File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎413v] (320/472)

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Government o£ India’s proposals as regards Bushive, whde as
regards Kishm it is for consideration whether the location there
of a force too small to operate on the mainland is likely to afford
sufficient leverage. , ,
(3) The possibility that the subsidised chiefs may not be able to c ^ ntr0 ;)
their own men, in view of the “ widespread anti-foreign feeling
to which the Persian Government referred in their memorandum
(see Sir G. Barclay’s telegram No. 2, of the 1st instant), and the
inflammatory telegrams from the Muhammadan clergy urging the
tribes and inhabitants to rise against foreign invasion which
Muhammad Ali pleaded as his excuse (Sir G. Barclay s telegram
No. 39, of 13th January).
(4.) The high improbability that the four Swedish officers, howevei
efficient, and however well supplied with funds by the Persian
Government (a very doubtful point), will be able to organise a
sufficient force before the movement of the tribes in March, which
is the moment when danger is most to be feared.
These considerations, taken together, seem to suggest that the Govern
ment of India’s proposals involve very great risk of a disaster at Shiiaz if
they are regarded as an alternative to the policy of withdrawal.
There remains the question of blockading the coast in order to prevent
the import of arms and ammunition. Sir E. Grey will doubtless agree with
the Government of India and the Naval Commander-in-Chief that this is a
measure which must sooner or later be undertaken. But it is to be feared
that if it is put in force now the stoppage of supplies may cause the same
irritation among the tribesmen there as it did among the Afghans on the
Mekran coast and the tribes on the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India, and may
therefore seriously endanger the safety of Shiraz. It is a question, therefore,
whether it should not be postponed unless a sufficient force to effect relief, if
necessary, is within reach. In this connection it will be remembered that
n ' the Viceroy was instructed on the 23rd
Copy of telegram encloseq^ ) ^ gir R Q rey . s reqi , esti t0
proceed with the least possible delay to frame proposals for despatch of troops
and as to number and composition of a relieving force.
As regards the question of the cost of the blockade, I am directed by the
Secretary of State m Council to say it is assumed that half the expenditure
will be borne by Imperial revenues.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
R. Ritchie.