File 619/1907 Pt 7 'Arms traffic: Persian Gulf. Debai incident.' [‎172v] (26/142)

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petty shopkeeper hailing from Lingah, Lar, and Bastak, whom we are indebted
Truciaf rm’T n Tf r 0 r^ 0 S T e traffi ° “ Sma11 consi ? nf ««ts of arms from the
W, »fi C f' m ?' d n0t Seem an onerous condition to ask the Shaikh to
?, fi ° f a " flK irora a ver y sma11 proportion of those who had so freely
used them against our men. As a matter of fact, however, the Shaikh’s autl.o'-
y u ,s not sufficient to enable him to confiscate more than 300 weapons
and for the rest he substituted cash at the rate of 100 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per rifle.
., ^ , ' e s,,m of ,, 50 i 0 ?, 0 ' vas scgSested by me to the Admiral as a suit
able figure with full knowledge of the Shaikh’s financial position and of the
extent to " Inch he would be able to levy contribution from his notables and
subjects The Shaikh accepted this condition so promptly that I was rather
inclined to think that he was prepared for a higher figure.
. p u any oase , it wil1 b ® realised from the terms of my letters to the Shaikh
that Government are not committed in regard to the disposal of this amount
and I may add that it was my hope that Government would decide to authorise
111 tv 1 le that they felt it nece.ssary to press the installation of
a British Agent and a Post Office and to ad.i that If he met thffir wthef whicn
were for the good of his town and himself, in a tractable way, the money fine
would be refunded to him. J ^ une
.... 4 - fff Government of India should have been consulted as to the con-
dihonsof the ultimatum —\have the honour to ex plain that His Exceilenc v the
Commander-In-Chief and I left for Behai at very short notice, and tlfa t
was only on the way thither that we learnt the details of what had taken place
On arrival we found that the populace had all sent iheir women and children
out of the town into the hinterland and that the Shaikh feared to came off as
usual on seeing my flag, until he he had received a safe conduct in writing
from me. It was clear in fact from the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. Agent’s report that thev had
anticipated immediate hostilities and were pleasantly surprised at not e ettin<‘
them These people do not under tand deliberate methods of justice “and ft
would have been difficult to prolong such a situation as existed while we
attempted to exchange telegraphic communications with Government bv wire
less, which was liable to interruption from atmospherics at any moment in the
most uncertain weather which prevailed at the time. ’
As to whether the conditions we imposed were suitable or the reverse the
Government of India must decide, but I cannot think that the situation was
one " Inch could have been delayed without prejudice while we made references
to Calcutta and awaited replies.
5. The idea oJ- installing a British Agent by bombardment. This
is not quite what His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and I contem
plated, and I think it is perhaps a cdse in which telegraphic brevity or
faulty expression has conveyed a wrung impression. We had no primary
wish to install an Agent by bombardment, indeed we were greatly averse to
any bombaidment at all, as calculated to cripple the port from a trade point of
1 view tor some time to come W e had every hope that the action taken in the
present connection would demonstrate to the Shaikh and his people that thev
must make up their minds to fall in with the reasonable requirements of the
protecting Power, and both the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. Agent and the Shaikhs of Sharjah
and Umm-el-Kawain were enjoined, and undertook, to endeavour, pending
reply from Government, to influence the Shaikh and his notables in the riaht
direction in tins connection. We hoped good counsels would prevail but “we
thought it conceivable that the Shaikh might be put up by his reactionary
adviser to oppose the British Agent and the Post Office and that in that even
tuality, in order to bring him and the intractable section of his followers to
their knees, it might be necessary to occupy the town for a short period after
first dominating it by bombardment. As it was probable that most of the
Arabs would bolt to the desert very shortly after the fire commenced from the
ships, we had to consider the question of dealing with some 2000 well-armed
men, and for that reason it was considered necessary to have sufficient force at
hand in case the worst happened. It was thought probable that the majority
o: them could be withdrawn after a very short occupation. J 3
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