File 6/1912 Part 1 'Persia: Shiraz affairs; attack on Mr Smart; Swedish gendarmerie' [‎479r] (451/472)

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FOREIGN SECRET TELEGRAMS.
Secret Department.
From Viceroy, Uth January 1912.
Foreign Secret. We have received no further information from Minister
as to details or responsibility for attack upon Smart and composition of the
force concerned. Meanwhile it would appear from papers received by Cox
who is here that attack was more than a local ebullition of resentment on
the part of discontented road guards and was partly due to appeals from
cleigy of Mesopotamia to Chiefs of Fars, referring to Russian action in the
north and calling on them to oppose similar action by us in the south.
Cox fui ther reports that Chick, who after commercial researches at Shiraz
has just returned to Bushire through the winter quarters of the Kashgai
ti ibe, was accoided as an officer of the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. extremely friendly treat
ment by tiibal Chiefs. Chick states, however, that owing to attitude towards
tribe into which Shiraz Consulate has of late been driven m connection with
suppoit ol La warn and vagaries of, Nizam-es-Sultaneh, the tribal Chiefs
are convinced that if any British troops enter Fars their first objective will be
to ciush Kashgais and that latter will certainly fight in consequence, and
could probably put 7,000 or 8,000 well armed men in the field. Having
regard to the urgent necessity of avoiding very extensive military operations
which might clearly be forced upon us, Cox expresses the view, based on a
suggestion from Bill, now in charge at Bushire, that it is still conceivable a
solution of the present difficulty might be found by reversion to former idea
of entering into direct relations with tribal Chiefs for the preservation of
order on the road. We should send a regiments (sic) of Native Infantry to
Bushire and then explain to the Chiefs concerned that we have no designs
against any of them, that we are extremely anxious to avoid intervention,
that we cannot tolerate these outrages, but before resorting to extensive
military operations we offer them the opportunity to give us satisfaction for
recent outrages and to enter into a direct compact with us for maintenance
of security on the road, a matter in which their interests (? are) as much as
ours. Suggestion is that Chiefs concerned should be subsidised by us, and
in return would keep up guards on a regular roster and regular pay, a
special Assistant to the Resident being appointed to supervise arrangements,
something on the lines of Political Officer in the Khyber.
Neither Cox nor we have had time to think out details and all pros and
cons of scheme, but we are of opinion that, yrima facie, proposal offers a
possible means of satisfying our interests without extensive military opera
tions, and would at the same time demonstrate to the public in India and
Southern Persia the bond fides of our desire to do all that is possible to avoid
intervention.
A further communication will be sent after full examination of scheme.