Ext 3974/41 'British propaganda in IRAQ' [‎3r] (5/14)

J. v
FROM SECRETARY, EXTERNAL DEPT,,
INDIA OFFICE The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
QR/iL l^iA^ *T KJ O tJ
*/o feel it car.rot bo too clearly ptatctiTiior 1 too
ofte.r repeated that there is only one difficulty :.t t*<c roct
of all our relations vith the Arab v.arlc: tnis difficulty
i*» wnc absence of dry clear state:.-ent froiv His ] ajesty*s
uovern^ont^of their intentions txjv/^rds *rub nation .lis«* the
future o: Syria and itr.ib co;ifec era tiortf and the still
unresolved problem of Palestine? The fact t’:<st this has
been s*-.L(J ad infinitum must not be t.H.cn to lessen in any
de :rce its pri^,.ry importance and its essential truth;
without such a statement the plans sujfested below c a nnot
be expected to lead to satisfactory results*
♦
^ Palestine v/as the keynote of every Iraqi
broadcast during the crisis,_/
2. The minority religious and tribal problems, such as
Kurd, Yezidis, Assyrian, Christian, Shia and Sunni, etc,,
are not dealt with in this report since their importance
and character are already well known to experts and their ‘
peculiarities are more strictly political than propagandist.
We here set ou^ to study the best means of bringing to our
side a young and growing force, hitherto too much* ne-lected
by British influence, and, we believe it soon to be of
Paramount importance. It is the youn,? nationalist idea in
the Liddle E.-^st . — ■'
OBJECTIVES TO liAKS FOR .
3- The main problem in Irag as in all the Liccls East is
to_.rally the forces of nationalism on our side . Any other
success is secondary, a mere dabbling in backwaters when
our necessity is to regulate the main current of the stream.
Because we have no territorial needs in Arab lands, because
our interests run parallel with and not against the interc&s
of the Arabs, there is no reason why national and pro-
British feeling should not be united. Our aim should be to
try to influence nationalism and make it pro-British To
do so we must gain to our side:-
(a) The Army.
(b) The disbanded officers and men who night be a
serious potential source of trouble.
(c) Education.
(d) The young educated population of the towns.
4. It is possible that we have been presented bv the
present unhappy events with a last chance to achieVe
Satisfactory results in this field* The prestige of the
Iraqi Army and its bitterly hostile leaders will be at a
low ebb; and equally so the prestige of German ally,
who has failed to bring them effective aid. We~repeat
however that very little can be done unless the measures
suggested in paragraph 1 are attended to in the first *
OTHER RIEANS AVAILABLE TO ATTAIN THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES.
V
5. We have in Iraq Various instruments of persuasion
ready to our hand. The chief of these are:-
(a) The Military Mission.
(b) The Oil Companies and their officials
(c) The British Colony in general.
(d) British Officials in the Iraqi Government.
(e) The Teaching Community.
(f) The Embassy.
(g) The British troops in Iraq.
(a) The Military Mission .
It will be difficult, after recent events, for most
members of the Military Mission to continue their work in
full and friendly cooperation with the Iraqi Army. It will,