‘Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia. By Sir John P Hewett, GCSI, KBE’ [‎12r] (28/119)

28. From figures supplied by the Director of Local Resources it has been ascertained that 56,472
tons of wheat and barley have so far become available for the army in the form of either revenue grain,
purchase demand (i.e., barley requisitioned from the farmers at the fixed price of Rs. 100 (£6§) a ton),
or purchases in the open market. Three classes of transactions are shown. The amounts received under
each class were the following :—
—
Wheat.
Barley.
Tons.
Tons.
Tons.
(1) Revenue
36,660
7,122
29,538
(2) Purchase demand
5,648
—
5,648
(3) Purchases in the open market
14,164
2,008
12,156
56,472
9,130
47,342
For revenue grain the cost to the Army is calculated at Rs. 168 (£lli) per ton for wheat and Rs. 107
(£7yk) per ton for barley (paragraph 22). In the case of purchase demand the charge of Rs. 100 (£6§)
per ton, is the rate fixed by proclamation for barley in certain districts in the Euphrates area. For the
open market purchases the average prices paid have been Rs. 228 (£15^) per ton in the case of wheat and
Rs. 88 (£5yf-) per ton in the case of barley.
On the above data it appears that the charge to the army for 9,130 tons of wheat will be Rs. 16,54,320
(£110,288), and for 47,342 tons of barley Rs. 47,95,104 (£319,673) or a total sum of Rs. 64,49,424 (£429,961).
For the same quantity of grain imported from India the Army would have had to pay Rs. 1,36,85,154
(£912,677) at the rates for wheat and barley (Rs. 270 (£18) and Rs. 237 (£15|-) per ton respectively)
prevailing-during the period when import would have had to be effected. If the total of Rs. 50,92,000
(£339,466) mentioned in paragraph 27 is added to the amount paid for grain, there will still be a direct
gain to the Army of Rs. 21,43,730 (£142,915) on the local purchase of grain. To this must be added the
saving on the local purchase of bhusa.
The collection of bhusa for the use of the Army from the 1918 harvest fell far short of the estimate
of 150,000 tons. There were two principal reasons why it proved impossible to collect and bale anything
like the amount of bhusa hoped for. The Director of Local Resources had not at his disposal sufficient
transport to collect more than a small portion of the bhusa available on the ground. Before it is baled,
this bulky product needs a great deal of transport to move it. Many of the camels promised to the
Directorate had to be employed in Persia. Moreover, the machinery for baling bhusa received and
erected was only sufficient to bale 350 tons a week. Some of the presses were placed on peripatetic
barges ; others were erected at various centres. We have seen them working at Hillah, Amarah, Kut and
Jerboiyah. Further difficulty arose, especially in the Hillah Division, from the shortage of labour avail
able to clean and stack the unbaled bhusa due to the activities of the Irrigation Directorate. Eight
thousand seven hundred tons of bhusa have been purchased at an average cost of Rs. 10£ (14s.) or, after
adding handling and baling charges, of Rs. 30 (£2) per ton. A supply of some 10,000 tons more is said to
have been collected in the villages where steps have been taken to protect it against the weather by
covering it with tarpaulins until it can be baled. We have ourselves seen places in which it is at present
stored in this manner. The cost of procuring this supply is, owing to charges for protecting it and
damage done by rain, expected to be about Rs. 50 (£3£) a ton. The cost of importing and landing at
Baghdad a ton of bhusa, during the period in which supplies have been purchased locally, is estimated
by the Controller of War Accounts to be Rs. 170 (£11^) per ton. If credit for the difference in cost is
taken on 8,700 tons already made over to the Army, and on an estimate of half as much again to be
handled and baled before the next harvest, there would be a saving to the Army on local purchase of bhusa
of Rs. 18,18,000 (£121,200).
The criticism might be made that the Army has only received 56,472 tons of grain against an antici
pated amount of 117,000, and it will be well to meet it in anticipation. The amount of the revenue demand
which the Army was to receive was 50,000 tons. But the actual revenue demand is now stated to be
47,742 tons (some reasons for its being less than was estimated have been given in paragraph 17). Up
to the close of December, 1918 about 45,000 tons of this amount had been collected, and the Army had
received 13,340 tons less than was anticipated. The balance not handed over to the Army was retained
for the use of the civil population in Karbala, Najaf, and other districts.
The Directorate of Local Resources has for some time ceased to purchase wheat in the Basrah and
Baghdad wilayats, for the reason that it is usually so much mixed with barley that it will not pass the
standard prescribed by the medical authorities. Good wheat is obtainable from the Karun, and it will
also be obtainable when harvested at Mosul, Erbil and Altun Kupri, where it is of much purer quality
than in the Baghdad and Basrah wilayats.
The amount of barley purchased by the Directorate of Local Resources fell far short of what had been
anticipated. There is no doubt whatever that the farmers held up their grain in the hope that the Army
would have to purchase at a high price. The wonderful prospects of the crop now on the ground have
defeated their anticipation, and they have now to face the prospect of selling to the army at a much
reduced rate. How wise the Department of Local Resources has been in deferring further purchases of
barley for the present may be gathered from the following two instances. When I was at Kadhimain
r (Kazimain), a town 7 miles from Baghdad, on the 27th January, the Assistant Political Officer told me