Letter No.52 of 1870 from Colonel Sir William Lockyer Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner's Office, Camp the Tanda to His Excellency The Right Honourable Sir William Robert Seymour Vesey Fitzgerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay [‎64v] (22/28)

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3.5. With regard to maintaining this force, the Khan is I conclude the
best judge as to its necessity, and considering his life was once nearly taken,
and he was violently deposed by the very Barons it is recommended he should
call again to his side without any new power of control over them, it is not
surprising that the Khan should desire to keep by him some support, in which
lie has at all events some confidence. Exactly the same course of events that
occurred in Beloochistan is now passing in Affghanistan. His Highness the
Ameer finding it impossible to trust any longer to the doubtful support of his
nobles, and their treacherous levies, is putting an end to the feudal system,
and forming a regular paid army, and I hold we have no more right or reason
to interfere with the proceedings of His Highness the Khan of Kelat in this
way, than we have with His Highness the Ameer of Gabool.
36. Colonel Phayre, however, in spite of the views of Government com
municated to him by order of your Excellency, last summer, and in spite of the
clear evidence of the gross misconduct of the Chiefs of Beloochistan, which
was laid before him by the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Captain Harrison, still conceives
that some further interference than has hitherto been exerted should be em
ployed, and that the Chiefs being a grievously ill-nsed set of people, measures
should be adopted to compel His Highness the Khan to treat them in a
different manner. I need hardly say that I entirely differ with Colonel Phayre
in his estimation of the state of affairs in Beloochistan, and particularly so in
regard to the light in which he holds our relations with that State. It is not
quite clear what course exactly he would pursue, but it would seem that his
first move would be to address His Highness the Khan on the part cf Go
vernment with a threat that, unless he behaved better to his nobles, and crave
^ O
them the share of power in his kingdom, which they thought they should have,
the British Officer at his Court would be withdrawn, and he would be left to
his own devices. Colonel Phayre lays stress on this being the policy of Lord
Elphinstone's Government in 1858, but that was only enunciated on a very
adverse report on the Khan's personal character, and it was never considered
requisite to carry it into effect.
37. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this would now be a style of
interference totally opposed to the orders of Government, and unjust to His
Highness the Khan himself, who has ever staunchly adhered to that part of the
Treaty under which he bound himself " to act in subordinate co-operation with
ts the British Government, and to enter into no negotiation with other States
'• without its consent," and has steadily endeavoured, in spite of great difficul
ties and most adverse circumstances, to carry out to the best of his ability
and po\\er, the other terms of the ireaty. It would also be a very false move,
for it would be setting ourselves in direct antagonism to the Khan. It would
destroy his power for good as ruler of the country, and it would infallibly
lead to greater dissensions than had ever occurred before, a scramble for power,
ending in the country being parcelled out amongst a number of rival Chieftains,
jealous of and hostile to each other, and ready to hand their services over to