'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎6v] (12/248)

10
PAET I.—PREFACE.
B. Physical and Climatic Peculiarities of Mesopotamia.
and well supplied with river transport, it was manifest from the outset that without these
facilities the orderly despatch and distribution of the reinforcements, ammunition, stores
and supplies necessary for the well-being and replenishment of an advancing force, would
be almost impossible. The treacherous climate, and the alternation of sweltering heat and
bitter cold in these regions made the continuous supply of such articles as warm clothing,
double-fly tents, sun-helmets, spine-pads, goggles, ice, ventila ting-fans, mosquito-nets, quinine
and other tropical prophylactics indispensable, if the health and moral of the troops were
to be maintained at their accustomed high standard. Full rations, varied from time to
time to counteract the climatic diseases of the country, were very requisite. Sickness,
even with a full supply of such palliatives, was certain to be high, necessitating abnormal
hospital accommodation in addition to the ordinary provision for military casualties.
Hence it is clear that all the conditions of the campaign indicated the necessity for very
ample transport.
22 . By the expression “ transport ” we mean, not only the provision of the necessary
river steamers—in itself no easy task—but the conversion of Basra into such a port as
would make it an adequate base of operations for a large inland expedition. The latter
task required an experience and knowledge not possessed by the ordinary soldier and marine
officer in the employ of the Indian Government. It necessitated the engagement of those
who had a knowledge of the organisation of a port and were accustomed to the handling of
large masses of traffic. But the mere engagement of such officials would not be enough
in itself, unless they were authorised to incur heavy expenditure, ahd had at their disposal
the necessary personnel and materiel. Such work, moreover, requires foresight and
time for its effective fruition. Hasty improvisation on a large scale was not possible,
and this criticism equally applies to the provision of river craft.
C. Condition of Indian Army on Outbreak of War.
23. For some years previous to the war a strong economy campaign had been carried
on in India by the Indian and Home Governments, especially in connection with military
expenditure. * The gradual extinction of the opium revenue, amounting to three millions
sterling, and the friendly understandings arrived at with Russia, were both treated as
reasons for a reduction of military establishments in India. On September 9th, 1909,
Lord Kitchener was succeeded by Sir O’Moore Creagh as Commander-in-Chief. During his
regime a strong and continuous pressure in the direction of economy was exercised,
with the support of the Viceroy, over the detailed demands of the Military Budget. Reduc
tions were made on the assumption that the Indian Army need not contemplate the
likelihood of a collision outside India with the army of a European power, and the provision
for the equipment, organisation and transport of the Indian Army was regulated by the
requirements of frontier warfare alone. The proportion of field guns per division was
cut down to a very low point, and of guns of a large calibre there were practically none,
as no increase to existing expenditure was to be sanctioned, while the number of divisions
available for immediate mobilisation was reduced from nine to seven. There was a
considerable exchange of opinions between the Home and Indian Governments upon these
reductions, and the last of a series of despatches relating to the help which, in view of the
economies effected, India would henceforward be able to afford the Empire in war
time, was only written by the Government of India on July 30th, one day before the out
break of war. An aircraft establishment had been started a few months before, but its
scope was very limited.
24. The Indian Army was therefore relatively, as regards mechanical equipment,
guns, etc., in a less favourable position to confront European troops than it was at the time
of the South African War ; but in no branch of military expenditure was the pressure so
much felt as in connection with the medical establishments. According to high medical
authorities the whole standard of medical establishments, of hospital equipment, and of
field ambulances in India has been for years past much below that in vogue in the British
Army. In consequence of the financial pressure alluded to, little or nothing was done to
raise" this standard, whilst reserves, both of personnel and materiel, had been reduced to
a very low ebb when the war broke out.
25. The Indian Army was thus suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to participate
largely in an external warfare for which no preparation had been made, as the contingency