File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎467v] (428/472)

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have not the means of carrying this out within any reasonable time;
it is impossible to foresee what complications m the noith might
hinder them even in well-meant attempts to do so; and it is more
than possible that they might, as on previous occasions, make the
presence of foreign troops on Persian soil an excuse for not attempting the
task, while the presence of a single battalion at a town on the coast, even
coupled with control of the customs, would afford ns a minimum of leverage
for moving them to efficient action. Moreover the eventual evacuation of
Bushire on any terms short of complete satisfaction from the Persian Govern
ment would itself bear the appearance of a defeat. Finally, it must be borne
in mind that the question is not between His Majesty’s Government and the
Persian Government alone. There are at Shiraz, Ispahan, and Yezd consular
representatives and subjects of other Powers, including Russia; it is
improbable that all of these would elect to withdraw with the British force ;
and it is inconceivable that, if Great Britain showed herself unwilling or
unable to protect them, Russia would fail to do so ; His Majesty’s Govern
ment would be in no position to protest; and with the appearance of Russian
troops in a region which though nominally neutral, has, in fact, been
accustomed only to British troops in the past, the whole policy of the Under
standing would be very gravely affected.
The alternative would appear to be the immediate occupation in force of
Shiraz, and the effective control of the road to Bushire. How strongly the
Secretary of State for India feels the objections to any such course is
sufficiently indicated in this Office letter of 16th October last. But the
situation has entirely changed since that date. It is no longer a question
of escorting caravans along the roads, but of ensuring the safety of British
troops and subjects in Shiraz against overwhelming numbers, and of
maintaining the prestige of this country in a sphere in which its influence
has hitherto been predominant. With a brigade of infantry and a battery
of mountain artillery at Shiraz, together with other troops sufficient
to keep open their communications with Bushire, we should presumably
be in a position to dictate both to the Persian Government and to the
tribes the terms on which we would withdraw, and it would be worth
their while not only to secure our withdrawal with the least possible delay,
but to take such measures as would ensure that no similar occupation would
ever be necessary again.
It is not suggested that this course is free from disadvantages. It would
not be popular in this country or in India ; it would be very expensive, though
the cost of sending 5,000 men to Shiraz must in any case be great; there is
the risk that so large a force at Shiraz might find itself drawn into punitive
operations which should lie altogether outside its programme ; and it is always
possible that, as indicated above in connection with the occupation of
Bushire, the Persian Government might profess to regard its presence as a
reason for not negotiating at all.
As regards the question of cost, I am to say that whichever course is
adopted the consent of both Houses of Parliament will be necessary (under
21 & 22 Viet., c. 106, s. 55) before any part of the cost of “Military
operations,” whether at Bushire or Shiraz, can be charged to Indian revenues ;
and I am to suggest that in view of the obvious unpopularity of such a
charge, and of the consideration that the maintenance of the Understanding