File 2182/1913 Pt 5 'Arabia Nejd: Policy Bin Saud' [‎343r] (261/308)

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From General, Basra, $th July 1916.
(Repeated Foreign, Simla-, Chief of General Staff, Simla; and Cairo.)
LG. 3228, dated 9th July 1916. Your telegram of 30th June.
Firstly.—Suggested reconciliation between Bin Saud and Bin Rashid. At
meeting with Bin Saud in January, Chief Political Officer explained to him
that it would be helpful to British policy if he became reconciled with
Bin Rashid and won him over to our side.
If Bin Rashid made overtures as he was expected probably to do,
Bin Rashid (? Saud) then intended encouragement of them. Things shaped
otherwise, however. Shortly after Bin Sand’s return to Riyadh he was called
south again to punish the A1 Morra while Bin Rashid moved up towards
Nasiriyah.
Latter’s intentions and attitude were from the first doubtful, but he
showed no inclination to be unfriendly and so was treated with utmost
patience and allowed obtain necessaries from our towns until he finally
stated to Chief Political Officer’s emissary that he was here by instructions
and in payment of Turks and would certainly join them in attacking us il
the Turks sent troops to support him. On receipt of this frank declaration,
the Russlam section of the Shammar and the Dhalir, who are in our pay, were
encouraged to oppose him and clear him out. They came in contact with
him on 28th June near Khamsieh, and, supported by a squadron of our
cavalry, routed him and captured some 400 of his camels and killed 15 oi
20 men Meanwhile, reports have been received that Bin^ Sand’s son and
brother are operating against the Shamar near Hail with considerable
success, and on the other hand, that Bin Rashid has received a telegram from
Constantinople calling upon him to return to Hail and await Turkish
support. . , . . . . , ,
It is expected that this summons, combined with the knock recently
administered to him, will send him back to Hail, but at piesent moment he
is within few miles of Khamsieh. It is possible, however, that the active
hostility of ? Shammar and Dhalir, and difficulty he now finds in feeding
himself may induce him to make overtures to us, but this is hardly likely.
He has only small following and very little prestige, and unless he is joined
by other tribes, is of little military signif^ppeew L
Secondly.—Effect of Sherif’s action. Minds]^ movement slowihere, and
it is earlv yet to gauge its full effect, the news created no paiticulai stii,
and large majority of the inhabitants are too ill-inforhied to appreciate its
significance, and many are disinclined to ciedit it. Ihe actively pio-1 uikish
element, of which a number of former kurkish employees form the nucleus,
regret it and consider that it is unfair of Sherif to rebel and raise question
of Arab independence while lurkey was in, throes of wai. Intelligent
Shiah Arabs with little more liking for British than for the Turks, appear
to be pleased at news, and affect to hope that Sherif’s declaration will be
extended to Iraq. The small sprinkling of enlightened Sunni Arabs,
including a few individuals of Arab nationalist tendencies now here, are of
course delighted, and among these the chief Arab resident of Basra, after
the Naikib, on being acquainted with Reuter’s communique by Chief
Political Officer, at once remarked spontaneously, “ What the Sherd ought
to do now is to declare himself Calif, everyone would welcome it. ^ Ihe
recent incidents at Kerbela will of course create greater stir m Persia than
in Iraq Here the majority of Shiah, who as a class aie strong]\ anti-l ersian,
discount the sio-nificance of the occurrences and regard them as phase of the
time-honoured^feud between Holy Places and the Turkish Government.
The minority regard Kerbela incidents with indignation, and make them a
specific reason for welcoming Sherif’s action and hoping for its extension
to Iraq. ^
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