‘Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia. By Sir John P Hewett, GCSI, KBE’ [‎20r] (44/119)

of Agriculture were required to send their indents for agricultural machinery, were dissolved on the 1st
January, 1919, and outstanding indents are being dealt with by the Quartermaster-General’s Department
at Army Headquarters.
A telegram which was sent to India on the 14th January last, to ascertain whether in placing orders
for pumps Mr. Henderson fixed any maximum price and date for delivery, and if so, what prices and dates
were fixed, and whether masonry testing foundations for pumps had been erected at Bombay on premises
of firms supplying pumps and how the cost of these foundations was to be adjusted elicited the following
reply
“ Orders were not placed for pump sets as units. No firm in Calcutta, Madras or Bombay
approached by me was willing to carry out the Mesopotamia specification. Messrs. Greaves
Cotton, and Messrs. Duncan Stratton and Agricultural Engineer Bombay agreed to collect
pumps and engines from the districts, and along with pumps and engines collected as an urgent
war measure by various Government agencies to assemble into sets according to Mesopotamia
specification. Prices of all engines and pumps were individually agreed to by me and Deputy
Controller Machinery. Engines came from all parts of India and Burma, so no dates could be
fixed as owing to congestion of Railway impossible state date of delivery. Masonry foundations
were erected beside tanks at Jumna Mills and Apollo Mills, Bombay, and at Agricultural College,
Poona. At these places engines and pumps were first overhauled, special suction and delivery
piping cast, and worked till test passed, so one uniform charge debited to all sets for testing
includes proportion for masonry beds.”
The latest fortnightly progress report from Mr. Henderson (dated the 1st February) contains the
information that 50 sets have been cancelled.
The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has suggested to the Chief of the General Staff in India
[Telegram Q/413, dated 2nd January, 1919] that India should bear the loss, as no authority was ever
given on his behalf to exceed the average price of Rs. 12,000 (£800) per set. The record of this trans
action shows that the original estimate of the cost of pumping sets has been largely departed from. It
is clear that, when it was found that pumping sets could not be obtained for Rs. 12,000 (£800) and
would cost on an average (judging from the cost of the sets received by the 31st December, 1918) over
50 per cent, more (including freight and charges for erection), the Board of Agriculture should have
been at once informed in order that they might have the opportunity of modifying their programme so
as to avoid the extra expenditure. There is, so far as the facts connected With this transaction have
transpired, no ground for debiting either Army funds or civil revenues in Mesopotamia with the loss
resulting from it, and I am emphatically of opinion that no portion of it should be met from Imperial
Army funds.
42. Mr. Ward estimated that 2,000 Sind ploughs would be required, at a cost of Rs. 30,000 (£2,000)
The estimate was reduced to 600, which have been imported, and proved highly successful. They are
being used mainly on the farms, but some have been sold to Arabs who are anxious to purchase them.
No priced invoice has been received from India, but it is not thought that their price landed will
exceed £1 a piece.
43. The estimated expenditure then on the production of wheat and barley for the harvest of 1919
compares thus with the estimate sanctioned by the War Office.
Estimate.
Expenditure.
Irrigation (including Rs. 10,00,000 (£66,667) for
Rs.
£
Rs.
£
roads and buildings)
Advances—
140,85,000
(939,000)
102,19,000
(681,267)
(1) Cash
40,00,000
(266,667) •
6,00,000
f40,000)
(2) Seed
34,50,000
(230,000)
13,50,000
(90.000)
(3) Cattle
6,00,000
(40,000)
1,92,600
(12,840)
(4) Pumping sets ...
24,00,000
(160,000)
36,20,000
(241,333)
(5) Ploughs
30,000
(2,000)
9,000
(600)
*
2,45,65,000
(1,637,667)
1,59,90,600
(1,066,040)
44. By the time that work began on the irrigation projects for the 1919 harvest labour had, owing
to the needs of the Army, become very scarce and very dear. Mr. Ward had recommended that ail
the works should be completed by the 30th September, 1918. This was found to be impossible. Military
labour was employed at a cost much higher than that of civil labour in normal times. This factor is
of considerable importance in the assessment of the charges which should be made against the civil
administration for these works. The acting Civil Commissioner has urged that he was opposed to the
full programme originally contemplated on account of the shortness of the labour supply, and at his
suggestion it was, he informed us, reduced by some 50 per cent. He also contended that the haste
in carrying out the works, plans not having been subject to the usual close scrutiny by higher authority,
has prevented them from reaching the standard that might have been attained in normal conditions.