File 600/1905 Pt 5 'Aden Hinterland: Treaty with Sultan of Balahaf' [‎119r] (21/152)

were much disconcerted at my reply and Mohsin bin Saleh actually took off his
sword and handed it to me as a token of his absolute submission to the British
GoTernment. This is an extremely rare thing for an Arab to do and much
astonished me, but I was soon to learn the reason for it. They next represented
to me their extreme fear of the Kayti and stated that his purchase of Haifa
was forced on the V\ ahidi of Bir Ali who was very unwilling to part with the
place. ^ They said that the Kayti had designs on both Bir Ali and Balahaf and
on their country generally and they said that sooner than part with them to the
Kayti, they would hand oyer their country to the British Government and leave
the place altogether. I attribute the whole of this matter to their fear of the
Kayti which was very evident and they pressed me for an assurance that the
Kayti should not he permitted to purchase their country, nor to acquire it in
any other way. They have since written me a letter asking for a written assur
ance on this point. I replied to them that according to the Treaty of 1895 they
were forbidden to sell, lease or mortgatre their country to any other than the
British Government and that the Kayti could not forcibly dispossess them of it
without the consent of the British Government under whose protection they
were. Ihey then took leave apparently satisfied after I had told them to write to
me on the subject. Personally I am of opinion that it would be impolitic to
allow the Kayti to absorb these smaller ports, ichose owners are under Hritish
protection, though, ro doubt there would be advantages in such a course, yet
were he allowed to do so, the Arabs in general would undoubtedly think that
protectorate treaties with the British Government were valueless, and thus the
disadvantages would swallow up the advantages.
5. As regards the first three documents, I hardly think that there would be
any danger in the recognition by Government of the’arrangements they propose
as to the Chieftainship, as the protectorate treaty has b^en notified to some, if
not to all, of the Powers. Thus unless any Power deliberately wished to be
unfriendly there could be no repetition of the events of 189i-95. On the other
hand the arrangement appears to have the consent not only of the present Chief
but also of the most important Sheikhs of the Wahidi, and on the principle of
non-interference with the internal affairs of the Arab tribes the arrangement
would not seem to be objectionable. In fact his recognition would seem to be
the only course open to Government, as otherwise, he would never be satisfied
but would be restless and only too ready to cause trouble whenever opportunity
offered. Personally he is the fittest of the family to rule the Wahidi, whereas
the present Chief is little more than a nonen ity.
No. 1.
Praise he to God, tne Lord of the Universe. On the 23rd of Al K tdah 1318
there appeared before us the Chiefs, namely, Saleh bin Abdullah bin Ahmed
and Ahmed bin Saleh bin Nasar and acknowledged on behalf of themselves that
Sultan Mohsin bin Saleh should be their Chief on land and sea and for the im
provement of their affairs and to enter into a treaty with the British on their
behalf. The responsibility of the former treaty between the relations of Nasar
bin Abdullah and the British should rest on Saltan Mohsin bin Saleh bin Nasar.
Sayad Umar bin Muhamad bin Abdullah Al Muhdar has written this by order
of the aforesaid.
(Signed) Ahmed bin Saleh bin Nasar bin Abdallah.
( ,, ) Saleh bin Abdallah bin Ahmed on behalf
of himself and his nephew Bubakar bin
Nasar.
TTitn esses—
Abdallah bin Hussein bin Mohsin Al Wahidi.
Muhamad bin Salim bin Muhamad Daban.
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