File 1421/1908 Pt 2 'Persia: oil; Ahwaz oil guard' [‎122v] (244/482)

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Id conclusion, T l)c^ to point out tliut should His Tllsjcstj s Government decide
upon affording - armed protection to the Syndicate s employes, the objections previously
urged by the military authorities in connection with Consular guaids against the locking
up of small detachments would to a large extent be removed, in that the three places
where I understand the borings are now being conducted, viz., Mamatain, Chardin,
and Batwand, are, unlike the Consular posts in the interior, accessible from the one
navigable river in Persia, and detachments stationed there could accordingly be
withdrawn or reinforced with relative ease and rapidity.
I am consulting Captain Lorimer as to the measures he would propose. I might,
however, suggest that, as a temporary measure, his guard might be increased, and that
he should be instructed to reside in the immediate vicinity of the works.
I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.
Inclosure 1 in No. 1.
Vice-Consul Lorimer to Sir C. Spring-Hiee.
(No. 56. Camp.)
Sir, Ispahan, August 29, 1907.
1 HAVE the honour to inform you that I have just received a large budget of
letters and reports from Mr. Reynolds of the Oil Syndicate. I forward inclosed extracts
of the more essential parts of these reports, which will enable you to form some idea of
the state of affairs.
2. The situation, as I diagnose it, is becoming very serious. All that is wanted to
make it impossible is a complete sense of impunity on the part of the aggressive tribes
men, and everything for the past six months has been directly calculated to foster such
a feeling.
The stage already reached is, in my opinion, by no means free of danger to the
lives of the European employes of the Syndicate.
I have done, and shall continue to do, all that I can with the Khans; but at the
best they are a broken reed, and punishments inflicted by them, only under extreme
pressure, lose all their value. Such punishments as have been inflicted have been due
entirely to insistence by me; they have only been effected after long delay, and it is
evident that they have produced no moral effect.
The unsatisfactory state of affairs is perhaps not entirely due to ill-will on the part
of the Khans, but largely to their total lack of administrative ability, their want of
trustworthy underlings, and their domestic quarrels, which make them afraid in many
cases of alienating to a rival the support of tribesmen who look on any form of discipline
with abhorrence.
6. The serious element in the situation is the character of the Bakhtiari tribesmen.
Sudden and ungoverned in their passions, they are accustomed to exercise them among
themselves with little regard to future consequences. It is with retaliation only that
they have chiefly to reckon ; the one restraint which might have a moderating
influence on them—that of capital punishment—is, to the best of my knowledge,
non-existent.
I heir relations with Europeans in the past have been almost nil, and they have
been guided^ in them by a vague apprehension that unknown calamities must follow
injury to a European.
This feaip which was general, is, however, gradually disappearing throughout
Persia, and during the past year or two the Bakhtiaris have been conducting a series o
experiments on their own account.
1 he results of these can only be tending to assure them that Europeans and their
property are in no way inviolate, and they have gained the certainty that their Khans
aie eithei unable or opposed to securing for Europeans effective protection, and that the
latter have no power to compel their active assistance.
All these conditions combine to furnish a prospect which cannot be regarded by us
without disquietude.
4. With regard to the action to be taken at the moment, I shall write myself very
strongly to the Khans, and 1 would suggest that the Harris case be again referred to
the Attabek. I should not, however, recommend that the latter cases, which have not
already been referred to him, should be referred to him at present.