File 523/1912 Pt 1 'Persia: Imperial Bank: mint contract' [‎161r] (317/386)

action of the Persian Government which would destroy our position as a State bank,
and might compel our withdrawal from Persia ; and we would thus solicit the good
offices of the Secretary of State to strengthen the protests of our chief manager against
a policy which would be so injurious to us. There is no advantage in protesting
against a /<u£ accompli, but a timely protest by His Majesty’s Government against an
intended measure will not be without the desired effect.
X have &c
LEPEL GRIFFIN, Chairman.
( 10 .)
Mr. Griffin to Foreign Office.
•
Sir, March 7, IbJJ- -
I have the honour to submit for your consideration, and that of His Majesty’s
Secretary of State, the opinion of the directors of the Imperial Bank of Persia that the
time has come when they may confidently call upon the Government to assist them in
safeguarding and maintaining the undoubted rights, granted to their institution by
the Royal Charter and their concession, which are directly attacked and endangered by
the concession newly given to the so-called National Bank at Tehran by the Shah. A
copy of this concession is doutless already in your hands, but for convenience of refer
ence the document, ratified by the Shah about the 1st February, is hereto attached.
2. Your acquaintance with Persian affairs is so accurate and complete that it is
unnecessary for me to take up your time with more than a brief statement of the
considerations which have induced the board to solicit the early intervention of the
British Government.
It is in the first place evident that the National Bank has but a provisional and
shadowy existence, and it might be held that in protesting against a concession which
could never become effective we were fighting a phantom rather than a reality. It is
true that there is little likelihood of the capital of the National Bank being subscribed
locally by Persians. There is little money in the country, and those who possess it,
too thoroughly distrust their Government to give it in relief of the Shah’s necessities.
But there is great danger of the capital required being supplied, under some
colourable pretext or through nominal Persian subscribers by Germany, which is
notoriously anxious to obtain a locus standi in Persia. Without trade interests,
Germany is endeavouring to found a German bank in Tehran, the clerks to man which
have already arrived, while the director is shortly expected. Nothing is more probable
than that the Persian Government, disgusted by the amicable relations now existing
between England and Russia, which remove the advantages which the rivalry of these
nations had so long procured them, may turn to German}' for financial assistance.
3. Whether the embryonic National Bank ever obtains an independent existence
or not, it is clear that the Shah, yielding to the extravagant demands of the Assembly,
has granted what is opposed to the legal rights of the Imperial Bank of Persia and
what may endanger its very existence unless resisted and cancelled.
The board would specially invite your attention to clause 8 of the concession to ,
the National Bank, providing that when silver is required for the Mint the National j
Bank will have priority of import and sale. The deadly effect of this clause on our
supply of silver to duly pay notes presented has been already brought to the notice of
His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran by our chief manager on the 9th ultimo. It amounts
to a virtual cancelment of our concession. This clause should be also read wit i
clause 4 in which the right of issuing notes is promised to the National Bank when
the Imperial Bank’s concession shall have expired or otherwise terminated. Ihus a
direct incitement to make runs upon our bank is created, which, if ° remains
in force, we shall be unable to meet. No allusion to a future grant of this monopo y
should have been allowed by the Persian Government seeing that our concession has
many years to run. - • p i i u r
4. The directors also desire to point out that the security for the loans botk ot
the British Government and the Imperial Bank will be endangered if, as is proposed
the customs of the Gulf ports be assigned to the National Bank against subscribed
capital; while the dismissal of M. Naus and his deputy M. Pnem leave the collection
and appropriation of this revenue in hands in which we have no confidence.
5. The board of directors would consequently respectfully solicit His Majesty s
Government to make the strongest possible protest against a policy which, m ic mg
Torn o m C