File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎466r] (425/472)

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
o\st December 1911.
Foreign Secret. Your tele<
;rams of 29th. December. Shiraz incident.
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observations
“(1.) Question is governed by situation at Shiraz, which may nroboblv
by end of March be surrounded by 15,000 tribesmen, with i^nS
danger to Yezd and Ispahan. This danger would no be met Tv h 0 “d nf
Bush.re with battalion, and taking over Customs there Government of I G
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withdrawal, and to hold Bushire till redress is received from Persian Gofern
ment. I his is attractive. But it involves postponing, till Shiraz is actually
m danger, operations which it may take two months to execute. It involves
occupation and partial administration of Bushire for indefinite period since
Persian Government, even ,f willing, may not be able within any reasonable
irae to restore order, and it is possible that they make make presence of
foreign troops on Persian soil pretext for not attempting task. Occupation
of Bushire by a single battalion, even coupled with loss by Persian Govern
ment of control of Customs, may not afford sufficient leverage to move
them to efficient action, and our eventual withdrawal from Bushire on any
terms short of complete satisfaction would bear the appearance of a defeat
(d.) further, there are at Shiraz, Ispahan, and Yezd, Consular repre
sentatives and subjects of other Powers, including Russia. Should any of
m ? e J le unwilling to withdraw to Bushire under our protection, contingency
that Kussia will take steps for their protection must be contemplated. With
appearance of Russian troops in sphere which, though nominally neutral has
always been under British influence, policy of Convention as to Persia would
be gravely affected.
“ (4). Alternative seems immediate occupation in force of Shiraz and
effective control of road to Bushire. Objections to any such action are
sulhciently indicated m India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. letter to Foreign Office of 16th October
But since then situation has entirely changed. It is no longer question of
escorting caravans on trade routes, but of ensuring safety of British troops
and subjects at Shiraz against overwhelming numbers. It is a question
whether if we maintain infantry brigade and mountain battery at Shiraz with
other troops to keep open Bushire communications, result may not be that
tribes will be overawed, and that Persian Government will make real effort
to comply, with least possible delay, with conditions laid down by ns as
essentia] for withdrawal of troops, and will at same time take measures to
ensure that no similar occupation would ever be necessary afterwards.
“ (5.) On the other hand, (a) it is possible, as indicated above, in connection
with occupation of Bushire, that Persian Government will make presence of
our troops excuse for doing nothing, (6) so large a force may easily be drawn
into punitive operations which should be altogether outside the programme
(cj prolonged occupation will be very unpopular in this country, and very
expensive, though the cost of sending up 5,000 men must in any case be
great. *
(6) . Consent of Parliament will be required, under Government of India
Act, to payment from Indian revenues of cost of any military operations
whether at Bushire or Shiraz. It is suggested that whole cost should be
borne by British revenues in view of unpopularity of such charge on Indian
revenues, and of consideration that maintenance of entente with Russia has
become a matter of European rather than of Asiatic importance.
(7) . Substance of above observations has been telegraphed to Viceroy
and Secretary of State. On receipt of further expression of their views
Foreign Office will be informed.”