'Historical Memorandum on the Relations of the Wahabi Amirs and Ibn Saud with Eastern Arabia and the British Government, 1800-1934' [‎8v] (16/64)

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Khalid. A letter addressed by him to the Sultan of Muscat, directing Muscat to
assist or be considered an enemy, was returned, but the Jowasimi Chief of Shargah,
at his instigation, summoned the Beni Naim, “ who had lately got possession of
Baraimi,” to surrender it to the Nejdis. The Beni Naim refused and appealed to
Abu Dhabi and the Chief of Sohar in Muscat for aid against the common enemy.
Representations were also made to the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. .
British Countermeasures and Support for Beni Naim of Baraimi.
59. H.M. Government were at this time principally concerned to reduce Mehemet
Ali to his proper position as a Turkish vassal and to prevent any further Egyptian
advance in Eastern Arabia. The application of the Beni Naim chiefs was therefore
well received ; the Resident held out hopes that a British agent would be sent
to Baraimi (Captain Hamerton subsequently visited the oasis in January—February
of 1840) ; and he undertook, if necessary, to supply ammunition to the Chiefs. The
Lor I 457 ® u ^ tan . Muscat, who had at first shown a disposition to take the side of the
^^yptiuns, in the hope of re-establishing his ascendancy over Bahrein, was informed
of the attitude of H.M. Government, and was called upon to support the Beni Naim
chiefs, a request to which he acceded. The Resident, after a formal protest against
the proceedings and intrigues of the Egyptian Commander as being in direct
opposition to the assurances which had been given by Mehemet Ali to H.M. Govern
ment, obtained a written agreement from the maritime chiefs of Oman to cultivate
close relations with the British Government, to abide by its wishes and instructions,
and to resist to the last extremity all attempts by the Egyptian Commander to
subdue them.
Withdrawal of Egyptian Agent under British pressure.
60. The Sheikh of Shargah, at his own request, was furnished with a document
requiring him to demand the immediate departure of the Egyptian Agent. This
was communicated to the Agent, who was also informed that, the British Govern
ment having taken the chiefs and tribes of Naim in Baraimi under their protection,
he would be held responsible for any injury to them ; and he was required, in
accordance with the assurances given by Mehemet Ali, to withdraw from Trucial
Oman. After repeated remonstrances he quitted the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. and, embarking
at Shargah (where he is alleged to have been assured by the Sheikh that if he
returned to Oman in force Shargah would join him and place all its resources at
his disposal), proceeded to Ojair. The withdrawal of Sa’ad Bin Mutlak was a
severe blow to Egyptian influence and is stated to have broken up the combination
rapidly forming in favour of Mehemet Ali. The Government of India approved
the action taken by the Resident, but intimated to him that they would not be
prepared to extend protection to Baraimi.
Egyptian Evacuation of Nejd, 1840.
61. After the departure of the Wahabi Agent an attack was made on the Beni
Naim at Baraimi by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, who was called to account by the
Resident and required to make reparation to the Beni Naim. In the same year
(1839) the Sheikh of Qatif was warned that any expedition against Oman or the
territories of the Sultan of Muscat would be opposed by the British naval squadron
in the Gulf. In 1840, internal dissensions breaking out among the Egyptians,
Sa’ad bin Mutlak was arrested and sent under escort to Riyadh, while in May of
that year the Egyptians evacuated Nejd, leaving the puppet Amir Khalid in charge
as an Egyptian tributary.
Attitude of H.M. Government, 1839-1841.
62. During the period 1839-41 H.M. Government departed from their policy of
refusing to concern themselves in the internal affairs of the Trucial Sheikhdoms
and of their hinterland. This modification of their attitude was directed by
considerations of European rather than of Arabian policy. As will be seen below,
once the Egyptian menace had been disposed of they reverted to their policy of non
intervention, and the Sheikhs of Baraimi, who, not unnaturally, had been encouraged
by the attitude adopted by H.M. Government in 1839-40 and by the visit of a
British Agent to Baraimi in the latter year to hope for some substantial support