File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎455r] (403/472)

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FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.
Secret Department.
From Viceroy, 30th December 1911.
Foreign Secret. Shiraz incident. The telegrams that have reached the
Government of India from Shiraz and Bushire shew that what was foreseen
as not unlikely has now happened, and that the detachments of Indian
cavalry sent to Shiraz and Ispahan have been attacked by tribesmen with
some loss (?) and that a force of 100 cavalry are in a precarious position at
Kazerun. It is satisfactory to note that Consul Smart has only been
wounded, and appears to be in safety in a caravanserai A roadside inn providing accommodation for caravans (groups of travellers). . Question now arises
as to what action is to be taken. First, obvious suggestion is to land a
battalion of infantry at Bushire to hold town in pledge until the Persian
Government have taken effective measures to inflict condign punishment
upon the tribesmen who attacked the British cavalry. The Customs should
be seized and retained, and surplus over what is due for the service loans
should be kept as a contribution towards claim to be made upon the Persian
Government. Disembarkation of infantry would free ship now guarding
the port, and would permit a blockade of coast which would create an
uncomfortable situation for the tribesmen, and prevent their renewing their
supplies of ammunition. This is very essential if measures are to be taken,
and we consider that the despatch of a battalion of infantry should be
proceeded with at once-
Question then arises as to whether any punitive measures should be
undertaken against the offending tribes. Government of India consider that
measures would be -eventi-mUy difficult and hazardous owing to elusive nature
of tribes and to precipitous character of country. Moreover, they could only
be undertaken by a large field force with a considerable amount of transport.
There is, however, a further contingency which must be foreseen, viz., that
even when the detachment at Kazerun has succeeded in returning to Shiraz,
it is possible that main force at Shiraz will find itself in an entirely isolated
position involving a certain amount of danger. It would then become
necessary to relieve the detachment, and to effect this without running new
risks a force of at least 5,000 men would be required consisting of four
regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and two mountain batteries.
Should the Government of India be reluctantly compelled by force
of circumstances, and in pursuit of a policy to which they have from the
outset been opposed, to send a force of this size to relieve detachment of
cavalry at^Shiraz, they are strongly of opinion that force should return to the
coast from.Shiraz with the least possible delay, and should bring away with
them the cavalry detachments from Ispahan and Shiraz, members of Consulate,
and any British subjects who might desire to avail themselves of British
troops as escort to leave Shiraz. Main body of troops could then return to
India, and Bushire could be held by a battalion of infantry until satisfactory
redress has been received from Persian Government.
We are not in favour of sending a regiment of infantry and battery of
artillery to Shiraz, since the despatch of this inadequate force would present
risks that should be avoided. If, as we have proposed, a battalion of infantry
is to be despatched to Bushire, we should be glad of early orders.
From Viceroy, 30th December 1911.
Foreign Secret. Shiraz incident. My previous telegram of to-day.
Senior Naval Officer is proceeding to Bushire with about 200 bluejackets and
marines and 250 Native infantry to Jask, with one 7-pounder gun and four
maxims. Native infantry will be landed at once, but (?) bluejackets will not
be landed without further orders. Instructions have been given that no
movement inland is to be made without express orders. This force should
be sufficient for immediate protection of Bushire, but is quite inadequate for
forcing passage to Shiraz.