Letter No.785 of 1869 from Colonel Sir William Lockyer Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, Commissioner's Office, Camp Mora to Colonel Robert Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier [‎5v] (5/8)

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made as to be quite useless. The locality called their " Shikargah'' by the
Murrees is the low range of hills near Mittree, known in former years to our
army as the " Chota Bolan," and from that to Hajee-ke-Shehr, and their line
of approach almost always by Mull. To enable the Phoolajee post to act effect
ively against a body of plunderers that were known to have left the hills, or
of whose attack on a Kafilah A train of travellers; a caravan; or any large party of travellers. in the above locality intelligence had been re
ceived, it would have to proceed with all speed to Mull, a distance of 39 miles,
to find the enemy had regained the hiJls, for the Murrees knowing the de
tachment was at Phoolajee would take care not to risk being intercepted. In
your letter I observe you propose leaving the protection of the Mittree and
Ilajee-ke-Shehr line of road to the Khelat authorities. This might equally be
done without our having a post at Phoolajee. I believe arrangements have
been made this season by His Highness the Khan for this purpose, and levies
placed by his officers at Lehree, Mull, and Mittree. This is as it should be,
and if the scheme is properly carried out by the Khelat authorities, it will en
sure all that is required.
7. The 5th point is, can the new posts be given from the existing Force
now on the Frontier ? You state in your letter, and in this opinion I quite con
cur, that it would not be advisable to withdraw the posts of Kusmore, Soee,
Toj, Sunree, and Goreenaree, the new posts then will be so much additional
duty imposed on the Force, and will certainly require two Squadrons or frds of
a Regiment of Cavalry. Knowing as I well do that the reductions in 1862
brought the Frontier Force to as low a mark as it was possible, and the ne
cessity of regular reliefs in such duty as it has to carry out, I question the
possibility of the arrangement being made, and shall be glad of a report from
you on this point particularly.
8. The Gth point is a very important one, and one which has, I think )
escaped due attention. It has always been, and naturally must ever be as
long as the Khan of Khelat remains a free and independent Sovereign, our
great object to increase his influence, and strengthen his power within his
country as much as we can. To relieve him of constant complaints by us re
garding lawless acts committed by certain refractory portions of his subjects
would doubtless be in some respect satisfactory, but when that end is only to
be gained by so public an acknowledgment of his weakness, one so likely to
have the worst effect on the remainder of his subjects, his wisdom in accepting
such relief would be most questionable, and for us to recommend it, would be
abandoning the policy we know to be right and most sound, the whole subject
of the protection of our Western Frontier being taken into consideration. As
long as the Khanate of Khelat is in the hands of one person, and that one as
at present only desirous to act in accordance with the wishes of the British
Government, we need feel no concern about the safety of our Frontier from
Korth to South. But once let his powers be destroyed, and the country fall
into the hands of a number of petty Chieftains with little control over their
followers, then the principle which is proposed for the Boogtee country will
hive to be carried out the whole way down to the Sea.