File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎441r] (375/472)

practically inevitable in the spring, whilst the*reports received
from our own representatives in Shiraz point to the necessity
of our being prepared for a serious outbreak of hostile feeling
amongst the tribesmen which, even if it does not vent itself in
an actual attack upon our troops, might render their position at
Shiraz extremely precarious owing to the ea.se with which com
munication with, the coast could be interrupted and supplies cut
off.
Bearing in mind the nature and strength of the opposition
that may possibly have to be encountered, the length of com
munications to be maintained (182 miles) in a mountainous country,
and the question of supply and transport, it is estimated that
a considerable force would be required in the event of its being
decided to take military action. It is not yet known how many of
the local tribes were concerned in the attack on Mr. Smart’s
escort, but from the fact that Major Eirdwood has been able to
join hands with Colonel Douglas without^further fighting taking
place it may be inferred that there is not as yet any organized
tribal revolt.
It is not possible to forecast with any accuracy the force
that may ultimately be required, but it would seem imprudent to
attempt the task of safeguarding Shiraz, making good the Lines
of Communication, and carrying out such punitive operations as
may be found necessary with a smaller force than:-
two mixed, brigades of infantry, each to include a Pioneer
battalion;
two Indian cavalry regiments, including the one already
in Southern Persia;
two or more batteries of Mountain artillery;
one Field Company of Sappers and Miners;
with the necessary administrative services.
6. It would also seem advisable to prevent the import of arms
and