File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎459v] (412/472)

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(Mrwn : —
Douolas says: “ Recent events have shown that we cannot move small bodies of
troops about the country without the possibility of their being attacked. This is
especially the case on the Bushire road at present, where an attack may be looked
upon as almost certain. The same will be the case on the Ispahan road when the
tribes move, if it is not so already. We are therefore entirely isolated, and later shall
be practically unable to move from Shiraz. I am unable to say what chance there is
of our being attacked or having our supplies cut off, but there seems a possibility of
it. Only sound military solution is to open up Bushire road, and I think an expedition
for this purpose indispensable.”
Smart says: “It is generally recognised by Persians here that very serious
disorders among Kashgais in the spring are practically inevitable, and it is quite
possible that Kawamis tribes may be drawn into the medley. Natural battle-field is the
immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz, and the expulsion of foreigners will be a very
likely war-cry for one of the parties. I cannot prophesy as to likelihood oi attack, but
above and the strong feeling of the tribesmen against our troops J?] certainly cannot be
ignored; anyhow, the interruption of our supplies by hostile tribal combination would
be effected without -mraoiom The absence of any action on our part after the recent
incidents would render such a contingency more likely.”
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C/JU Ca : —
There is, however, a further contingency which must be foreseen, viz., that
even when the detachment at Kazerun has succeeded in returning to Shiraz,
it is possible that main force at Shiraz will find itself in an entirely isolated
position involving a certain amount of danger. It would then become
necessary to relieve the detachment, and to effect this without running new
risks a force of at least 5,000 men would be required consisting of four
regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and two mountain batteries.
Should the Government of India be reluctantly compelled by force
of circumstances, and in pursuit of a policy to which they have from the
outset been opposed, to* send a force of this size to relieve detachment of
cavalry atJShiraz, they are strongly of opinion that force should return to the
coast from.Shiraz with the least possible delay, and should bring away with
them the cavalry detachments from Ispahan and Shiraz, members of Consulate,
and any British subjects who might desire to avail themselves of British
troops as escort to leave Shiraz. Main body of troops could then return to
India, and Bushire could be held by a battalion of infantry until satisfactory
redress has been received from Persian Government.
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