the tide of
Sikh success was stemmed. In like manner,
in the Mutiny, gallantly as the loyal natives
fought at Lucknow, was it not the 82d that
really held the place ? So again at Delhi; without
the skeleton battalions of white faces which lined
the ridge would it have been possible for the Pan-
jabis to have stormed the city ? We maintain
not. There are men in India, now at Simla, who
well remember the worth—the inestimable worth—
of a handful of British soldiers in 1857. Let them
not be deluded into the fact that things have
changed since then, and that because in outward
show our Native Army is smarter, more mobile,
more advanced in the theory of war, therefore
it is the more to be relied on in time of actual
trouble than it was 20 years ago.
We are glad to note that the Line Regiments de
stined to join the Army of Invasion have been
drawn from statiuns quite unconnected with the
frontier. For instance, the 17th Foot was, at the
time of receiving its order to move, at Kuldunah
in the Murree Hills ; the 18th were at Ferozepore ;
the 59th at Dugshae ; and the 60th Rifles at Mee-
rut. In moving these corps the Government are
avoiding the error of weakening frontier stations
in the vicinity of which hostilities are likely to
occur, or those head-quarters of religious fanaticism
which require especial watching. In like manner
the Native Cavalry Regiments are drawn from
Mian Meer, Mooltan, and Jhelum ; the Native: In
fantry from Jullundur,Mooltan, Sialkot, Dhurmsala,
Almora, Jhelum, and Tahagaon—all stations on the
natural line of reserve. Doubtless the Khyber
column will be chiefly composed of troops from
Peshawur and its legitimate supports of Nowshera
and Rawul Pindi, while troops from Umballa and
even further south will be pushed up to fill their
places ; so that our border line will be amply de
fended after the advance of the 25,000 to 30,000 men
destined to take part in the second Afghan war.
Of the troops now under orders for Cabul there are
some.regiments which took part in the former cam
paign : the 17th Foot stormed Ghuznee, and wear
the tiger on their caps in token of the gallant ser
vice they have performed in our Indian Empire.
The 12th Bengal Native Infantry are still styled
the Khelat-i-Ghilzae Regiment, and under that
designation earned lasting fame in the last great'
war. We still are in hopes that when the complete
details of the force are published we shall find the
British element increased to the strength usually
considered necessary in Indian campaigns. Sir
Frederick Haines has had experience of Eastern war
fare ; he knows full well the value to be attached to
the Line regiments in a mixed force. Lord Lytton,too
is surrounded by men whose schooling has been of
the sterner sort, men like Sir Sam Browne, Sir
James Brind, and others, who can fully appreciate
the difficulties even of a war with a paltry Oriental
potentate, and we may rest assured that a full pro
portion of British corps will be made available for
the forward move, even if extra troops have to be
asked for from England.
The fact, however, of stopping the ordinary re
liefs will increase the strength of our English troops
in India by about 6,000 men, among whom will be
four complete Line battalions. These, of course,will
release an equal number from purely police duties
and so enable the Commander-in-Chief to strengthen
the army in the field in a not inconsiderable manner.
When we recollect that battalions from many places
in Northern India can easily be spared for field
duties, there is every reason to hope the organi
zation of the Arhiy of Invasion may be completed
to the satisfaction of all who take a pride in the
prompt success of our military movements. We
are not overstating the case when in asserting that