File 747/1913 Pt 1 ‘Loans to Persia’ [‎228r] (460/480)

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to effect the complete evacuation of Shiraz, civil and military. Before they
abandoned this proposal the Government of India realised (what had been
pointed out by this Office and by the Director of Military Operations) that what
we evacuated someone else would occupy; and it is indeed obvious that this
policy means the final withdrawal of Great Britain from Southern Persia,
for it is certain that having thus retired we could never go back. Here we
come in touch with the other question now under discussion with the Foreign
Office, the fate of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s concession, and the
issues arising out of it. If Southern Persia could be isolated, there
would undoubtedly be much to be said for cutting our losses, and
concentrating upon the only part of the country that is really vital,
politically and strategically, to India—the British sphere. But Southern Persia
cannot be separated from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The control of the Gulf means
the control of the coast, and the influence that is supreme in the hinterland
is that which will ultimately be supreme on the coast. Personally, I am not
convinced that—quite apart from the future of Southern Persia—the trend
of events is not in the direction of the complete extinction of British
power in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. in the course of the next 20 years. We shall
have to face the inevitable consolidation of Turkey as an Asiatic power at
the head of the Gulf, more and more jealous of her rights and capable of
asserting them. Behind Turkey Germany pushing forward her economic,
and, therefore, political interests'^', along the Bagdad Railway to the sea. In
Arabia the possible development of forces which may easily absorb our
thin line of allies and squeeze us off the coast. The growth of inter
national commerce in the Gulf itself which, if the Bagdad Railway ever
reaches it, will become an international highway where the_ prescriptive
rights of one nation will in practice receive scant recognition. And in
Persia the growth of Russian power pressing down towards the warm water.
Against all this (it it has any real existence) we have very little to set, and I
venture to think that there will be a growing disinclination to stake anything
very important upon the maintenance of our interests there. For example,
Lord Lansdowne’s famous declaration of 1903, which in effect made the
establishment by a foreign power of a naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. a
casus belli,—what is the probability that Canada and the other; dominions (if
admitted to the control of foreign policy) would allow us to go to war, even
if we wanted to, now, on that question if limited to the Gulf properly so
called P,! or even to redeem our pledges
to the Sheikhs of Koweit and Moham-
mera, if by any chance Germany
should appear in shining armour beside
Turkey in opposition to those two
potentates? At a meeting of the
Defence Committee last year—of the proceedings of which there is no full
record—Lord Nicholson, if I remember rightly, threw out the opinion that it
did not matter very much what happened in the Gulf. And in fact it does
not matter vitally," on two conditions, (i) that we have a strong naval base
ft the mofth of 'the Gulf, or a sufficiently strong naval force within reach,
and can seal it when we will; (ii) that we allow no Power to come down
to the coast of Persia at Chahbar (in the British sphere) or anywhere outside
th6 These considerations may have seemed to stray rather far from the
immediate issue, but they are not irrelevant to my point, which is twofold,
viz (i) that we cannot deal even with the immediate issue without raising
the whole question of the British policy in those regions ; (n) that if we
are to confine ourselves to the vital necessities, political and strategical,
of India and the far East, it is possible to sacrifice the Gull as well as
Southern Persia, on certain indispensable conditions. A hether the advantages
so far outweigh the many disadvantages as to make it expedient is
another matter.
t Lord Lansdowne’s declaration was in
fact loosely worded. He had in mind
more especially Chahbar, which is outside
the Gulf, and is so near to India that we
should have no alternative at any time but
to resist its occupation.
» Since the above was written a consular report has been received which shows that the
bmce tne aot / whose relations with the German Government are well known)
^^“l^imioits^a the Gulf to Bagdad and Basra by 100 per cent, last year; while the
ierman firm ofWonckhaus (trading by what the Board of Trade call “ unsound methods )
xported inoi'e wheat than all the British firms put together, and made a profit of 30,0001.