Telegrams Relating to the South Persia Rifles [‎110r] (1/4)

Thin document is the property o f the Secretary o f State for India.
SECRET.
h'rom Secretary of State to \ iceroy, Army Department.
\)th January 19.17. \
Secret. No. ‘>431. South Persia. See telegram from Commander-in-Chief,
fndia, to Chief of Imperial Geueral Staff, No. 203. War Cabinet have con
sidered whole situation, and are of opinion that as operations round Shiraz
have now assumed a distinctly military character, it will probably be
necessary that Sykes’s force, including South Persian Rilles, should be
replaced under Government of India and command exercised by a military
officer appointed by you. War Cabinet therefore wish for an appreciation
from you of the situation as likely to develop in next few months, and of the
best means of dealing with it. In particular do you advise : —
(1) Occupation from Bush ire of the plain country between Bushire and
Daliki for at any rate some months on the understanding that
troops are not to commit themselves to an advance into the hills.
(2) Reinforcement of Shiraz from Lingah or Bunder Abbas ?
(3) If so, what troops would be required in either case, and can you supply
them ? Jf you can, what effect will this have on your other military
commitments ?
(4) To ensure proper co-ordination between forces at Shiraz and Bushire
do you think it desirable that both forces should be under your
control ?
(5) What are your views as to Sykes’s position and functions under
suggested arrangement ?
(C) Have you any other suggestions ?
It will, of course, be understood that in all questions of policy regarding
Persia, Government of India will be guided by ilis Majesty’s Minister,
Teheran, consulting him as well as me and keeping us fully informed.
Please repeat to Teheran, Commander-in-Chief’s telegram 203, this
telegram, and all subsequent telegrams on this subject emanating from you.
From Viceroy, A rmy Department, 2lst January 1917.
940. Tour telegram of the 9th January, 3431. The concrete facts before
us are (1) from all information it appears that Turks in vicinity of Baghdad
will be materially strengthened at an early date, possibly by as much as four
divisions ; (2) the unrest in Southern Persia may be ascribed to German and
Turkish influence among the local tribesmen. From these two facts it is
probable that enemy have not lost sight of their aim to push bodies of troops
towards Afghanistan with a view to induce Amir to take sides against us.
To accomplish their ambitions the Turks may intend (1) to endeavour to
overwhelm Maude at Ivut-al-Amarah; (2) to await advent of floods and the hot
weather to pin him to his present position with sufficient troops whilst
utilising bulk of their forces for a movement through Persia, which in view
of Russian menace to their communications, should the Turks advance
rid Teheran, is likely to follow a south-eastern direction via Ispahan.
Climatic conditions favour attack on Maude being undertaken during
the cold weather; the movement through Persia is preferably a hot
weather operation. The development of Shiraz situation must therefore
depend on success or failure of plan as above outlined. Bo long as we
maintain our present position on the Tigris enemy’s plans in Persia are
impeded, their eastward move checked, and the arrival of organised
enemy forces in South Persia improbable. The features of present situation
at Shiraz appear to be: the attack on Kazerun was primarily directed
against work of Governor Farman Farina who is known to be our friend
The tribal forces engaged were robber bands instigated by German agent
Wasmuss and unchecked by Soulet, but they apparently permit caravans and
individuals to move up and down Bushire-Shiraz road on payment of tolls.
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