File 3874/1908 'Railways:-Trans-Persian Railway.' [‎150r] (301/536)

[This Document is the P roperty of His Britannic Majesty’s Government,]
BAGDAD RAILWAY.
SECRET.
[43445]
No. 1.
[November 27.]
Section 1,
\ L—f. f (
W'/'D
Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)
(No. 497.)
(Telegraphic.) P. St. Petersburgh, November 27, 1909.
PLEASE refer to your telegram of yesterday No.' 1343 respecting the Bagdad
Railway, substance of which I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this
afternoon.
His Excellency observed, as regards a Bagdad-Khanikin branch, that a concession
had already been granted to the German company for a railway to the latter place
which was to join the main line north of Bagdad, and that, if negotiations were started
on the basis suggested by M. Gwinner between Germany and England, Russia’s own
interests would, of course, require that discussions should begin between Berlin and
St. Petersburgh ; if, however, an agreement had already been reached between England
and Germany, the position of Russia in entering into discussions with the latter .Power
would be seriously weakened.
On M. Isvolsky remarking that for the purpose of bargaining with the German
Government it was of course essential that he should have some asset in his hands,
I observed that in any case no quid pro quo should be offered to Germany in the
part of Persia outside the British and Russian spheres, as the terms of the Anglo-
Russian convention would hardly admit of such a transaction. (I confess that
personally I am not quite sure if this is so.) M. Isvolsky remarked that he had not
said that that was the direction in which he would look when driving his bargain, but
he could not go to Germany empty-handed. Germany would be very difficult to
negotiate with if His Majesty’s Government did accept the proposals made last week.
After conversing for some time more with M. Isvolsky I tried to elicit from his
Excellency the answer which he would wish me to send to you; but he would only say
that his reply would be given later, and that the question must first be examined with
great care. More, I regret to say, I was unable to extract from him. I represented to
his Excellency the danger of all offers being withdrawn by Germany and of the line
being constructed by her alone without either Russian of English co-operation if no
move were made and nothing done by the other Powers concerned. M. Isvolsky then
said that the question put to me by him when we last discussed the matter still
remained unanswered. On my enquiring to what question he referred, he replied that
he wanted to know if the proposals put forward by M. Gwinner were going to be
accepted by His Majesty’s Government or not, and were all interests in the line north
of Bagdad to be abandoned ? In fact, was a conversation d deux to be definitely
substituted for a conversation d quatre ? I told him that as yet no decision had been
come to. His Majesty’s Government were waiting to learn his views, but if there were
further delay they would probably have to decide in the above sense. M. Isvolsky
recurred to the interpretation which he puts on the paragraph respecting customs surtax
in the Turkish note, i.e., that Turkey is thereby debarred from applying the proceeds of
the surtax to any enterprises already begun (as, for instance, the Bagdad Railway); did
His Majesty’s Government think the interpretation correct ? I replied that no reply
had been sent to me on this question.
I find it impossible to obtain a definite answer from M. Isvolsky; and in these
circumstances you may possibly wish that I should give him positively to understand
that you will advise the British group to wait no longer and proceed with negotiations
with M. Gwinner. In my private letter of the 19th instant I observed that it might
be dangerous to leave M. Isvolsky to negotiate with Germany alone, and I am still
somewhat apprehensive in this respect. But it may possibly be better to secure the
Bagdad- Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. section of the line and run this risk.
[2518 dd—1]
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