'Memorandum by Sir M Durand on the situation in Persia' [‎38v] (10/42)

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tribesmen. We need not excite the ready alarm of the Russians by too
frequent journeys along their border, but I think we should spend some moif/
in encouraging travel elsewhere, and in establishing Agencies at important
points. For instance, I feel very doubtful whether the Government of India
are right in deprecating the establishment of a British officer in Beistan; and,
under certain conditions, we might find it very useful to have a man in Shuster
to help in the opening of the roads through the Lur and Bakhtiari country,
but we must have picked officers, working with definite instructions and objects,
not untried boys on leave wandering about and getting into mischief.
Reform of currency. 19. There are other means by which we could gain the good-will of the
people of Persia, notably by securing for them a respectable currency. ^ If we
could gain the credit of restoring the circulation of silver, and saving the
poorer classes from the suffering caused to them by the “ black money,”
we should undo almost all, perhaps more than all, the harm done to us by the
tobacco troubles. Copper is now at a discount of from 15 to 25 per cent., and
all wages are paid in the depreciated coin; but, as I have explained, such
reforms are difficult to bring about.
Unsatisfactory attitude 20. As to the Persian Government, I feel sure we already enjoy their
menr ian G ° vern ' confidence in so far that they believe we mean them no harm, but they think
we are selfish, and not inclined to do much for them. Their respect I do
not think we enjoy as fully as we ought to do; at least they have peculiar ways
of showing it. I have been much surprised at the peremptory tone in which the
Persian officials have at times permitted themselves to address this Legation,
and at the semi-contemptuous carelessness with which in ^ other cases our
repeated representations have been ignored or evaded. This may have been
due to various causes: to over-centralization and overwork; to Oriental
laziness; to the overweening conceit of the Persians, and their fondness
for showing off; to the belief in our inexhaustible good nature. But whatever
the cause, such behaviour should not be passed over. It is a mistake, from a
practical point of view, to stand any want of respect from Asiatic Governments.
I have therefore selected two instances in which it seemed to me that ue had
not been properly treated by the Persian Government, and have pressed these
somewhat seriously upon their notice. One case, in which the Persian
Government directly refused to abstain from aggression on a disputed fiontier
district, and was generally troublesome, I have already reported at length.
_ In the other instance I found that a number of claims justly advanced by
British merchants and others, and supported by this Legation,^ had. been
allowed to remain for years unsettled, and that some of the Shah s principal
Ministers, including the Minister of Justice and Commerce, and the 1 icsident
of the Council, were personally interested in defeating them. ^ This seemed a
very useful case to take up, and the Sadr-i-Azam declaring himself unable to
overcome the resistance of the influential persons concerned, I hi ought the
matter to the notice of the Shah. The result was that although the Mmistei
of Justice and Commerce tendered his resignation, the Shah, nho can make
himself obeyed when he chooses, insisted upon a proper settlement of each
claim, and they were all cleared off* I hope that these two cases will have a
good effect in Tehran.
My view is that, while treating the Persian Government with ah possible
courtesy, we should not allow them to trifle with us. We should, I think, do
all we can to show our interest in Persia, and our desire for her welfare, but the
Government of this country, which may be said to depend for its very existence
upon our support, should be made to understand that any representation we
may make must be treated seriously. A little wholesome fear, mixed with
confidence in our intentions, will tend to make the relations between the
Persians and ourselves very much more satisfactory than they are at present.
21. As to securing the good-will of the Persian Government, the question
is what we can do for them. This question, unfortunately, is only too easy
to answer. The Shah and the Sadr-i-Azam, who constitute^ the Persian
^ Government, want practically nothing from us but money. The Shah no
* I would take this opportunity of observing that the Shah is by no means a “ Roi faineant. All
important matters go to him for disposal, and papers come down from his Palace with long auto
graph notes on them. These are often wide of the mark, but the fault is not entirely his. Ihe
cases are in no way prepared for him, and he has often to decide on very imperfect information,
s — He regards his officials as mere boys, and attaches little value to their opinions. H. M. D.