File 364/1913 'Persia: situation in Fars (attack on 39th Central India Horse)' [‎134r] (272/522)

fThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s finypinmont ]
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[December 30. j
SEcngN 1.
[556091
Sir W. Townlev to Sir Edward Grey.-—(Received December 30.)
(No. 263.)
Sir, Tehran, December 18, 1912.
IN continuation of my despatch No. 259 of the 16th instant upon the subject of
the attack on a British shooting party near- Khaneh Zinian on the Shiraz-Bushire road,
which unfortunately resulted in the death of Captain Eckford, I have the honour to
transmit herewith copies of further correspondence.
Late last night I received the note from the Persian Government, of which a
translation is enclosed, together with a summary in English, copy also enclosed, of
a telegraphic conversation which had taken place between the Governor-General of
Ears and the Minister of Foreign Alfairs and of the Interior. It will be seen from
the translation of the note that it contains nothing more than a summary of the
telegraphic conversation which relates to the steps which are to be taken to endeavour
to obtain reparation for the outrage. The proposed measures are very thorough, and
would have every chance of success, but for the fact that the season is most
unfavourable for military movements in the mountains, and for the even more serious
fact that it is extremely doubtful if the loyal co-operation of the parties whose
assistance has been invoked can be relied upon. It is, I think, greatly to Mukhber-es-
Sultaneh’s credit that he should have lost no time in preparing a punitive expedition,
and in urging the Central Government to move the Bakhtiaris to come to his assistance
by operating against the suspected tribe from the side of Behbehan. His Excellency
would appear to me over sanguine in hazarding a belief that he can obtain reparation for
the last outrage, as also for the attack on Mr. Smart nearly a year ago, within one
month. I am very sceptical as to the capability of the Persian authorities to punish
the guilty parties within any period of time, and certainly not under from three to four
months. _ . . ‘ .
Since Mukhber-es-Sultaneh shows such a praiseworthy determination to obtain
reparation, it would appear to me but fair to give him a chance to do so within a
reasonable space of time—say, four months. Should his Excellency succeed, it will be
known that the punitive measures were taken to satisfy British requirements, and oui
honour would be saved, whilst a successful expedition of the sort would establish
Mukhber-es-Sultaneh as a powerful governor, and would go far to re-establish peace and
order in the province. His Majesty’s consul at Shiraz is strongly in favour o givmg
Mukhber-es-Sultaneh a fair chance. In this contention I agree with him, although o
not share his opinion that the recent incident has not changed the situation, or that we
can afford to give the Governor-General time to form a force that it won ta e a year
or so to make competent to assume the duties it is intended that it should perform, i
do not think that the British good name in Southern Persian can atlord to wait lor an
indefinite period for reparation for this fresh outrage. . ^ ^ r j-r
I concur with the view expressed by Sir Percy Cox m his telegram of the
15th December to the Government of India, that the unfortunate murder of Captain
Eckford should not be allowed to obscure our vision of the general question of the
solution of the trade-routes problem. What has occurred, is but one more m ^ m a ong
chain of evidence which proves the incapacity of the Persian aut on les to pro ec le
lives and property of foreigners. Since our trade is more m eres e m e is nc
concerned than that of any other country, so, it would seem to me, i is oui specia u y
not only to seek reparation for the outrage perpetrated on Bntisi so lers, u o secur
the establishment of law and order on the road. -in +
Major O’Connor, in his arguments in favour of according another chance to t (
Persian provincial authorities, calls attention to the fact that u er ’f S U ^ ^ ’
before this unfortunate incident occurred, elaborated a eme OT
military force. He advocates that to ensure the efficiency of such a force one
foreign officer at least would be required, and he lets it be un eis oo ^ i
opinion such an officer should be British. S r ^ ve m rn -^ ^i
a scheme would be that it would entail two semi-military orces a on ’
under Swedish officers, the other under one or more Britis o ceis. ie e
General would naturally favour his own corps, and endeavour to secure or i
[2729 gg-1]
COPY TO
10 JAN 1913