‘Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia. By Sir John P Hewett, GCSI, KBE’ [‎8v] (21/119)

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was based seem to be very imperfect, and, while due weight should be attached to Mr. Garbett’s experience
as a revenue officer and his knowledge of the country, all that can safely be asserted is that, in the
circumstances described in paragraphs 5-7, the area on which crops matured in 1917 must have been
limited and far below normal.
The actual amount of wheat and barley seed dealt with in 1918 was 6,495 tons. The balance of
this amount, over and above that purchased from India, was taken locally from revenue grain. Nine
hundred and eighty-seven tons proved bad, and the amount actually advanced was 5,517 tons. Some
of this was no doubt eaten or sold ; but the results shown by the harvest which was reaped seem to prove
that the greater portion of the full estimate of 30,000 tons (paragraph 8) must actually have been sown..
In two respects the scheme did not come up to expectations. In the first place some of the imported
Indian wheat did not give the return expected. This was due in part to the Indian seed selected not
being of the kind best suited to Mesopotamia, where the climatic conditions favour the wheats grown
in the Punjab. In the second place the area irrigated by the two canals taking off from the Hindiyah
barrage (the Georgiyah and the Beni Hasan) was far less than was expected. When full measurements
were received the area irrigated by the Beni Hasan canal was found to be 20,650 acres and that by the
Georgiyah 14,000 acres—a serious shortage compared with the estimate of 100,000 acres. It seems that
this result was to a considerable extent due to the ground now brought for the first time under regular
cultivation being in many places full of deep fissures, so that a very large volume of water ran down
the cracks and disappeared, a phenomenon which should not be repeated once the whole of the area
has been ploughed over. The figures furnished by the Irrigation Department show that the area culti
vated for the spring harvest of 1918 in the Baghdad wilayat, including the district of Kut, amounted
to 393,000 acres on the Euphrates and 140,000 acres on the Tigris, or 533,000 acres in all. Those for
the Euphrates area are said to have been arrived at by measurement, those on the Tigris were estimated.
Moreover the figures take account of flow irrigation only and do not include land irrigated by lift, of
which there is a considerable area on the Tigris, nor rain matured crop. It would be a mistake to place
too much reliance on their accuracy but, such as they are, they would, if additions are made for areas
which they do not cover, justify an estimate of the area under crop of from 550,000 to 600,000 acres.
This figure may be tested by another method. On the smaller area of 550,000 acres the crop calculated
on Mr. Garbett’s expectation of outturn, would amount to 256,000 tons. The revenue demand in kind
for the spring crop of 1918, amounts to 47,742 tons, a close approximation to the estimate of 50,000 tons
of revenue grain to be obtained from the scheme. Government revenue is assessed at l/5th of the
produce. Various considerations point to the conclusion that this assessment has not been fully recovered.
Owing to the shortage of staff it was not possible as intended to assess the revenue according to measure
ments made by the Irrigation Department. This led to delay, and, combined with an apparent unwilling
ness for political reasons to enforce the demand too strictly, especially in districts such as the Samawah
division where the Turk had in the past little or no control, tended to keep the demand low. It has been
suggested that, if the revenue demand be multiplied five-fold and the result increased by 25 per eent-
on account of low assessments, a fairly accurate estimate of the gross crop will be obtained. A revenue
demand of 48,000 tons would at this calculation give a gross crop of 300,000 tons. It may be assumed
with some degree of confidence that the gross spring crop for 1918 in the area covered by the agricultural
development scheme amounted to some figure between 260,000 and 300,000 tons.
It is not easy to estimate the proportion of this crop which is directly due to the agricultural develop
ment scheme combined with the operations of the Irrigation Department. It would be reasonable
to assume that, if the clearing of the canals had not been systematically taken in hand, and advances for
this and other purposes had not been made from army funds, there would still have been some extension
in cultivation. But it seems undeniable that the area under crop has been very materially increased
by bhe various methods in which the farmer has been assisted. The distribution of seed has been the
chief factor in the Tigris area. There 3,926 tons of seed and Rs. 70,175 (£4,678) cash were distributed.
A large proportion of the crops matured in this area can undoubtedly be claimed as due to the scheme.
But advances of seed and cash had a considerable effect also in the Euphrates area. Large advances of
seed were made in hallujah and Ramadi, in which two districts Rs. 1,04,000 (£6,933) were distributed
in cash. In Hindiyah much of the seed required for the area brought under cultivation by the Beni
Hasan and Georgiyah canals was advanced ; and such was the eagerness displayed to sow every atom of
seed available, that sufficient was not retained for the support of the people. Cash advances aggregating
Rs. 89,000 (£5,933) had to be made to keep the cultivators and their cattle alive until the harvest matured.
In Shamiyah also, where rice, the main staple of the district, largely failed, cash advances of Rs. 88,000
(£5,866) were made. On the other hand, in the rich Euphrates area commanded by the Hillah canal
and its numerous distributaries it was the extension of irrigation which was mainly responsible for the good
results achieved. Mr. Garbett attributed two-thirds of the crops on this large area (228,000 acres) to
the activities of the Irrigation Department. He considered 55 per cent, of the total area matured through
out the wilayat of Baghdad and Kut to be due to the steps taken to give advances and to increase the
suppiy of water for irrigation. It would then probably not be going beyond the mark to estimate that
at least 125,000 tons of the spring crop resulted from these two measures.
18. It is interesting to estimate the cost of the importation of this amount of grain, basing the
calculation on one-fifth being wheat and four-fifths barley, this being the proportion between wheat and
barley paid in as revenue grain. The average of f.o.b. prices at Karachi for wheat and barley from July
to October, 1918,A\orks out at Rs. 161-7-1 (£10|) and Rs. 131-9-4 (£8§) per ton respectively. The
Financial Adviser, basing his estimate on commercial rates and the actual costs of a voyage, considers
that sea freight may be taken at Rs. 40 (£2§) per ton. He also advises that the cost of river freight to
aghdad may be taken to be Rs. 40 (£2f) per ton, this rate being based on figures supplied by Messrs.