'A Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistan By Lieutenant A T Wilson, Acting Consul for Arabistan' [‎24v] (53/143)

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tion to the “ Malamir ” on the Karun. His alarm at the threatened encroach,
ments by the Persian Government upon his authority, and^at the possibility
of Turkish ambitions finding an outlet in the conquest of Arabistan caused
him, as early as 1899, to seek to obtain a secret understanding for his protec
tion by the British Government. He said that he did not at that stage wish to
press for written assurances. All he wanted was a verbal assurance that we
accepted him as a servant, and that we would support him by such means as
the Legation thought desirable. He said that he did not ask for an alliance
against the Persians, whom he had, and would continue to serve faithfully,
though they might not appreciate his actions. Ihe Legation, for instance, he
said, if they considered him as their servant, would oppose the proposal to
remove the Customs from his control, a step to which he would not consent.
The late Shaikh Miz’al whom the Persians never interfered with, always
opposed British interests: it was our duty to support him as long as he
assisted our commerce, and we should not allow the Persians to diminish his
influence.
His proposals were sent on to the Government of India, but it was not
then considered desirable to have closer political relations with the Shaikh.
Colonel Meade, Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , writing to His Majes
ty’s Consul, Mohammerah, on the 20th May 1899, considered it impossible
for us to make a formal agreement with the Shaikh, as he was a Persian sub
ject, though of course we should do our best for him.
In 1900 it became known that the Persian Government intended to take
the Customs of ’Arabistan under direct management, and there were rumours
that an attempt would at the same time be made to deprive the Shaikh of his
large executive powers and absolute tribal authority. Almost simultaneously
a doubt arose as to whether the Persian Government admit that the Customs
of ’Arabistan to be included in those of “ the Gulf of Pars and Pars,” which
were reserved, by an agreement made with the British Government in 1897
from alienation to any foreign power as security for a loan. The danger
thus suggested of a hypothecation of the Mohammerah Customs to Russia was
one to which His Majesty’s Government could not remain indifferent, and
steps were immediately taken to guard against it by adopting a less reserved
attitude towards the Shaikh, and by obtaining an assurance from the Shah’s
Ministers that the Customs of all Southern Persia including those of ’Arabis
tan would be treated as inalienable under the agreement of 1897. This latter
question was not settled satisfactorily until 1904, when a clear statement of
the British view was allowed by the Persian Government to pass unchallenged,
and may therefore be regarded as having obtained acceptance, an acceptance
confirmed by wording of the R^glement Douanier of 1904 which was agreed to
by Russia. The local problem, that of the position of the Shaikh vis a vis
the Persian Government, and in particular of the department of the Imperial
Customs, had a more rapid development, and is dealt with separately under
the head “ Shaikh and Customs ” (Chapter V).
Sir H. M. Durand wrote demi-officially to Colonel Meade on the subject
of assurances as follows :—
I have thought much about the Shaikh of Mohammerah and his request for
assurances. I send you a copy of the Memorandum which I carried away from
Ahwaz. I think you should tell the Shaikh that if I gave him the assurances
he wants I should be practically committing my Government beforehand
to the occupation of the country. 1 feel sure that my Government would not
like this since we have no apprehensions as to the break up of Persia, and do
not desire to take any Persian territory. At the same time it has always
been our policy to oppose the interference of foreign powers in the Persian
Gulf, and I presume that that policy would still remain in force as far as
circumstances permitted it if the present situation was disturbed. Do not
write this, let McDouall say. I fear the Belgians and the Sadr A’zam are
determined to take over the Mohammerah Customs, but by amicable arrange
ment with the Shaikh if possible. I have advised them not try and force him.
The following is the Memorandum enclosed in the above letter:—
We cannot of course undertake to maintain the Shaikh against the Persian Govern
ment, nor can we say that if the Persian Government breaks up we shall