‘Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia. By Sir John P Hewett, GCSI, KBE’ [‎6r] (16/119)

advances at £30,000. The scheme as prepared by Mr. Garbett did not contain any allotment for
original irrigation works which were arranged for separately (paragraph 15). The total estimate was
therefore £300,000, the whole of which would be recoverable from the landlords and farmers.
The scheme was referred by Sir Stanley Maude to a committee consisting of Sir Percy Cox, Civil
Commissioner, the Deputy Quartermaster-General, the Financial Adviser, the Engineer in Chief, the
Director of Supplies and Transport, the Director of Local Resources, the Superintending Engineer,
Hindiyah Irrigation Works and Mr. Garbett. [Appendix F.] The Committee approved of the scheme
on the 10th August. By adding to the estimate £100,000 for staff, machinery and transport charges,
they raised it to £400,000. They contemplated that repayment in the form of Government revenue
would begin in the following June. The scheme received the administrative approval of the Army
Commander on the 12th August, and final approval was given by the War Office on the 16th September.
Mr. Garbett was appointed Administrator under the Civil Commissioner who was at the outset in executive
charge of the scheme. Subsequently, with the consent of the Civil Commissioner, Mr. Garbett was
directed to report to the Deputy Quartermaster-General, and thenceforward he acted as liaison officer
responsible both to the Civil and Military authorities. Under Mr. Garbett’s supervision the detailed
arrangements of the scheme were entrusted to the political officers and the ordinary machinery of the
civil administration, aided by a very small additional establishment.
9. In its original conception the scheme provided for the production of wheat, barley and bhusa,
and was confined to the areas commanded by the canals on the Euphrates. The estimate of land avail
able was based on inaccurate maps. The administration depended upon Turkish records, and the
Euphrates area was to a great extent unexplored. It was found necessary to include privately owned
lands as well as Government land in the scheme, thus reducing the quantity of revenue grain which would
become due to Government. The final forecast of revenue grain was therefore fixed at 50,000 tons.
Further difficulties ensued. Tribal disturbances suspended the work of canal clearance on two of the
most important canals for over a month, and thereby prevented 100,000 acres from being cultivated.
Compensation for this was found in other areas. Our advance on the Diyalah took place, and the efforts
of the political officers brought back the tribes to the Tigris. The estimate of grain that would be
available for the army was eventually increased by 17,000 tons in Baghdad, and 10,000 tons in Basrah
to a total of 117,000 tons to consist of :—
Wheat .. .. .. .. .. 10,000 tons.
Barley .. .. .. .. .. 107,000 tons.
As already remarked this surplus was calculated with reference to the needs of the civil population,
and it made no provision for demands by either the military or civil authorities on behalf of refugees
not normally resident in the two wilayats.
10. The Chief Political Officer had meanwhile authorized the grant of certain revenue concessions
to the leading Shaikhs (tribal leaders) in the Euphrates area in return for their co-operation, and, in
pursuance of this arrangement, the provision of seed for the areas commanded by the Hillah canals was
guaranteed by the Shaikhs. As a result the amount of seed to be advanced was reduced from 15,000 tons
to 6,000 tons, the remaining 9,000 tons being provided by the tribes themselves from stock which other
wise would have been sold. The greater portion of the seed required, viz., 4,000 tons of barley and
1,700 tons of wheat, were ordered during August and September from India by the Director of Local
Resources. Mr. Garbett has placed on record his opinion that the success of the scheme, so far as it
has been attained, is largely due to the foresight of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) E. Dickson, C.M.G.,
Director of Local Resources, in placing this order, and to his accurate provision of the difficulties of
purchasing seed in Mesopotamia without disturbing severely the economic conditions of the country.
11. The amount to be advanced in the form of seed having been reduced to 6,000 tons and, as it
appeared to be unlikely that the addition of £100,000 made to Mr. Garbett’s original estimate by the
Committee which examined it would be required, the estimate of the cash expenditure involved in the
scheme was reduced to £150,000.
12. The greater portion of the seed was, as already remarked, furnished by the Director of Local
Resources. His calculation of the cost of importing it from India worked out at Rs. 215 (£14^) for a
ton of barley, and Rs. 280 (£18f) for a ton of wheat. It was agreed that the seed thus advanced to the
Administrator of the scheme should be paid for at these rates, or returned in kind. The price at which
the civil authorities would advance it to the cultivators was fixed by them at Rs. 240 (£16) for barley
and Rs. 410 (£27|) for wheat. This was regarded by the Administrator as the lowest figure at which
seed could be sold with any confidence that it would be sown, and not sold again or eaten. The local
rate at the time for wheat was Rs. 610 (£40f) per ton. It was obvious that the new crop ought to be
heavier than the previous one, and that, if this expectation was realized, prices must fall. Had the
seed been advanced on too easy terms it would have been sold, the farmer relying on repaying from what
he could borrow when prices fell.
13. Another direction in which aid was given to the Arab cultivators was by giving them assistance
to repair and bring into use pumping plant in their possession. Cultivation on the banks of the Tigris
depends on lift irrigation. The most important form of lifts are pumps. Owing to war conditions
these had fallen into disrepair, and there were no workshops available to the public. The Revenue
department undertook, with considerable success, to supply the needs of the cultivators in this respect.
Pumping sets owned by Arabs were overhauled, and facilities provided for the repairs of broken parts
and the supply of spares if necessary. The agricultural machinery section of the scheme was eventually
absorbed by the Director of Works. In the section of the Electrical and Mechanical Workshops, 451