'Memorandum by Sir M Durand on the situation in Persia' [‎46r] (25/42)

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At his fall the Shah divided the responsibility between the different Ministers, giving
±^em the power to report directly to the Sovereign. These, together with other influential
personages, formed themselves into a Council to report on all important questions of
public interest. The President, though shown much consideration, retained his rank of
Minister only, and was not called Prime Minister.
About twelve years ago another departure was made in favour of a Prime Minister,
and the Mustaufli-ul-Mamalik was nominated as such. The other Ministers were,
however, held responsible in their various Departments, and retained their separate
privileges.
At the death of the MustaufS, the Ministers again conjointly assisted in the govern
ment, and this system continued to within the last three years, when the Amin-es-Sultan,
then Minister of the Court and now Sadr Azm, or Prime Minister, was promoted to the
vacant post.
Since that date the value of the Council has been discounted, and for all practical
purposes it has ceased to exist.
His Majesty has failed apparently to grasp the meaning of a Council of State. He General note,
regards the assembly, half suspiciously, as something which might possibly interfere with
the Royal prerogative, not as a valuable means for the control of the various Ministries, or
as an agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. for the higher criticism of the Financial Department, a Department which
now has nothing between itself and the Crown except the Sadr Azm.
The Sadr Azm’s motive in absorbing the Council is apparent, as thereby he removes
the only Assembly which could stand between himself and the Throne, or which might
have proved an obstacle to his schemes of centralization.
No. 13 .—Employment and Payment of Public Servants,
Appointments depend on inherited right, family interest, favouritism, seldom on merit Employment,
alone.
Government service is a matter of great consideration in Persia, and the staff of
servants is exceedingly large when compared to the field of labour, so large that numbers
of officials are maintained with pay and without employment.
A considerable sum of money is annually budgeted for on account of its servants, but
fixed pay is a figure of speech, the influence of the individual being the one determining
factor.
In the provinces the payment of the subordinates and of all those borne on the Payment of public
Provincial Lists is a matter which depends very much on the financial prosperity of the servants.
Governor. If his affairs are doing well, and the demands made by the Central Government
have been vyithin reason, the officials may be paid. If, on the contrary, the demands have
been excessive, the salaries will either be withheld, paid in part, or not paid at all.
In the latter case every individual sufferer will set about making good his losses from
the people, who eventually reap the harvest of the misdeeds of their superiors.
(Signed)
Tehran, August 31, 1895.
H. PICOT, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Military Attache.
Paet II .—Proposals for Reform of the Central Administration of Government.
No. 1.
(Confidential.)
The papers on Persian administration, Part I, have entered into the question of Reform in
administration in some detail, and have shown the evils resulting from too great a concen- administration,
tration of power, the effacement of the individual Minister, the weakening of the central
authorities, want of permanency in the administration of the provinces, disorganization
and want of control over the finances, &c.
In this, the second part of my sketch, I propose dealing with the subject of reform
and such other matters, financial or commercial, as may assist the country in re-establishing
its finance and credit.
In drawing up this scheme I have attempted to keep the following points continually Object aimed at in
before me:— scheme of reform.
1. To retain the old forms whilst endeavouring to reconstruct j in other words, to
avoid novelty.
2. To restore the central authority, and to extend its control and direction to every
Department of the public service, whether in the provinces or the capital.
3. To re-establish the responsibility and individuality of the Ministers, as well as of
other chief officers of the State. To extend their powers in the provinces
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