'Reconaissance through Baluchistan and Seistan, 1897' [‎8v] (21/120)

12
CHAPTER II.
Future
policy.
Russian Designs and Political Considerations.
During the stay of the Mission in Seistan over a lengthened period, I travelled
every foot of the country which enabled my party to cement very friendly relations with
the priests and people of the country.
My repeated tours in all directions enable me to verify the information embodied
m this report, which was chiefly extracted from the Revenue, Octroi, and State Records,
to which I had access (surreptitiously) owing to the cordial and friendly relations which
my profession enabled me to establish with the Sardars, officials, and others. It is
not my intention here to explain from what source I gathered the information anent
Russian aspirations, &c., I simply confine myself to recording what came to my notice.
. The remedies to be adopted to counter Russian designs I leave to abler heads than
nune, yet I do not think a fatal blow would be struck to the well-being of our trade and
prestige all over Persia, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan if we were to establish without
loss of time a British agent in Seistan, and thus checkmate the not remote contino-ency
of our rival forestalling us by making such an appointment. This alone would strengthen
our hands and give confidence to British traders.
The Sardars, priests, and people throughout the country have for years been well
disposed towards the British Government, and are strongly in favour of coming under our
suzeiainty in preference to that of our northern rival. This was frequently assured me
and beautifully illustrated by the following expression: “ Sag-i-zard, biradar-i-shiyhal”
(literally, the yellow dog and the jackal are of the same family), often repeated to
us, and really meaning that the present Persian rulers are bad enough, but that the
Russians would be no better.
One of the head Mullahs of the country informed me secretly that “ beyond doubt
the Russians had got hold of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah, and there was every probability of
his secretly granting them concessions and allowing the Russians to occupy Khaf Biriand
and Seistan. That when that day came they would no longer be Mahomedansthey all
knew the Supreme Sarkar respected the Mahomedan religion and laws all over the world
but they did not think the Russians would. That everyone throughout the kingdom
knew in their hearts of the right and might of the English laws, &c.”
I cannot in all humility say what ought to be done, and merely repeat the above as
things that may come to pass, feeling steadfast in the belief that if we neglect
to maintain a preponderating influence in Seistan our northern rival will assuredlv
become mistress of it.
I he object of Russia’s recent activity in Khorassan has yet to be disclosed. Her
political aspirations as regards Eastern Persia, particularly the fertile oasis of Seistan
have been revealed to me during my stay in the country. With her rapidly increasing
influence in Northern 1 ersia, the present official entente between Persia and Russia must
be carefully watched. It is certainly prejudicial to our Imperial interest to permit anv
further extension of Russian influence south, on this side, so near our Indian frontier
at the only assailable point now open to our northern rival.
The most important of these are the gigantic railway projects of linking up the
Irans-Caspian Railway with a port on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (Bandar Abas or Chahba)
and the acquisition of Khorassan as far south and including Seistan, with a branch line
running to it from Birjand.
Some ambitious Muscovites hope that with the advance of time, and by mutual
consent, this proposed extension may be linked up with our Baluchistan railway.
^ ^ ^ e 1 e .^ k e . ^ severe blow to our amour propre if Russian influence at the
Tehran Court (which with the present Shah is very great, vide previous report at pa^e 79
A Reconnaissance through Persian-Baluchistan and Eastern Persia, 1893 and 1894
succeed, and her long-sought-for concessions be granted by the present Shah.
The acquisition of Khorassan and ultimate occupation of Seistan by Russia is of no
mean significance, yet it is to her trifling, in comparison to its importance to us. Such
a concession would virtually damage our prestige, not only amongst tribes in the country,