File 351/1904 'Persian Gulf:- Erection of British flagstaffs at Musandam’ [‎213v] (431/454)

/
4. The (juestion of tho position to be assumed bv Great Britain at the
entrance to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. either in the event of'hostilities with a foreign
I ower, or—which is perhaps even more important—with a view to preventin'-
the acquisition of coaling stations or harbours by such Powers in time of peace"
resolves itself into a decision as to the best stations to he occupied on the’
northern and southern sides of the entrance. Stations outside the Gulf or
inside it at any distance from tho mouth, will not enable a fleet to operate with
nearly so much rapidity or advantage: while the configuration of the entrance
the two sides of which are in sight of each other, is such as to give to a naval
1 ower, suitably established on either coast, a command of the interior waters
so absolute as to enable it to dispense with stations farther up the Gulf and
to exercise a commanding control over the movements of a Power possessing
any such bases. For this purpose the anchorage at the eastern end of Kishm
Island, which is formed by the islands of Kishm, Larak, and Hormuz, hein-
enclosed between them and the mainland, on which stands the port of Bunder
Abbas, appears to afford an almost ideal position on the northern side. The
anchorage extends far up the channel between Kishm and the mainland
v men is known as Clarence Straits. It is well screened from the sea * it
would accommodate the largest fleet; it commands an important Persian
trading port and trade route; and there has been for a long time past a
consensus of expert naval opinion that this is the first position that should
e occujned by Great Britain, together with the adjoining islands, in the
event of such action being required. The anchorage in question is not one
where a coaling station w^ould probably be established, or which would call
lor detence. But as a place of rendezvous for a fleet that desired to com
mand the entry to the Gulf, and to prevent the acquisition of Bunder Abbas or
t le neighbouring islands by a foreign Power, it would appear to be admirably
adapted for the purpose. y
b. i lie investigation conducted by the Viceroy and the Admiral on the oppo
site shores of the mouth of the Gulf, where they explored the various harbours,
inlets, and fiords of the curiously indented promontory commonly known as
Cape Musandim, led to equally clear conclusions. It will be seen from the report
ot the JNaval Commander-in-Chief that he advocates establishing a lien as a
coaling station upon the anchorage of Khor Kawi on the western side of the
peninsula, presuming that further surveys, wFich he ordered, but the results of
winch w T e have not yet learned, confirm its desirability as an anchorage. At
the same time it would be necessary to take steps to prevent the occupation
by foreign Powers of the fine harbours of Kubbat Ghazira (Malcolm Inlet) and
Knor-ash-Shern (Elphinstone Inlet), which pierce the peninsula at its narrowest
point, and are only prevented from mingling their waters by a narrow isthmus
or tongue of land a few hundred yards in width. These harbours are not
required by us, because there are superior positions elsewhere, and because
oi their torrid and insupportable climate in the summer. At the same time
it is undesirable that any foreign flag should be planted in either of them
or that any question, save of British ownership, should arise. Fortunately
this question is one that admits of easy solution. Elphinstone Inlet has
already once been in British occupation. The plinth of the former Telegraph
fetation on a small island in tho interior of the Khor is still standing^ and
the cable itself w^as taken in former days from Malcolm Inlet across the
narrow isthmus that we have described. In Lord George Hamilton’s despatch
Iso. 4 (Secret), dated 27th February 1903, we received permission to re-occupy
the old lelegraph Station at a suitable opportunity. It seems to us that the
best way oi: effecting this re-occupation and of preventing the contino-encv
ot foreign rivalry would be to erect a flagstaff on the isthmus that commands
the two harbours, and also on Telegraph Island. The posts will be put un
unobtrusively, and the action is likely not only not to attract attention, but in
all probability to remain undiscovered for a longtime, so rarely are these
waters visited by any but British vessels and so infrequently even by these
V\ e believe that^ we should have no difficulty in arranging with the local
n es who consist only of a few miserable communities of fishermen occupv-
mg any villages in the inner recesses of the coves, and acknowledging no Chief
or master—to take care of the flagstaffs, and occasionally, or when required to
hoist a flag upon them. We would propose, as recommended by tlm Admiral
rv