File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎439r] (371/472)

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(b) temporarily to abandon our position in the western
part of Southern Persia, by closing: the consulates at
Shiraz and elsewhere, and withdrawing them, their
escorts, and British subjects (including the officers
of the Indo-European Telegraph Department) to the
coast.
3. While the maintenance of our position in the west of
Southern Persia must involve military difficulties and
expenditure in addition, to snich political disadvantages as are
inseparable from military intervention, these disadvantages
may be outweighed by the political, commercial, and military
disadvantages attendant on an abandonment - even of a temporary
nature - of our position in that region.
The abandonment of our position in the west of Southern
Persia:-
(1) might mean a serious less of prestige, both in
Persia, itself, and the East generally;
(2) would entail a loss of trade and trade connection -
possibly permanentlyj
(3) would give Russia an opportunity and a pretext for
the military occupation of the neutral zone of Southern
Persia to "protecV* threatened interests and consulates.
She would thus gain in prestige, and to a great extent
in trade, what we should lose. She has considerable
military forces already in Northern Persia and could
quickly seize her opportunity;
other
(4) might also give/Powers a similar opening, to our
detriment; ^
(5) might give Russia an opportunity of obtaining an outlet
on the' Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. which it has hitherto been cur
policy to deny her. The attainment of an outlet on the
seaboard of S.W.Persia might be of great political and
military advantage to Russia hereafter;
(6) would result in its being very difficult, if not
impossible, for Great Britain to regain her former com
mercial position in S t W.Persia, if that part of the
country were once domina.ted by another Power.
There is understood to be little likelihood of the Russian
Government withdrawing its troops from Northern Persia till the
country is settled and the Persian Government is itself able
to maintain order. Even then it is not impossible that a
variety of circumstances, fortuitous or otherwise, might