'Memorandum respecting British interests in the Persian Gulf' [‎45r] (55/126)

1901.
To Sir F. Fascelles,
No. 128,
Telegraphic,
August 10,
1901.
To Sir N. O’Conor,
No. 103,
Telegraphic,
August 10,
1901.
Sir N. O’Conor,
Nos. 92 and 93,
Telegraphic,
August 21, 1901.
Sir N. O’Conor,
No. 102,
Telegraphic,
August 29, 1901.
To Sir F. Lascelles,
No. 306,
August 29, 1901.
It was therefore pointed out to Sir E. Lascelles
that the German Government might take advan
tage of his language to argue that the Sultan
could dispose of the territory of. the Sheikh.
The view that the Sheikh was simply a subject
of the Sultan was one that Her Majesty’s
Government were totally unable to accept, and
his Excellency was instructed to use language
of a more explicit character.
Sir N. O’Conor was at the same time authorized
to state, if occasion arose, that if Koweit were
threatened, Her Majesty’s Government would use
force to prevent attack.
Important communications now took place at
Constantinople and London.
Considerable pressure was being exercised on
the Ottoman Government by the German and
Itussian Embassies, and, though a proposal of
the Yali of Bussorah to use force against the
Sheikh had been rejected by the Council of
Ministers, Tewfik Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. informed Sir N. O’Conor
that Koweit was regarded as an integral part of
the Ottoman Empire. A warning given by the
Commander of the “ Perseus ” to the Captain of
a Turkish corvette off Koweit that no troops
w r ould be permitted to land was largely magnified
in transmission, and occasioned further protests.
Tewfik Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. inquired on the 29th August
whether Her Majesty’s Government intended to
establish a Protectorate, and on the same day the
German Embassy in London received a pressing
instruction to state that a British Protectorate
would be contrary to the Treaty of Berlin, and
that, in view of her interest in Koweit as the
future terminus of the Anatolian Bail way,
Germany would he compelled to regard such a
proceeding as an unfriendly act. The reply in
each case was that His Majesty’s Government
had no such intention. Sir N. O’Conor adding the
reservation “ provided that Turkey did not force
our hands by interfering with the Sheikh.”
Subsequently, the German Ambassador called
to say “ that if by threats of force His Majesty’s
Government prevented the Sultan from landing
troops at Koweit, they were refusing to recognize
the Sultan’s authority with which they had
stated (in a Memorandum communicated by the
King to the German Emperor) that they did not
desire to interfere in those parts, and that the
German Government considered that Koweit
formed unquestionably part of the territories
belonging to the Sultan.”