File 1855/1904 Pt 7 'Koweit Flag.' [‎222r] (107/154)

that is required is that we should arrive at an understanding with the Persian
Government as to the status of subjects of the Sheikh within the dominions of
cu a point as to which we hold that our relations with the
^ • i 118 direct demand for our protection no longer permit the attitude
of the British Government to^ remain undefined. So far, it will he observed
from the correspondence of which we have the honour to enclose copies, the
local officials of the Persian Customs Department have declined to admit the
right of our representatives to intervene on behalf of Koweit subjects. We
suggest that His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran should now be authorised to
explain to the Persian Government that we claim recognition of Koweitans as
British protected persons. Should the Shah’s Ministers question our pretension,
they might be informed ^ of the terms of our agreement concluded with the
Sheikh in 1899, and it might be pointed out that our right to intervene, by
virtue of similar treaties, on behalf of subjects of the Trucial Chiefs, has already
been recognised and acted upon. At the least, it might he required that
Koweitans should he entitled to the same privileges as Afghan subjects in
Persia, on whose behalf it has been arranged that “ the friendly recommend
ations and wishes of the British Government should be accepted”.
6 . As regards the specific incidents which have made it necessary to raise
the general question, we consider that in cases (a) and (6), in the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the Customs Department, there is good ground for
a claim to compensation. In respect of (<?), we think that the Sheikh is clearly
entitled to an apology; while as regards (d), without entering into the question
of the doubtful claim of the Persian Government to exercise a right of search
on the waters of the Shat-el-Arab—against this we understand that the Porte
have already entered a protest at Tehran—we hold that, in the particular
instance, their action was entirely unjustified, inasmuch as the vessel in question
was bound not for a Persian, but for a Turkish port, while the confiscated arms
may reasonably be taken to have been required for purposes of self-protection.
The insecurity of the Shat-el-Arab is notorious; wo have recently had occasion
to urge that representations should be made to the Persian Government regard
ing a grave outrage on a British vessel in the estuary; and we understand that
the Persian Government have themselves lately admitted the propriety of
native craft carrying arms in these waters. In this case also, therefore, we
would press for pecuniary amends. The Persian Government may rest assured
of our anxiety to check the traffic in arms, but, even assuming that their
proceedings were directed solely to the repression of illicit trade, and were in no
way inspired by a desire to harass a protege of the British Government, we are
unable to countenance high-handed action, such as that of the Persian Customs
officials in the present instance. We have purposely abstained from mention
of the further case in which a vessel sailing from Koweit was admittedly
found to have concealed on board 28 rifles, in respect of which suspicions may
reasonably exist that they were contraband, whether intended for a Turkish or
Persian destination.
7. It will be observed that, in connection with this subject, Major Cox
has raised the question of the flag flown by Koweit vessels. The matter was
considered in 1901, and it was then decided that, in view of the objections
which the Sublime Porte might raise to any change as involving a disturbance
of the status quo, it was preferable to abstain from advising the adoption of
another flag. We agree with the Besident, however, that there would be a
distinct advantage if Koweit ships hoisted a distinctive ensign, and, with
the approval of His Majesty’s Government, we would propose to approach
the Sheikh on the subject. Should the Sheikh agree to the proposal, and should
the Porte hereafter raise objections, we would point out that we have an
agreement with the Chief whereby we are entitled to search Koweit craft for
contraband arms, and that being desirous of avoiding any risk of detaining a
Turkish ship by mistake for a Koweit vessel—a very possible contingency if
both fly the same flag—we had recommended the Sheikh to adopt distinctive
colours for shipping purposes, while retaining his present flag for use in
Koweit.