File 2182/1913 Pt 8 'Arabia – Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎282r] (148/602)

onrmot well be blamed If they choose to place themselves under the suzerainty
of a power in which they have confidence and to which they are attached by
religious, geographical, racial and other ties and to resist any claim to over-
loixhhip by a ruler who has made it clear that he will not tolerate the
exercise of their religions according to their own lights.
(3) The above remarks I trust will be sufficient to shew that at any rate
there is a good case for investigation and that no ex-parte opinion can dispose
of it satisfactorily. The two reverses to his aims which I have reported have
doubtless proved injurious to the Sheriff’s prestige but he has no one to blame
for that hut himself. I note that the High Commissioner considers that the
Sneritf regards Khurma as his territory “ apparently with reason ” and that lie
does not doubt the sincerity of his assurances that Shakir will not advance
east of Khurma to attack Ibn Sand’s subjects. If these remarks are intended
to indicate that no action is being or has been taken to prevent the develop-
ruent of the Sheriff’s operations and that His Majesty’s Government approve of
thus letting events run their course, I can only say I regard the situation with
the most lively apprehension. Until the w^orst comes to the worst, however,
I cannot believe that His Majesty’s Government after their impartial warning
to both rulers to refrain from provocative action will allow one of the
recipients of that warning to disregard it in the very matter in respect of ,
w hich it was issued. The issue of that warning has, as already reported,, had 1
a very favourable i effect on Ibn Saud but he assumes, as I think he is entitled
to do, that it will be e^qually effective on the Sheriff.
(4) As regards the last paragraph of the telegram under consideration
I note that the Sheriff has been warned of possible disturbances on his eastern
frontier and that His Majesty’s Government’s first message has been delivered
^ . to him and also that the second message*
No. 27 . j u iy 27th has been withheld. : Th^
High Commissioner considers that it would lessen the risk of hostilities if
I bn Saud w^ ere required to adopt a “hands off” policy in respect of the
+ Semi No. 24. Khurma district. In my review,! da fed
Under despatch to Government of India, June 25th, I have fully explained anff,^
may now repeat in respect of the subsequent period of neatly two months that
Ibn Saud up to date has taken no action whatever in respect of the affairs of
Khurma except to forbid the Akhwan of Ghat Ghat to proceed to the rose up
of their co-religionists when they w r ere actually on the way and to forbid (ai
mv request) the people of Khurma to take any forward action to avenge them-
selves on their aggressors. As I have said before he has exercised his, powerful
influence in the interests of the preservation of the peace in tne assurance that
we would intervene to prevent things going too far. I am unable therefore
to see what more the High Commissioner requires of him or what he find^,
to blame in Ibn Sand’s past conduct—further more I guarantee that Ibn
Saud will faithfully maintain his past policy of non-interference in the affairs
of Khurma provided that the Sheriff reciprocates by adopting the same policy. h :
A mutual “hands off” policy is the only possible guarantee of the preserv
ation of peace. uw
Thirdly, as regards High Commissioner’s telegram J of July 31st (Baghdad,
No. 6310 of 1st august 1918)—
I Serial No. 31.
(1) The High Commissioner reports that the attention of the Arabs, of
the Hedjaz is turned to Khurma and that the King’s prestige would be gravely
affected by the failure of Shakir’s expedition. Mutalis mutandis the samp
may be said for Najd, where as I have already reported Ibn baud has, since
the first attack on Kliurma, been beset by insistent demands by priests and
people, 1 Akhwan and tribesmen, to take immediate action to save Khurma
and when his failure to effect that object either through our intervention or hjs
own efforts will seriously affect both his prestige and his influence. Incidentally
Ibn Baud’s position is even more delicate than that of the Sheriff in view of
the attacks on uis other frontier by the Ajtffan. It is not, however, only thp
Hedjaz and Najd which are watching the development of the Khurma situation