'Despatch by Lieutenant-General R. Wapshare, C.B., C.S.I. on the Organization and Working of the East Persian Line of Communications. From 1st April 1918 to 15th January 1919' [‎4v] (13/138)

2
Up to November 1918 an alternative route to Meshed from Kain through Rui
Khaf was used, but since the shorter road through Turbat-i-Haidari was made fit
for motor transport this alternative route has been abandoned.
The climate of this section is good.
The last section between Meshed and Askabad has only been under my com-
mknd since December, since when the road has been under snow. Except in very
bad weather this road is good and it is fit for motor traffic. It runs between two
mountain ranges of 9,000 feet to 11,000 feet in height.
Up to Kuchan the road is practically level and runs through well-watered and
cultivated country. The road between Kuchan and Askabad runs through diffi
cult mountainous country.
The two rivers Atrak and Duringar crossed by the road are both fordable.
The climate of this section of the Line of Communications is good.
Full details regarding the roads are shown in General Dickson’s Report,
Appendix 5, Chapter VI.
2. East Persian Cordon. —d he Eastern Persian Cordon Field Force, m April
1918, was stretched out between Saindak and Meshed with the object of preventing
enemy agents from getting access into Afghanistan and India. The Russians in
North Persia were, owing to the upheaval of Russia, fast disappearing northwards
and it had become necessary to maintain a larger garrison in Meshed to uphold
British policy in that area.
hrom April onwards the military centre of gravity shifted still farther north
into Irans-Caspia, and General Malleson was given a not inconsiderable portion of
the Cordon troops into his command, so that he could assert the necessary British
influence on Transcaspian politics.
In June 1918 a force under Captain Kreyer had to resort to open hostilities
against hostile raiders at Fareh, a full report of which has been rendered to the
Commander-in-Chief by Rfigadier-General Dale. In August General Malleson’s
troops for the first time engaged the Bolsheviks.
It was recognized that our then small forces in Transcaspia would have to be
largely augmented, and this gave birth to the present Line of Communications
whjch came under my orders on the 22nd September 1918.
Before I assumed command, the Eastern Persian Cordon Field Force troops
were distributed as shown in detail on Map 1,* Appendix 1, amounting to 1 coin-
19th Punjabis, and 1 squadron 28th Light Cavalry (the Headquarters and
remainder of both these units being under General Malleson, North of Meshed),
the 98th Infantry (6 companies) and 2 squadrons of the 41st Cavalry.
3. The 'present Line of Communications. —On the 21st September orders were
issued by you to the effect that the whole of the forces in East Persia would be
under my command, with the exception of Malleson’s Mission which was to remain
directly under the Commander-in-Chief. To assist me in this, Lieutenant-Colonel
H. W. Jackson, D.S.O., 89th Punjabis, was appointed Brigadier-General in charge
administration, Brigadier-General AV. E. R. Dickson, C.I.E., R.E., was appointed
Inspector General of Communications for administrative control of communica
tions beyond railhead, and Brigadier-General Dale, C.M.G., late Commander of the
Eastern Persian Co don, Defence Commander of the Line of Communications.
My control extended to Meshed inclusive for administration and defence.
The soldiers under General Malleson were now put under the command of
Brigadier-General Beatty, D.S.O., who would act under General Malleson. The
latter officer was responsible for the policy of the Government of India in direct
communication with Army Head Quarters.
It was ordered,_ too, that I was to secure the maintenance of General Beatty’s
force through the Line of Communications.
The headquarters and remaining squadrons of the 41st Cavalry and the 42nd
Cavalry were mobilized in October 1918 with a view to their moving up to Meshed
to join General Beatty’s contingent.
* N Q t reproduced.