File 3852/1912 Pt 2 'Persia. Conditions in South Persia. German Documents' [‎223r] (77/280)

It is a fact that already in the first month of the session
the Persian representatives of the people declined to vote
the proposed Anglo-Russian loan of £ 400,000, a paltry sum
which would speedily have found its way into the pockets of
the courtiers.
In 1907 Mohammed Ali succeeded Muzaffar-Eddin. He
t&s known as a Russophile and an enemy of the Constitution
and feared and hated by his people as the despotic ruler of the
Azerbaijan province. The Parliament, which Europe derided
and which the Shah affected to ignore, gave evidence of itself
soon after his accession, by a patriotic resolve. It forced the
Shah to dismiss the Belgian Naus, who, like the other Belgians
in the service of Persia, had provoked the greatest indignation
of the Persians by administrative measures which were
contrary to all Persian interests. To this Belgian Naus 1 ) may
be traced the conclusion of the two Russian loans which shook
the foundations of Persian independence. He is the author
of that unfortunate customs tariff, conceived solely in Russian
interests, the absurdly low rates of which lost Persia one of
her most important sources of income 2 ).
On August 31, 1907, England and Russia signed the well-
known treaty which divided Persia into two spheres of interest
and a neutral zone. It was a treaty in the conclusion of which
the most largely interested party, the sovereign state of Persia,
was never consulted. On the day of the publication of the
x ) Even David Fraser, the correspondent of the Times who showed
such a prejudice against Persia, condemns Naus (Persia in Revolt, p. 31)
and his activity: “ He well deserved his fate ”. His fate, by the way, is bearable
When Naus had radically mismanaged Persian finances, he was able to pur
chase from his “takings” in Persia magnificent chateaux and property in
Belgium (v. Shuster “Strangling of Persia”, p. 63).
2 ) Morgan Shuster (Strangling of Persia, p. 271) calls the Naus tariff
“the most conspicuouly unsuccessful tariff of the world” from the Persian
point of view. Shuster gives figures: The import and export duties brought
in 1909/10 only 4 1 /2%. Russia who participated with 5 °% xn en ti re
import and export of Persia only had to pay 3% on its chief article of importa
tion: sugar, and on refined petrol only 14 % duty. Besides, Russia forbade all
transit traffic destined for Persia which was non-Russian. This exclusion of
the non-Russian goods, non-Russian merchants sought to circumvent, by
sending merchandise by parcels post which according to international rules
had to pass through Russia unopened.