'A Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistan By Lieutenant A T Wilson, Acting Consul for Arabistan' [‎10r] (24/143)

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ponsible for the Ka’ab in the future and for the losses caused by them in
past years.
In March 1768, the London Court of Directors The London-based directors of the East India Company who dealt with the daily conduct of the Company's affairs. wrote to Basrah making
some remarks on past events and directions for future policy in the Gulf.
They said that lack of experience has caused non-success in every direction.
The first mistake was in 1766 when their forces joined a land expedition
with the Turks against the Ka’ab.
Our forces * * * * landed in a very bad wet place where the men had great
difficulty to march, and wdiich was too great a distance from the place to be
attacked and consequently very difficult to bring up Artillery.
The next step was attacking the fort before the Turks had joined, who certainly
from their numbers should have begun the attack, and been assisted by our
men : this not being the case we were most shamefully beat and lost many of
our people.
The letter goes on to say that we next put our faith in Karim Khan,
though he played us false. Our engagements to him are heavy, his
promises to us are of no value.
Passes have been issued at a price of BlOO each to Arab boats by the
Resident at Bushire to protect them from being plundered : this is a mistaken
policy, as it increases our engagements to a dangerous extent.
Our policy in lending ships and men to the Turks, who are uniformly un
successful in their expeditions, has damaged our ships and our trade * and
worst of all the honour and reputation of the nation.” The Basrah factors
are ordered to avoid any alliance with the Arabs other than to be on friend
ship, and to avoid joining in expeditions in which all the hard work will be
left to us to do.
“ Always remember the promises or even writings of Persians or Arabs will be no
longer validity than their interest coincides with them.”
In October 1766, the Basrah ’factors reported that the Ka’ab was build
ing forts on either side of the river and the “ Turks are in no capacity to
stop him.”
In April 1768, Karim Khan “ diverted glory from the Ka’ab by power.” {'Arab
history.)
In April 1769, “ the Kjfi’ab ” was apparently sufficiently under the thumb
of Karim Khan to obey his order to send a fleet from Doraq to Ganawah
though in a half-hearted fashion.
In this year (1769) a “ new Chaub ” appears on the scene, 1 no doubt a
successor of Shaikh Salman.
He is said to be heartily tired of bis Persian connections, and it is said that Karim
Khan has fleeced him more during the three years that he has been a Persian
subject at Daurack than he paid the Turks in a dozen when he was a Turkish
subject.
It is plain from this that the Persians had by this time established an
effective supremacy over the Ka’ab in default of the Turks.
The Ka’ab was at this time in alliance with the Turks against the Munta-
fik Arabs and his five ships of war lay off Minawi to protect Basrah against
attack.
It was reported on one occasion that several Turkish gallies with 9 gallivats of the
Chaub arrived that night from the Haffar and gone up the river against a tribe
of Arabs in alliance with the Muntafik, called the Kholt Arabs, who are
situated on the Persian side of the river between this and Coornah.
This is the first mention of the north bank of the Shatt-el-Arab as “ the
Persian bank,” and may be quoted in support with the Persian claim to the
whole north bank of the river up to Qurnah.
In November 1769, the Bombay Board in a letter to London discuss the
advantages of trade with Shushtar and mention the “ Shishter ” (Shushtar ?)
Hawlzeh-Basrah road as unsafe.
1 Native history records the death of Shaikh Salman in 1183 Hejra (1768) : his successor was Ghanim, his
Son, who was replaced a year later on his death by Dawud-bin-Salman, and sii months later barkat-bm-L tkm&n
sacceeded, Dawud having been killed.