'Historical Memorandum on the Relations of the Wahabi Amirs and Ibn Saud with Eastern Arabia and the British Government, 1800-1934' [‎7v] (14/64)

10
Bo. Sel.
XXIV,
442-4.
Decline of Wahabi Influence, 1834 : Loss of Baraimi.
48. The Wahabis about this time were still blockaded by the Sheikh of Bahrein
and called in the assistance of Shargah against the Sheikhs of that island. On the
murder in 1834 of Amir Turki this question, however, dropped, and the effect of
the murder is stated to have introduced such confusion and discord into Wahabi
affairs “as to counteract the operation of any ambitious views of late entertained
by the murdered chief, and for a time, at least, to leave the maritime tribes in the
same relative position as before.” In 1836 the preponderating influence of Mehemet
Ali in the west began to afford a salutary check on Wahabi encroachments towards
the coast of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . In that year the Wahabi agent at Baraimi failed to
secure the maritime assistance of Muscat and the coastal tribes against Bahrein,
and by 1838 the Wahabis had lost Baraimi to the local tribe of the Beni Naim,
though in what circumstances is not clear.
Bahrein and the Wahabis, 1824-1840.
Lor. I, 49. In 1830-31 Bahrein, apprehensive of a coalition between the Wahabi Amir
856-8. an d the Sultan of Muscat, who had made overtures to the Wahabis with a view to
securing Wahabi support in the reduction of Bahrein, formally submitted to the
Wahabi Amir, acknowledged his supremacy and undertook to pay tribute. By
1833, however, the Sheikhs of Bahrein felt sufficiently strong to defy the Amir and
between 1834 and 1836 they blockaded the coast of Hasa and caused sufficient
inconvenience to the W 7 ahabis to lead the latter to call in the assistance (which was
not, in fact, accorded) of the Jowasimi Sheikh of Shargah. In 1836, however,
alarmed by indications of an active assertion of the Persian claim and by the
possibility of a coalition between Muscat and Persia, Bahrein reached a friendly
agreement with the Amir, under which the Sheikh was to pay a nominal tribute of
2,000 dollars, while the Amir undertook to supply troops for the defence of Bahrein
against external attacks, and to refrain from calling on the Sheikh for marine
transport in the event of a Wahabi attack on Muscat by sea. In 1839 the Wahabi
Lor. 1,1098. general, Umr bin Ufeysan, took refuge at Bahrein on the fall of the Amir Feisul.
Qatar and the Wahabis, 1824-1840.
50. Little of moment happened in Qatar between 1824 and 1840. During much
of this period the authority of the Sheikh of Bahrein was paramount. In 1835
Lor I 857 the people of Huwailah rebelled against Bahrein and entered into correspondence
‘ ' with the Wahabis. A settlement was, however, reached by the mediation of the
son of the Sultan of Muscat.
Kuweit and the Wahabis, 1824-1840.
51. The solidarity of the Uttabi rulers of Koweit with those of Bahrein and
Qatar was apparently maintained throughout this period. Koweit continued to
Lor. I, resist, on the whole successfully, and latterly under the protection of the Turks, the
1006-10 efforts of the Wahabi Amirs to incorporate it with their dominions. During the
Egyptian occupation of Hasa in 1838-40 an Egyptian agent was appointed^ to
Koweit and appears to have remained there during the period of Egyptian
ascendancy.
H.M. Government and the Wahabis, 1824-1839.
52. In 1825 on the revival of the Wahabi power in Nejd, the Jowasimi Sheikh
of Shargah enquired whether he might look to the British Government for
assistance should he endeavour to maintain his independence against Vv ahabi
intrigue. He was informed in reply that he was the best judge of his own interests,
“ but that no connection or authority would be received by the British Government
as an excuse for any proceedings bearing a predatory character.” He was further
warned against co-operating with the Wahabis against the territories of Muscat.
Nejd Precis, “ The language held on this occasion was confirmed by the Governor [of Bombay] in
§ 34. Council, with a further intimation, that, however improbable it might be that we
should act against the Wahabis so long as they confined their conquests to the
shore, it was still not desirable that we should bind ourselves to abstain from
interposition or hold out so great an encouragement to the invasion of the Imam s
territories as our avowed indifference would be likely to afford.”